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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation investigates mathematics as a multivalent metaphor in twentieth-century 
fiction and theory and as a powerful cultural force integral to the development of competing 
modernist paradigms.  Though it appears that writers such as Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, and 
Wyndham Lewis deploy mathematical metaphors to reinforce the qualities of abstraction, 
objectivity, and detachment typically associated with modernist writing, I argue instead that 
mathematics offers early-twentieth-century writers a new lexicon for describing and explaining 
subjective experience.  Particularly for a diverse range of modern women writers, including, for 
example, Edna Ferber, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, H.D., Mina Loy, and Gertrude Stein, 
mathematics enables an alternative mode of self-expression through which to communicate 
their political, professional, and sexual desires.  I trace the emergence of mathematics as a 
means to construct new models of gender and racial identity as well as to channel emotional 
expression into a more culturally authoritative form.  Thus, rather than a context-free, gender-
neutral domain, mathematics plays an integral role in cultural formations of identity and 
difference within an emerging technoscientific society. As a whole, my project approaches 
scientific developments not as mere context to the rise of literary modernism; instead, I show 
how modernist modes of writing arise in conjunction with and in some cases in dialogue with 
developments in applied and theoretical mathematics.  Bringing together these seemingly 
distinct fields of knowledge sheds new light on the interrelationship of science and subjectivity 
as it unfolds within literary modernism.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
She insisted that Fanny crack her own mathematical nuts. She said it was good mental training, 
not to speak of the moral side of it. 
—Edna Ferber, Fanny Herself (1917) 
 
She remembered with mortification that her own chest and her own waist and her own hips had 
almost exactly the same circumference.  
—Katherine Newman, The Hard-Boiled Virgin (1926) 
 
She would be so embodied in long parallelograms and in square and cube and rectangle. She 
wanted those things. 
—H.D., Nights (1935)  
 
Numbers have such a pretty name. It can bring tears of pleasure to ones eyes when you think of 
any number… 
—Gertrude Stein, The Geographical History of America (1936) 
 
 
 
For a discipline that has long held its status as the purveyor of objectivity, mathematics 
emerges with remarkable frequency in late nineteenth- and early-twentieth century 
American literature as a means to describe and interpret subjective experience.  The 
application of mathematics to social and human phenomena, particularly in its turn-of-
the-century instantiations, is almost always interpreted, however, as dehumanizing and 
reductive; to “number” someone is to strip them of their unique identity.  We need look 
no further than Elmer Rice’s hollowed out protagonist Mr. Zero in his 1920 play The 
Adding Machine to find evidence of “the weight of vast numbers and monolithic 
impersonal institutions” that traditionally have been understood to afflict many a 
modernist hero and further disempower the modernist heroine.1  And yet, in equally 
many (if not more) instances, including the above examples, mathematical modes of 
description and analysis play an integral role in the construction of modern selfhood 
rather than its subjection to nightmare visions of disempowerment, regimentation, and 
depersonalization.  For modern heroines in particular, mathematical rhetoric enables 
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new ways of conceptualizing embodiment, emotion, sexuality, morality, and self-
expression, offering a new affective register that both defines them as individuals while 
also alluding to some kind of generalizable, collective female experience.2  While 
scholars have focused primarily on the use of mathematical imagery in the work of 
numerous male authors, particularly modernist writers such as Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, 
and Wyndham Lewis, I reveal a concurrent tradition of women’s engagement with 
various aspects of mathematics, stretching from the late nineteenth through the mid-
twentieth centuries.  I investigate the complex ways in which a number of American 
women writers such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Edna Ferber, Frances Newman, 
H.D., Mina Loy, and Gertrude Stein rely on mathematical rhetoric as a means both to 
critique patriarchal literary and cultural traditions and to imagine alternatives to, and in 
some cases reinforce, existing notions of gender and ethnic identity.  Rather than a 
context-free, gender-neutral domain, mathematics—in a variety of forms and 
applications—plays a crucial role in cultural formations of identity and difference within 
an emerging technoscientific society.3   
 
The Mathematics of Modernism, Revisited 
 
The tendency to perceive mathematics as operating above or outside of culture has 
contributed to the scholarly consensus that modernist representations of mathematics 
are merely an abstract aesthetic exercise, one tool among others in a broader agenda of 
formal innovation.  Conceived of as an aftereffect or symbol of modernist 
experimentation, critics tend to approach these mathematical references as reflexively 
bound up with qualities of abstraction, objectivity, and detachment, creating a feedback 
loop between traditional notions of mathematical practice and modernist poetics.  A 
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much more compelling and complex picture of this “mathematical turn” emerges, 
however, if we approach the modern American writer’s penchant for mathematics from 
a socio-cultural perspective, taking into consideration not only the internal, historical 
developments within mathematics and its increasing application within other scientific 
and social enterprises, but also the affective, material, and experiential dimensions of 
mathematical thought and praxis.  The abstract mathematics of modernism turns out to 
have particular historical, cultural, and material referents.  These referents indicate both 
an emerging model of subjectivity expressed through quantitative rather than 
qualitative terms as well as a new and important way in which modernism’s self-
referential focus on form simultaneously engages political and social experience.4  This 
is not to enter the longstanding debates—incisively glossed by scholars such as 
Marianne DeKoven and Astradur Eysteinsson—about whether modernist formal 
innovation in and of itself is politically progressive or reactionary, since to do so would 
be to once again stabilize and codify modernist writing and thus disregard decades of 
criticism aimed at revealing its contradictory, multivocal, and varied forms.5  Instead, 
this dissertation emphasizes the ongoing interactivity between formal techniques and 
socio-political positioning.  More specifically, I consider both how certain narrative and 
rhetorical strategies, particularly those conversant with mathematical concepts and 
terms, encode a gendered and racialized political discourse, as well as how the political 
and social cachet of mathematical information offered late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century writers a new mode of agency.  
I do not intend, then, to approach the literary texts in this dissertation simply as 
a catalogue of responses to the social applications of mathematics within early 
twentieth-century American culture, or, more generally, to suggest this “mathematical 
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turn” as simply a response to modernity.  The writers on whom I focus certainly reveal 
literature and poetry’s capacity to interpret the cultural dimensions of science, but they 
also find in mathematics a new language for negotiating modern literature’s internal 
crisis of representation—a crisis, as Pericles Lewis writes in The Cambridge Introduction 
to Modernism, “in what could be represented and a crisis of how it should be represented” 
(2).  For the writers considered in this dissertation, I suggest that their deferral to 
mathematical symbolism indicates the simultaneous desire to transcend the limitations 
of linguistic forms of representation and at the same time fortify literature’s 
representational and cultural authority.  I argue further that these mathematical 
references are crucial to our understanding of some of modernist writing’s most 
contradictory impulses: the tensions between object and subject, wholeness and 
fragmentation, emotion and reason, individual expression and collective action, elitism 
and populism, and tradition and “making it new” that foreground the modernist crisis of 
representation.  Rather than offer a resolution of these tensions, I show how they are 
constitutive of a particular modernist poetics and how mathematical expression 
complicates easy distinctions between the different halves of these dialectical 
oppositions.  To this end, I investigate both what this preoccupation with mathematics 
reveals about the internal dynamics of modernist writing as well as how the literary, 
theoretical, and historical texts under consideration here enable a critical reexamination 
of our modernist metanarratives, or the history of our own critical approaches to this 
literary historical period.  As I discuss at greater length in Chapter 4, our conceptions of 
mathematics play an integral role both in the modernist literary imaginary as well as in 
the development of a number of twentieth-century theoretical frameworks.  
 5 
Before examining the historical, cultural, and material dimensions of 
mathematics to which these modern women writers refer, I first consider existing 
critical perspectives on modernist scientism and how certain entrenched notions of 
mathematics limit our understanding of both its capacity to signify—to say something 
about external reality—and the role women writers play in realizing its signifying 
potential.  Indeed, critics tend to interpret the appropriation of scientific and 
mathematical metaphors by modernist writers in one of two ways: either as a resistance 
to previous movements such as sentimentalism and aestheticism or as a reaction to 
emerging demands within literary studies for disciplinary demarcation and pressures to 
professionalize in ways that mirror the sciences.  Both explanations also tend to be 
situated within a masculinist framework, wherein writers either eschew effeminacy 
through their rejection of previous literary modes or reestablish masculine mastery by 
modeling their writing on science.  Scientific and mathematical references thus appear 
to reinforce images of masculine authority and expertise and to signal the disavowal of 
the feminine, further anchoring traditional and exclusionary versions of modernism.  
Susan Squier points to Andreas Huyssen’s now well-known After the Great Divide: 
Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (1986) as “one of the first to suggest that the 
modernist commitment to scientificity may originate in a masculine reaction-formation 
against feminized mass culture,” a correlation Squier believes rests on the “hitherto 
unexamined relations among modernism and science, which has itself been understood 
as an equally, and unproblematically, masculine territory” (301).  But even within more 
recent examinations of modernism and science, and even within those that include the 
work of women writers, this modernism/masculinity/mathematics nexus resurfaces in 
one form or another.  
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Miranda Hickman, for example, focuses on the geometric preoccupations of 
Vorticism, a British artistic movement spearheaded by Wyndham Lewis and Ezra 
Pound, whose influence on Anglo-American modernism, Hickman argues, extends 
beyond its short-lived run between 1913-1915.  Quoting from Lewis, Hickman connects 
Vorticist “geometrics” to a larger artistic effort to resist “feminine” modes of writing:  
[G]eometric figures come to be coded within the project of Vorticism’s 
formation so as to serve an early twentieth-century project of combating 
effeminacy…. Within the Vorticist context, the geometrics come to stand for the 
‘sternness and severity,’ the ‘mastered, vivid vitality’ that will counteract 
effeminacy and serve the project of disavowal. (87-8) 
Vorticism’s “geometric gestures,” she adds, emerge in the later modernist work of 
Pound, H.D., and Yeats to promote “other kinds of precision, discipline, vigilance, 
aggression, and force” (88).  For Ann Ardis, these qualities of mastery, precision, and 
discipline—“the signature rhetoric about the scientific precision of poetic 
observation”—are reflections of the external “pressures of ‘scientific’ professionalism” 
that are “driving the consolidation of modern disciplinary boundaries at the end of the 
nineteenth century” (174).  While acknowledging women writers’ participation in the 
cultivation of professional expertise, Ardis also upholds the link between scientific 
rhetoric and a territorial male modernism: “literary modernists sought to (re)establish 
the cultural authority of literature on firmer grounds in the 1910s . . . by privileging 
poetry, appropriating the discursive authority of science, and thereby reconstituting the 
literary field as a ‘masculine’ domain (17).  Both Hickman and Ardis’s perspectives point 
to the cultural perception of science’s certitude and authority as a cure-all or cover-up 
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for male writers’ anxieties about their professional status and authorial personas as 
thoroughly credentialed, “expert” writers.   
 These readings of modernist scientism are particularly persuasive given the 
wealth of self-diagnostic, non-fiction essays produced by writers such as Pound, Eliot, 
Lewis, and Yeats that define and promulgate their versions of modernism.  Indeed, it 
has proven difficult, as Deborah Jacob observes, to “rechart or rethink the definition of 
modernism in terms other than those modernism narrated/laid out for itself” (277).  
From Lewis’s manifestos in Blast, for example, critics find some of the most explicit 
rejections of sentimentality, or “pretty language” as Lewis refers to it: “We stand for the 
Reality of the Present—not for the sentimental future” (“Manifesto I” 7).  Such 
statements are accompanied by celebrations of the purifying, hygienic language of 
geometry, the “clean arched shapes and angular plots” that can correct “the grotesque 
anachronisms of our physique” (25).  Similarly in A Vision (1925), Yeats illustrates the 
fragmentation of the self through quantitative charts and geometric diagrams that 
divide, rank, and number the various facets of human personality:   
                    
        The Great Wheel, A Vision, 81             The Four Faculties, A Vision, 77 
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Geometric diagramming and figuration become not simply reflective but constitutive of 
modernist notions of identity; the internal complexities and the physical and 
psychological divisions of the self are to writers such as Yeats best described through a 
spatial distribution rather than a linguistic construction.  These pseudo-scientific 
diagrams also reinforce visually cultural perceptions of science’s diagnostic authority 
and its ability to measure the human subject objectively.   
Pound and Eliot’s essays also call on mathematics, and science more generally, 
as models of emotional restraint and impersonality—qualities that scholars have come 
to see as the hallmarks of their literary criticism.  Stressing emotion as an after-effect of 
precise intellectual methods, Pound writes, “Poetry is a sort of inspired mathematics, 
which gives us equations, not for abstract figures, triangles, spheres, and the like, but 
equations for the human emotions” (SR 14).  Eliot urges a similar kind of critical 
distance between writers and their material such that their work might avoid personal 
inflections: “The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction 
of personality.…It is in this depersonalization that art may be said to approach the 
condition of science” (TIT 7).  In drawing these analogies between science and art, 
Pound and Eliot appear to project an image of the modernist writer as objective, 
detached, authoritative, methodical, and professional—an image that is slow to recede in 
our narratives of modernism.  Pound repeatedly states that the artist and the scientist 
follow a similar methodology: “The difference between art and analytic geometry is the 
difference of subject-matter only” (GB 91).  Or, as he recapitulates in another essay: 
“The difference between science and art is not a difference of method, but of subject 
matter. Art is the scientific spirit applied to soul, observing, collating, noting (SA 166). 
More than a description of his own or others’ writing, Pound prescribes a recursive, 
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formalized writing technique.  Eliot likewise argues that the scientist and the poet are 
both beholden to traditions and principles and occupy the same professional latitude: “A 
poet, like a scientist, is contributing toward the organic development of a culture: it is 
just as absurd for him not to know the work of his predecessors or of men writing in 
other languages as it would for a biologist to be ignorant of Mendel or De Vries” (CON 
84).  For these male writers, the rhetoric of science and mathematics serves more as a 
means of authorial self-fashioning than as a description of the characteristics or subjects 
of their own fiction and poetry.  And yet, critics tend to allow these self-described 
qualities to stand in for the whole of the author’s work, often overlooking the 
distinctions between their fictional and non-fictional modes of writing and the 
contradictions within their non-fictional essays.6 
 While I do not want to deny that these male writers were drawn to the sciences 
for the reasons that Hickman and Ardis persuasively propose, I am less interested in 
how these writers live up to the “poet as scientist” image they seek to project and much 
more intrigued by how these writers use scientific terms and concepts, particularly 
those of mathematics, to explore questions of subjectivity, embodiment, and emotional 
expression.  We have not sufficiently considered why these mathematical metaphors and 
diagrams in the work of these male writers are so often intertwined with discussions of 
spirituality, inspiration, emotion, personality, and identity.  Little attention has been 
paid, for example, to Lewis’s reflections on the relationship of form and emotion: “It is 
no more ridiculous that a person should receive or convey an emotion by means of an 
arrangement of shapes, or planes, or colours, than they should receive or convey such 
emotion by an arrangement of musical notes” (GB 81).  Or more boldly stated: “I 
SHALL DERIVE MY EMOTIONS SOLEY FROM THE ARRANGEMENT OF 
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SURFACES” (GB 28).  Yeats similarly proposes a connection between mathematical 
and emotional expression: “there is immense confidence in self-expression, a vehement 
self, working through mathematical calculation, a delight in straight line and right 
angle” (V 120).  Their scientific and mathematical expressions convey more than simply 
“precision, discipline, vigilance, aggression, and force,” but also reflect moments of 
ambiguity, exploration, transcendence, and feeling.7  As readers of modernist texts, we 
must tread carefully the thin line between emotional detachment and the transference or 
cathexis of emotions onto new symbolic registers.  Indeed, there is more to this 
modernist attraction to mathematics than an attempt to poach or draw from a culturally 
authoritative discipline; instead, I explore both the ways in which writers deploy 
mathematical terms and tropes to develop a new rhetoric of the self as well as the 
literary and cultural influences that led writers to see mathematics as a productive 
representational model for interpreting modern subjectivity.   
Scholars of late nineteenth- and early-twentieth century literature and culture 
stand to gain a fuller sense of how mathematics functions as an alternative grammar of 
self-expression and introspection by examining this phenomenon in the fiction and 
poetry of modern American women writers.  More often than their male counterparts, 
who tend to reserve their scientific analogies for their non-fictional writings, women 
writers incorporate mathematics primarily into their fiction, and thus in some respects 
enact the art/science analogies that became the “stuff” of many modernist manifestoes.  I 
focus particularly on selected works by Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Edna Ferber, 
Frances Newman, H.D., Mina Loy, and Gertrude Stein, both to move beyond 
masculinist interpretations of science’s role in the modernist imaginary and to explore 
how these women writers inventively repurpose the “masculine” subject of mathematics 
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for feminist ends.  I build on the work of scholars such as Marianne DeKoven, Michael 
Kaufmann, and Susan Squier (to name only a few) who complicate separatist, gendered 
models of modernism, by showing how these women writers not only draw on 
mathematical tropes, but openly embrace them as a means of representing their 
professional, psychological, and sexual desires.   
As the opening epigraphs reveal, writers such as Ferber and Newman approach 
mathematical analysis as both a self-disciplining and self-measuring tool—a method for 
achieving a certain feminine ideal—and also an essential skill for first-wave feminist 
goals of economic and social autonomy.  As I show in Chapter 1, writers such as Ferber, 
Gilman, and Cather depict women calculators or bookkeepers who use their quantitative 
skills to assume subject positions traditionally reserved for men, while also, in many 
instances, relying on these same skills to reinforce existing racial and economic 
taxonomies.  For writers such as H.D. and Stein, as the epigraphs reveal, it is the 
mathematical objects themselves that effect change in the characters, evoking cathartic 
emotional responses from the narrators.  As I investigate in Chapter 2, modernist 
women writers like H.D. deploy geometric tropes to explore female sexuality apart from 
hetero-normative, monogamous, and reproductive sex and as independent from male 
desire.  In Chapter 3, I explore Stein’s interest in the connections between mathematical 
thought and human cognition, as well as the potential for mathematical terms, like 
ordinary language, to be representational and expressive.  Rather than a threat to 
human agency, then, the idioms of geometry, arithmetic, and logic provide these women 
writers a variety of ways of constructing selfhood in and for their characters, and more 
specifically, of reshaping and reinforcing certain gender and ethnic constructs within 
early twentieth-century American culture.  
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Origins of the Mathematical Subject   
 
While a robust and thriving discipline well before the turn-of-the-century, mathematics 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to solidify its privileged 
status within scientific as well as public spheres.  Mathematical books, lectures, and 
figures became a newspaper fixture, and it was not uncommon to find articles 
proclaiming the “mathematization” of early 20th-century American culture.  A Columbia 
University professor made headlines for claiming in his 1907 lecture that “Ours, not 
Euclid’s, is the golden age of mathematics,” a claim followed by a list of the field’s 
accomplishments: “Six international congresses of mathematics have been held in less 
than ten years.  Fifty thousand mathematical books and memoirs have been produced 
during the last generation. Mathematics, though the oldest of the sciences, is at the 
same time in a sense the youngest, flourishing to-day as never before” (“Exalts”).  
Particular fields within mathematics also garnered public attention; Bertrand Russell 
and Alfred Whitehead’s widely popular Principia Mathematica volumes (1910-13), for 
example, signaled growing interest in the logical foundations of mathematics.  The 
emergence of Cubist visual art and modern, minimalist architecture in the early decades 
of the twentieth-century inspired other artistic and popular representations of geometry 
perhaps more so than even concurrent and arguably interrelated developments in non-
Euclidean geometry.8  Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg’s discoveries in quantum 
mechanics highlighted the mathematical underpinnings of twentieth-century theoretical 
physics.  In addition to its application within other sciences, the establishment of the 
U.S. Census Bureau in 1902, the expansion of the health and life insurance industries, 
and the growing need for accountants and bookkeepers within “Taylor-made” 
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management schemes are just some examples of the increased visibility of social 
applications of mathematics.  A 1910 New York Times article, for example, touts 
arithmetic as “the muse of the coming era” and details the lecture of a Chicago 
University professor who touts the creative, even poetical, potential of mathematics. 
“The adding machine,” he declares, “is the latest rival of Dante and Milton” (“Modern 
Muse”).  Such claims for the cultural significance of mathematics were perhaps nowhere 
better demonstrated than in its successful applications within World War I intelligence 
and defense operations, particularly its use in solving problems of ballastics and 
submarine detection.  One 1918 headline tellingly credits the discipline rather than its 
practitioners as the true war hero: “Mathematics Locates German Supercannon,” and 
was thus regarded, as one historian of mathematics writes, “of vital importance in 
determining the outcome of the war,” revealing “the power of mathematics in a most 
emphatic manner to the unsuspecting public” (Slaught 189).  If mathematics solidified 
its place in the public imaginary as a zeitgeist of the twentieth century, the growth of 
applied mathematics, and particularly the increasing production and dissemination of 
statistics within political, economic, and social institutions, also produced real material 
effects on people’s lives and their conceptions of themselves.  It is these experiential 
aspects of the “mathematization” of society that are all too often overlooked in our 
metanarratives of modernity.  
 The effects of social quantification were of course not experienced universally or 
in the same way by people of different racial, ethnic, and national backgrounds.  In fact, 
quantitative practices, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were 
often deployed by white elites to cloak exploitative and often inhumane practice under 
the guise of objectivity, or, in effect, to constrain or delimit the subjectivity of racial and 
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ethnic others.  A prime example of this is The Three-fifths Compromise of 1787, or the 
culmination of debates between the Southern and Northern states over how slaves 
should be counted—either as whole or fractional persons—concluding with the 
designation of slaves as “three-fifths of a person.”  While concerns over federal taxation 
and representation motivated the three-fifths rule, individual states adopted blood 
quantum laws to regulate the voting rights of African and Native Americans and to 
prohibit interracial marriage.  Blood quantum, or the fractional quantity of one’s 
particular ancestry, served as irrefutable “proof” of one’s belonging to a racial category, 
reinforcing the idea, as Werner Sollors writes, that “‘race’ was foremost a mathematical 
problem” (114).  An 1886 Virginia statute determined, for example, “that every person 
having one fourth or more of negro blood shall be determined a colored person, and 
every person not a colored person having one fourth or more of Indian blood shall be 
deemed an Indian.”9  This deferral to mathematics as a supposedly objective indicator of 
embodied racial differences would continue to legitimize not only political and legal 
determinations, but also the late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century “sciences” of 
eugenics, craniometry, and IQ testing.10   
These particular instances of human measurement and the history of social 
quantification in the U.S. more broadly are of course also inextricable from the 
institution of slavery.  The “business” of slavery and the plantation system it enabled 
depended on the careful accounting, record keeping, and crude calculation of human 
value, naturalizing the representation of racial others as numbers and prices.  The 
records and ledgers of slave owners and traders reflect, as Walter Johnson writes, “a 
human history hidden by the numbers they record in their account books” (59).  The 
conflation of what one is “worth” with one’s self-worth marks one of slavery’s most 
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corrosive psychological affects, as Paul D of Toni Morrison’s Beloved well illustrates: 
“now he discovers his worth, which is to say he learns his price. The dollar value of his 
weight, his strength, his heart, his brain, his penis, and his future” (262).  While 
mathematical rhetoric became a powerful tool for determining and delimiting one’s 
identity—and indeed for defining and preserving whiteness as a whole number—its use 
could also be subversive, enabling subaltern voices to gain representational agency and 
expose patterns of racial injustice.  
 Though I intend to consider more fully this convergence of African-American 
history, literature, and social quantification in future versions of this project, it bears 
mentioning a few examples of the subversive use of math as an important antecedent to 
the feminist appropriations of mathematics that I trace in this dissertation.  To be sure, 
scholars have certainly acknowledged the scientific methods employed by African-
American writers and activists such as Ida B. Wells, W.E.B. DuBois, George Edmund 
Haynes, and Richard R. Wright, Jr..  Yet few have looked specifically at their use of 
statistics in relation to a broader history of social quantification.  A closer examination 
of Wells’ 1895 The Red Record: Tabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynching in the 
United States, her essays “Class Legislations” and “Lynch Law,” and DuBois’ 1899 The 
Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study reveals the use of statistics to highlight a range of 
racial conditions, inequalities, and potential political strategies.  In these cases, the 
numbers give recognition to the otherwise nameless victims of racial discrimination and 
serve as a powerful rhetorical tool for substantiating the realities of racial prejudice.  It 
is perhaps this awareness of the interrelationship of numbers and individual 
representation that led DuBois to write in his journal: “mathematics is identity.”  These 
examples are also important reminders that numbers could give as well as take away.  
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But of course no essential values or truths inhere within the numbers themselves.  I do 
not intend in any way to demonize or even necessarily to celebrate mathematics; rather, 
following the insights of cultural theorists of science such as Brian Rotman, Michel 
Serres, and Bruno Latour, whose work I focus on in greater detail in Chapter 4, I urge 
the awareness of mathematics as a culturally embedded set of practices and ourselves as 
agents and practitioners of the field, responsible for its ethical and just applications.  
The use of mathematics to establish the scientific credibility of eugenic ideas, for 
example, is precisely the danger when math is seen as a disembodied, context-free model 
of objective truth.  
It must be noted that the examples of social quantification I have been tracing 
are themselves connected to a much longer history; the systematic application of 
mathematics to explain social rather than physical phenomena can be traced back to the 
Middle Ages, most notably with the emergence of double-entry bookkeeping around the 
13th century.11  But what distinguishes the period of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, I argue, is the increasing prevalence of quantitative methods to 
individuate—to describe an individual’s health, behaviors, desires, and self-image.  More 
specifically, developments in the life insurance industry and the emergence of the new 
sciences of psychology, psychiatry, and sexology during this period shifted the 
application of mathematical methods from a means not only of describing populations 
and persons, but also a way of describing the qualities or internal make-up of 
individuals.   
The life insurance industry expanded rapidly in the beginning the twentieth 
century.  By 1904, 106 life insurance companies existed, a number that would more than 
double in the next decade, steadily increasing to 708 new companies by 1937.12  To meet 
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this increasing demand for insurance, companies sought to establish more systematic, 
standardized methods of determining eligibility and premiums.  First applied in the 
context of life insurance in the 1880s, the “human life value” concept—a calculation of 
one’s projected life earnings—served as the economic basis of 20th-century life insurance 
and promoted the idea that one’s life is, as Theodore Porter writes, “subject to statistical 
laws”13 (227).  One’s life, or, really, the measure of one’s mortality, was expressed as the 
sum of a series of statistically analyzed risk factors, including “build, family history, 
physical condition, personal history, habits, occupation, habitat, and moral hazard” 
(Porter 236).  It was then up to a medical director or clerk to evaluate each factor of the 
applicant, “adding 20 percent for a risky occupation and 25 percent for a marginally 
elevated blood pressure, then subtracting 10 percent for an excellent family history, 
until, at the conclusion of the exercise, one had a single number expressing the relative 
risk associated with this particular life” (236).14  Insurance assessment thus contributed 
significantly to the sense that one’s personal history and health was an aggregation of 
variable numeric values.  The statistical practices that merged life insurance and medical 
evaluation sought to measure not so much external factors but one’s internal states, 
impulses, preferences, and dis/abilities. 
Like actuarial science, the developing fields of psychology, psychiatry, and 
sexology also capitalized on the authority of mathematics, with the intent not only to 
lend legitimacy to their findings, but also to categorize and qualify the spectrum of 
human emotions and sexual responses.  To explore the pioneering work of scholars such 
as Havelock Ellis, Cesare Lombroso, Otto Weininger, and Magnus Hirschfeld, whose 
work is foundational to the scientific study of the human psyche and sexuality, is to 
observe a compendium of tables, graphs, charts, and statistical figures that measure 
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anything from physical features to menstruation cycles and degrees of sexual attraction.  
The obsessively self-measuring heroine of Frances Newman’s The Hard-Boiled Virgin 
offers a useful comparison to the female subjects of Ellis and Lombroso’s studies, who 
are subject to measurement from their limbs to their senses—whose thighs, for 
example, “exceed that in the men by 1 ¼ inches” and whose delicate tactile sense 
averages 2.87mm on the right hand and 3.12 on the left (Ellis 49, 117).  These reports 
seek to establish highly specific numerical norms—indeed, up to one-hundreth of a 
millimeter—for gendered bodily characteristics.   
On the other hand, Magnus Hirschfeld (1868-1935), a German physician and 
early sexologist, was drawn to mathematical data as a way not only to validate 
homosexual identity but also to prove the sheer variety of sexual expressions, or what 
he called “transitions.”  Hirschfeld observed at least sixteen different sex characteristics 
(from physical build to handwriting), each of which could be masculine (M), feminine (F) 
or somewhere in between (M+F), amounting to at least three forms; he thus concluded 
that there could be no less than 316 or 43,046,721 sexual transitions (qtd in Kennedy 
123).  Though this large number attempts to “prove” the vast range of sexual 
preferences, it also reflects the pressure to define and support one’s claims 
mathematically.  Similarly, in Weininger’s 1904 “Sex and Character,” he expresses 
human sexual identity as a composite of proportional male and female characteristics.  
Given any individual “A” of “B,” he explains, where “each of the factors a, a’, b, b’ must 
be greater than 0 and less than unity,” one arrives at the resulting formula:    
   A = ∑ aM  B =∑ bW 
              a’W           b’M (8).  
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Weininger even suggests a formula for calculating the strength of sexual attraction 
between two people, where K stands for “all the known and unknown laws of sexual 
affinity,” ft stands for sexual “reaction-time,” and a and b the sexual characteristics:   
A =   __K__ ft 
            a-b    (37).  
  
All these formulas seek to isolate specific physiological and behavioral elements as 
independent factors operating within a numeric model of personhood.  One’s sexuality, 
according to many turn-of-the-century sexologists, was the sum of expertly measured, 
objectively quantifiable factors.  The classification of sexual “norms”—for which 
sexology is largely responsible—was as much statistical as ideological.   
 Rather than see this mathematization of the behavioral sciences as inherently 
reductive or misguided, however, it is important to consider how this recourse to 
quantitative data helped to sanction scholarly research on subjects previously 
considered the purview of religion, philosophy, and morality.  It also enabled the 
expression of not just taboo topics, but also the emotional and affective experiences that 
modernist culture ostensibly eschewed.  Otniel Dror argues that numeric data became 
the primary means for describing and legitimizing laboratory research on human 
emotion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:  
[T]he numeral representation of emotions created a new type of emotion.  The 
new emotion-as-number provided an alternative medium for the circulation and 
expression of emotions…It empowered experimenters who wished to study, 
provoke, and release dangerous emotions inside the laboratory—without 
corrupting or disrupting knowledge production. It created an emotion that did 
not threaten the laboratory’s self-representation as an emotion-free space. (359)  
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But it was not only that researchers could represent emotional responses through 
numbers, but also that numbers were seen as uniquely capable of interpreting emotion’s 
physiological effects: “emotion was a pattern written in the language of biological 
elements that one monitored in, or sampled from, the organism—translated into a 
sequence of numbers…The correlation between experience and expression, between 
subjective and objective, rapidly assumed a numeric foundation” (Dror 362).  The idea 
that mathematical information could be expressive highlighted the increasingly tenuous 
distinction between the subjective and objective that came to define later modernist 
literature.  The distinctions between internal and external, lab and home were also 
blurred by the invention of portable affect-gauging devices—technologies responsible 
for translating physiological responses into numeric data (Dror 367).  During the 
interwar period, the introduction of such devices as the Lie Detector, Affectometer, 
Emotograph, Emotion-Meter, Stressometer, Psycho-Detecto-Meter, Ego-meter and 
Kiss-O-meter enabled both professionals and non-specialists to generate numerical and 
graphical outputs of their inner emotional states (Dror 367).  Numbers thus functioned 
both as a crucial mediator between the scientific community and a supposedly emotion-
phobic culture and as a medium through which internal feelings could be externalized 
and actualized. 
Increasing public interest in psychology and sexology spurred a wave of popular 
fiction and self-help manuals, many of which also sought credibility through an appeal 
to quantitative data and the creation of simplified mathematical rubrics for self-analysis.  
In his 1908 self-help manual, titled Self-Measurement: A Scale of Human Values with 
Directions for Personal Application, William DeWitt Hyde writes: “If we are to measure 
ourselves we must have a scale which shall apply to human nature with something of 
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the definiteness with which bushels apply to wheat, yards to cloth, acres to land, and 
dollars to stocks and bonds.”15  Hyde thus creates a chart, wherein each positive or 
negative personality trait is given a numeric value so that one can add up his or her 
overall score; one simply adds “all the plus numbers you are entitled to; add all the 
minus numbers you deserve; and subtract the total of the minus numbers from the total 
of the plus numbers. Either way will show you as plainly as lines and figures where you 
stand and what you amount to” (22).  A score of +3 is given to qualities such as 
“vitality” and “devotion” while “health” and “intelligence” earn a +1, and one must 
subtract 2 for “ostentation” and “hypocrisy.”16  While some focused on pop-psychology, 
others like Margaret Sanger attempted to educate readers on topics such as sexual 
development and marital sex.  In her 1926 Happiness in Marriage, Sanger offers a 
graphical representation of the differences between male and female sexual arousal in an 
attempt to convey such responses as a measurable phenomenon, traceable from point to 
point through time: 
 
      (Sanger, “Happiness in Marriage” 128). 
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Though such representations might appear antithetical to expressions of passion and 
intimacy, the discourses of mathematics helped women in particular to forge a new 
medium of sexual expression, unburdened by the language of sentiment and bolstered 
by the authority of science.  As Dale Bauer argues, “co-extensive with a general shift in 
sexology, psychology, and sociology” is the “transition from the sentimental to the 
postsentimental, from the feminization of American culture to its sexualization” (17).   
In many ways, the scientific and mathematical basis of these emerging behavioral 
sciences enabled a logical, easily defensible motivation for this transition from self-
expression to sex expression.   
 Though I have been focusing here mostly on statistical and arithmetic 
applications, the writers on whom I focus certainly also draw on geometric figures and 
terms to describe emotional, sexual, and embodied experience.  Geometry might seem 
an even more abstract form of math than that of arithmetic or applied mathematics, and 
yet its apparent manifestation in early-twentieth-century art and architecture, for 
example, rendered its material foundations much more visible.  The most apparently 
geometric of these movements was Cubism, which emerged in Paris around 1907 and 
quickly became a widespread international phenomenon lasting well into the next 
decade.  Though some artists, including Picasso, were wary of drawing connections 
between their work and geometric applications, a shared interest in the properties of 
spatial representation and manipulation as well as Cubism’s depiction of objects as 
geometric solids (such as cubes, cones, and cylinders) made such associations inevitable 
and have proven fruitful to future generations of artists and mathematicians.17  Though 
literary critics have explored the overlapping methodologies of Cubism and modern 
American poetry—namely the self-conscious focus on methods of representation, the 
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breakdown of external and subjective reality, and the depiction of multiple, 
simultaneous perspectives—it is cubism’s frequent depiction of the human and typically 
female form as a composite of geometric shapes that I see as an important yet 
understudied influence on the poetry of Gertrude Stein and Mina Loy and the fiction of 
H.D. and Frances Newman.18  The desire, as H.D. writes in the opening epigraph, to be 
“embodied in long parallelograms and in square and cube and rectangle” not only 
conjures iconic cubist paintings such as Picasso’s “Nude Woman” (1910) or Jean 
Metzinger’s “Tea Time” (1911), but also reveals a mutual interest in thinking 
specifically about the body as both internally and externally constituted, as both 
malleable and finite, and more generally about space as embodied and relational.  The 
cubist and modernist interest in the “geometric body” offers another example of how an 
overemphasis on abstraction can obscure the materialist foundations of modern artistic 
and scientific expressions.19   
In what follows, I examine not only the ways in which a number of modern 
writers respond to the increasing application of mathematics to human experience, but 
also the various ways in which these writers draw on math to construct and constrain 
certain subject positions and to negotiate shifting stylistic and generic preferences.  
Chapter 1 focuses on the recurring portrait of the bookkeeping woman in the fiction of 
Mary Wilkins Freeman, Frances Harper, Willa Cather, Sinclair Lewis, Elmer Rice, 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Edna Ferber.  These writers use the figure of the female 
keeper of accounts not only to explore the implications of women’s historical relocation 
from the home to the office, but also to represent an emergent female subjectivity.  
Within this new model of subjectivity, rationality and fiscal discipline explicitly replace 
sentimentality and consumption as principal feminine characteristics.  Particularly in 
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Gilman’s What Diantha Did and Ferber’s Fanny Herself, the heroines adopt a 
mathematical sensibility, guiding their lives not by instinct or emotion—as do so many 
women in nineteenth-century sentimental fiction—but by channeling emotional 
expressions through numeric representations and defining their identities in terms of 
their quantitative skills.  At the same time, I explore how these writers depict 
bookkeeping and deploy quantitative description to preserve and justify certain racial, 
ethnic, and class taxonomies.  
Chapter 2 argues that modernist women writers, notably H.D., Mina Loy, and 
Frances Newman, consider mathematics as deeply connected to Western masculinist 
epistemology and thus crucial to any critique or transformation of existing social, 
economic, or political relations.  In their prose as well as their poetry, these women use 
mathematical terms both as metonymies for patriarchal models of power and as devices 
for articulating distinctly female experiences, particularly those of embodiment, 
sexuality, and perception.  Chapter 3 focuses solely on Stein’s numerous and varied 
representations of mathematics as a way to understand the ideological motivations of 
her literary experimentation and to resolve recent debates over whether she is a “true” 
modernist or a prescient postmodernist.  For these modernist writers, and for Stein in 
particular, mathematics is not simply an aesthetic tool, but an integral component of 
structures of meaning and authority.  
Many of these early twentieth-century women writers thus anticipate the 
cultural analyses of mathematics offered by contemporary science studies scholars such 
as Brian Rotman, Michel Serres, and Bruno Latour, who see mathematics, like language, 
as a historically contingent system of signs.  My final chapter places these science 
studies scholars in dialogue with poststructural theorists to understand the crucial role 
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that mathematics plays in the critique of metaphysics as well as its ongoing connections 
to questions of representation, objectivity and subjectivity, and materiality and 
embodiment—areas of inquiry that are foundational to modernist innovation and which 
continue to structure many of the current theoretical conversations taking place across 
divergent but overlapping realms of theory.  If theorists such as Rotman, Serres, and 
Latour remind us that mathematics is culturally and historically embedded, the writers 
on whom I focus offer an important index of how exactly it functions within particular 
cultural, material, and semiotic practices.  
 
“After the Great Divide” 
 
In exploring both these literary and theoretical histories, my project argues that 
literature and mathematics become mutually enabling discourses, particularly in the 
early decades of the twentieth century.  On the one hand, mathematics offers writers an 
authoritative vocabulary for describing and interpreting social phenomena and as a 
means to extend the boundaries of literary representation.  On the other, literature 
serves as a crucial interpreter of the historical aspects of mathematics, tying the field 
irrevocably to a cultural milieu.  In some sense, then, both fields confer authority on the 
other; writers and critics seek to renew the power of language through its ability to 
interpret mathematics and the role it plays in shaping human experience, particularly at 
a time when anxieties about literature’s relevance within an emerging technoscientific 
culture are manifest.  Mathematicians and theoretical physicists, notably Russell, 
Whitehead, and Bohr, on the other hand, were beginning to recognize the 
interdependency of mathematics and language, an interrelation necessary for the 
formation and transmission of mathematical knowledge, not to mention the meta-
mathematical communications, rich with linguistic metaphors and analogies, that Brian 
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Rotman reminds us are so much a part of the everyday business of doing mathematical 
research.  More than just methodological overlaps, however, Stein’s work also reminds 
us that writers and scientists were interested in similar epistemological questions, 
particularly concerning the limits of representation, determinacy, and realism.  
Ultimately, my hope is that this project challenges the methodological tendency to 
approach scientific developments—and particularly developments in twentieth-century 
applied and theoretical mathematics—as mere context to the development of modernist 
modes of writing rather than as co-constructive discourses, so that we can continue to 
explore the ongoing overlaps between these seemingly oppositional fields.  
Recent publications indicate an ongoing interest in thinking about the 
convergence of mathematical and literary studies.  Kathleen Woodward’s Statistical 
Panic: Cultural Politics and Poetics of the Emotions (2009), for example, tracks the 
relationship between particular “structures of feeling” within 1960s American literature 
and culture and the “science, practice, and deployment of statistics” (8).  Woodward 
challenges the familiar oppositions of reason and emotion, mathematics and feeling, by 
revealing connections between statistical information and powerful emotional responses 
of uncertainty, fear, insecurity, and even boredom.  Similarly, Melanie Benson’s 
Disturbing Calculations: The Economics of Identity in Postcolonial Southern Literature, 1912-
2002 (2008), examines the “calculating fixations” that proliferate in twentieth-century 
Southern literature, revealing “southerners’ tendencies to measure, divide, and value 
themselves and the Others against whom they find balance” (1).  Benson’s work is 
certainly critical to my own interests in exploring the socio-historical dynamic between 
mathematical expression and gendered and racialized conceptions of selfhood, though 
her work, informed by psychoanalytic and postcolonial theories, diverges in its 
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particular focus on how these “moments of mathematical reckoning” signal the 
dehumanizing forces of capitalism and the concomitant development of a narcissistic, 
fetishistic desire for the signs and symbols therein (5).  I thus see my own project 
building off of Benson’s concluding remarks, which “leave[s] open the possibility that 
these prevailing calculations of a master narrative might be resisted, disturbed, or 
rewritten” (26).  Both Woodward and Benson’s work reflect an emerging interest in 
how American literature of the twentieth century represents and interprets the 
interplay of applied mathematics and human experience.  
A January 2011 article in The Chronicle of Higher Education, titled “The Statistical 
Turn in Literary Studies,” also reflects a growing interest in using statistics and other 
quantitative measures as a method of literary analysis.  Within what author Jeffrey 
Williams calls the “statistical turn,” literary critics “treat literature as a body of 
empirical facts about which one gains knowledge through quantitative means” (2).  The 
article refers to work by scholars such as Franco Moretti, whose recent book Graphs, 
Maps & Trees (2005) utilizes statistical and graphical methods to chart, for example, 
generic patterns of novels from several countries over a 160-year period.  Other 
scholars such as Kenneth Roemer and Lynn Bloom have developed electronic databases 
from which they compile inventories and make determinations based on quantities and 
frequencies of certain subjects or authors.  Some might see these methodological trends 
as a discomforting reemergence of a scientific model of literary study, similar to the 
foundations of earlier and now outmoded movements such as Russian formalism and 
New Criticism. Or, perhaps also relatedly, some might consider these studies as a sign 
of the ever fragile state of the humanities within a culture that appears to value—
particularly in our current economic downturn—the efficiency, practicality, and 
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applicability that the sciences and business fields are assumed to deliver.  However, I see 
these studies as not only leading the way toward new avenues of research in the 
humanities, but also as crucial examples of how interdisciplinary investigations can 
enhance disciplinary self-understanding.  Indeed, I approach these studies, including my 
own, as one important means of explaining the ongoing relevance of the humanities 
amidst threats to and economic and administrative devaluations of its critically 
important role in and outside of academia.  To better understand the interdisciplinary 
nature of literary studies—our connectivity to so many other forms of knowledge and 
intellectual praxis—is to more fully understand what our discipline has to offer its 
students and scholars alike.  
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1 See Daniel Fuchs, “Saul Bellow and the Modern Tradition.” Contemporary Literature 
15.1 (1974): 75.   
2 Beginning with Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic, critics 
have long debated about whether literary modernism divides neatly along gender lines, 
such that we might speak of “male” and female” modernisms. Critics such as Marianne 
DeKoven, Bonnie Kime Scott, and Shari Benstock have complicated simple reactionary 
or separatist models of modernism and challenged the perception that “a collective 
female experience resulted in a homogeneous women’s literature” (Benstock 32). I share 
this same sense of the multi-faceted, idiosyncratic nature of modern women’s literature 
and experience (and for my purposes, their quite different approaches to and uses of 
distinct fields of mathematics).  At the same time, I seek to show how this turn to 
mathematical tropes indicates the desire to both define and transcend individual 
experience, or to borrow Michael Szalay’s phrase, the “conflicting impulses toward 
individual agency and collective affiliation” (3).  Contrary to the notion that women 
writers mimicked the style of their male counterparts or developed their own unified 
aesthetic program, I show how women writers helped formulate the aesthetics we’ve 
come to associate with canonical modernism, but used them toward quite different 
political and ideological ends.  
3 When using the umbrella term “mathematics,” I am quite aware of its generality and 
inability to capture the distinctions among different fields of mathematics, which are as 
varying and specialized as any other scholarly discipline.  The authors on whom I focus 
certainly draw on different fields of mathematics—most notably, geometry, logic, 
arithmetic, and applied mathematics—and these differences matter to both my readings 
of their effects within the individual texts and to an understanding of the particular 
historical, subdisciplinary contexts to which these idioms refer.  Nonetheless, it is often 
useful to refer to “mathematics” in this general sense as an aggregate term for these 
particular subfields. This aligns with the Oxford English Dictionary definition of 
mathematics as “the science of space, number, quantity, and arrangement, whose 
methods involve logical reasoning and usually the use of symbolic notation, and which 
includes geometry, arithmetic, algebra, and analysis” (“Mathematics,” 3rd Edition, July 
2010, Def. 1).  
4 Scholars such as Michael Szalay and Tamar Katz offer useful models for how one 
might approach modernist formal innovations and early twentieth-century social and 
political developments as co-constructive rather than an reaction-formation between an 
intact collection of responses and a set of static political and social events.  See Szalay’s 
New Deal Modernism: American Literature and the Invention the Welfare State (Duke, 2000) 
and Katz’s Impressionistic Subjects: Gender, Interiority, and Modernist Fiction in England (U 
of Illinois, 2000).  
5 While there are too many critical re-readings of modernism as monolith to name here, 
a number of relatively recent book-length studies reflect this investment in destabilizing 
modernism as a reified, cohesive form and in expanding its traditional parameters, 
including Lisa Botshon and Meredith Goldsmith’s, eds., Middlebrow Moderns: Popular 
American Women Writers of the 1920s (Northeastern, 2003), Ann Ardis’s Modernism and 
Cultural Conflict, 1880-1922 (Cambridge, 2004), Michael Szalay’s New Deal Modernism: 
American Literature and the Invention the Welfare State (Duke, 2000), Marjorie Perloff’s 
21st-Century Modernism: The “New” Poetics (Blackwell, 2002), Elizabeth Harrison and 
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Shirley Peterson’s, eds., Unmanning Modernism: Gendered Re-Readings (Tennessee, 1997), 
and Lisa Rado’s, ed., Rereading Modernism: New Directions in Feminist Criticism (Garland 
Press, 1995), to name only a few. 
6 Michael Kaufmann makes a similar argument about H.D. in his 1997 essay “Gendering 
Modernism: H.D., Imagism, and Masculinist Aesthetics,” stating provocatively that 
“masculinist modernism’s first poet was a woman” (59). Kaufmann goes on to 
demonstrate that H.D. explores in her poetry many of the same conceptual, aesthetic, 
and methodological strategies that her male contemporaries advocate for primarily in 
their non-fiction. See Unmanning Modernism: Gendered Re-Readings. Elizabeth Harrison 
and Shirley Peterson, eds. U of Tennessee Press, 1997, 59-72.   
7 The work of many male modernist writers has long been interpreted not only as anti-
sentimental, but also as emotionally restrained or detached, and their mathematical 
analogies have only helped to fuel this perception. More recently, a few scholars have 
begun to challenge the notion of the unfeeling male modernist.  Robert Dale Parker 
suggests a rethinking of emotional restraint—such as we see in Ernest Hemingway’s 
fiction, for example—as itself a strong feeling or emotional response.  Justus Nieland’s 
Feeling Modern: The Eccentricities of Public Life explores the “affective registers—
sympathy, intimacy, and comedy” that mediate the public, performative writings of 
poets such as Wyndham Lewis, E.E. Cummings, and Mardsen Hartley in an effort to 
“complicate persistent claims about male modernists’ supposed antisentimentality (23).  
Nieland considers more broadly how modernism “seeks to turn its own aesthetic 
innovations into rival technologies for shaping and structuring collective affects, 
instrumentalizing emotion through form” (21).  We might thus approach modernist 
formal and aesthetic innovations as in themselves emotionally resonant; the modernist 
writer’s self-conscious considerations of how to capture, represent, isolate, or even 
eschew emotion reveals the powerful and often contradictory desires to establish and 
define the place of emotion within literary expression and to find new ways of evoking 
feeling and response. In future developments of this project, I hope to build on Nieland’s 
insights to consider how mathematical analogies and tropes provide writers such as 
Pound, Eliot, and Lewis with methodological and rhetorical tools for exploring what 
Raymond Williams calls “structures of feeling,” or the relations between collective 
experience and personal expression. 
8 Credited with introducing the world to non-Euclidean geometry, the work of Carl 
Gauss, János Bolyai and Nikolai Lobachevsky proved that there are multiple consistent 
models for the basic geometric axioms—findings that seriously undermined the notion 
that mathematics describes a stable and objective ‘reality.’  As Rhonda Shearer argues 
“new thoughts of space, as curved and higher dimensional, induced from non-Euclidean 
and n-dimensional geometries, continued growing in popular interest from the late 
nineteenth until the early twentieth century” and these developments had a profound 
affect on the visual and literary arts (145).  Though artists such as Picasso publicly 
dismissed a connection between his work and geometry, a critic and close companion to 
Picasso said that he had “meditated upon geometry” and others artists and poets such as 
Guillaume Apollinaire explicitly connected their work to emerging interests in this 
“new space” known as the “4th dimension” (qtd. in Shearer 146).  
9 See Deborah A. Rosen, American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty, Race, and 
Citizenship, 1790-1880. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007, 95. Also, Peggy 
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Stephen Jay Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1996.  
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1600. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, and Mary Poovey’s A History of 
the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Science of Wealth and Society. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998.  
12 J. Owen Stalson, Marketing Life Insurance: Its History in America. Harvard University 
Press, 1942, p. 562.  
13 For more on the history of the human life value concept, see Alfred Hofflander, The 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1966), 381-391.  
14 Porter points out that “the measurement of blood pressure,” the value we now accept 
as a prime indicator of our personal well-being, “came into medicine not as a 
consequence of disinterested medical research or of the concern of physicians for their 
individual patients. Rather, it arose as part of the effort by life insurance companies to 
develop better and more objective means of mortality prognosis” (242).  
15 William DeWitt Hyde, Self-measurement: A Scale Of Human Values With Directions For 
Personal Application (New York: B. W. Huebsch) 1924, 9.   
16 This tradition of taking score of oneself is still very much alive and well in 
contemporary lifestyle magazines such as Glamour or Men’s Health, which provide 
readers with a series of questions or a quiz that yields a final numeric “score,” reflecting 
one’s psychological, emotional, and/or physical fitness.  For a discussion on the use of 
numbers in contemporary psychological and self-help practices, including online dating 
systems, see Eva Illouz, Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2007.  
17 See, for example, Dan Pedoe, Geometry and the Visual Arts. New York: Dover 
Publications, 2011, Matila Ghyka’s The Geometry of Art and Life. New York: Dover 
Publications, 1977, John Milner’s Kasimir Malevich and the Art of Geometry. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1996, and Rhonda Roland Shearer’s “Chaos Theory and Fractal 
Geometry: Their Potential Impact on the Future of Art.” Leonardo 25:2 (1992): 143-152.  
18 See, for example, Jacqueline Vaught Brogan’s Part of the Climate: American Cubist 
Poetry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, and Thomas Vargish and Delo 
Mook’s Inside Modernism: Relativity Theory, Cubism, Narrative. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999.  
19 Rhonda Shearer points out that Picasso and another pioneer of Cubism, Georges 
Braque, describe their methods as intuitive and tactile and that both used a variety of 
concrete tools to experiment with spatial representation. As Braque writes, “there is in 
nature a tactile space…what attracted me and what was the governing principle of 
Cubism, was the materialization of this new space which I sensed” (146). Picasso also 
used “balls of wax or clay ‘to feel the roundness of space,’” and he “‘always kept on hand 
some large balls of clay with which to make experiments’ in dimensional effects” (146). 
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Chapter 1: 
The Subject of Accounting:  
Bookkeeping Women in American Literature, 1885-1925 
 
 
Within modernist criticism, mathematics appears to have two faces.  On the one hand, 
critics tend to explain the realist and modernist appeal to mathematical themes and 
concepts as part of a collective, deliberate effort by writers to subvert sentimental modes 
of fiction and thereby distinguish themselves from prior literary traditions.  On the 
other hand, scholars often identify the quantification of society as a source of the 
individual’s feelings of detachment, disenchantment, and objectification—an instigator 
of the artifices of modern life.  Both perspectives converge on the notion that 
mathematics and subjectivity are fundamentally at odds with one another.  This chapter, 
however, argues for the dynamic interrelation of math and subjectivity through the 
particular case of women’s historical and literary investment in the practice of 
bookkeeping, or the skill and activity of recording, calculating, and interpreting 
financial transactions.  I trace the historical and educational developments that led to 
women’s involvement in and eventual dominance over the field of bookkeeping by the 
1930s as a way to contextualize the recurring but understudied trope of the 
bookkeeping woman that emerges in the fiction of writers such as Mary Wilkins 
Freeman, Frances Harper, Willa Cather, Sinclair Lewis, Elmer Rice, Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman, and Edna Ferber.  These writers depict primarily middle-class white women 
who perform mathematical tasks as household accountants, shopkeepers, office 
bookkeepers, and business professionals, and as such, point to an increasingly 
professionalized domestic sphere as well as the development of a particular form of 
feminized labor.  I am interested not only in the ways in which the discourse of 
mathematics offers women a set of skills for navigating emergent economic and 
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professional opportunities and provides a culturally authoritative means of self-
advocacy—that is, in how quantitative practices confer subjectivity—but also in how 
such practices are deployed to constrain or delimit subjectivity, particularly as a means 
to preserve certain racial, ethnic, and class taxonomies.  Rather than simply an 
exploration of the effects of an increasingly techno-scientific culture on literary 
formations, I show how writers capitalize on the cultural authority of mathematics to 
enable certain ideological and subjective positions. 
I focus particularly on Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s first novel What Diantha Did 
(1910) and Edna Ferber’s Fanny Herself (1917), two bildungsroman featuring heroines 
whose penchant for quantification catalyzes their professional success and personal 
fulfillment.  The use of mathematics as a means for women to become unstuck—
building on Jennifer’s Fleissner argument about the “stuckness in place” that plagues 
naturalist heroines—carries a great deal of ideological significance in itself.1  These 
numerically oriented heroines challenge the age-old correlation of masculinity with 
mathematical reasoning—a particularly significant gesture in the context of turn-of-
the-century debates over women’s suffrage, wherein women’s capacity for logical 
reasoning, rational behavior, and professional stamina were fundamental to the very 
terms of the national debate.2  As a paradigm of objectivity and rationality, mathematics 
serves as an ideal tool for these authors to create an alternative model of female 
subjectivity, one based on qualities that appear to subvert their association with 
excessive emotionality and careless consumption and to reject sentimental, domestic 
models of femininity. 
But while both Gilman and Ferber turn to the language of math as an 
alternative to the language of sentiment, neither completely substitutes one discourse 
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for the other.  In fact, this recourse to mathematical symbolism functions paradoxically 
as a narrative strategy for dealing with affect and emotion—a way of channeling or 
displacing affective responses onto numeric representations.  Scholars such as Suzanne 
Clark, Amy Kaplan, Ann Ardis, and Lauren Berlant, have shown sentimentalism to be 
an ongoing political and rhetorical strategy, dynamically interlinked with the 
development of realist and modernist modes of writing. I build on their insights by 
considering not only how sentimentalism motivates or reveals itself in these other 
modes, but also more specifically how early twentieth-century writers, and Gilman and 
Ferber in particular, deploy the “objective” language of mathematics to convey 
subjective and affective experience—the ways, that is, in which they cloak the 
sentimental in realist garb.  Rather than reinforcing the familiar opposition of science 
and sentiment, both Gilman and Ferber consider them as importantly intertwined.3  
While both writers represent bookkeeping and quantitative reasoning as 
emancipatory tools for women’s self-realization, they also, to varying degrees, rely on 
an exclusionary and hierarchical model of new womanhood in which mathematical 
expertise is not only implicated but also deployed to justify and rationalize white racial 
privilege.  Scholars such as Gail Bederman, Louise Newman, Martha Patterson, Dana 
Seitler, and Francesca Sawaya (to name only a few) have demonstrated this co-
construction of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century feminism and racist, 
nativist ideologies, using Gilman’s work in particular as a prime example of how “sexual 
equality was a racial necessity”(Bederman 145).  Seitler examines more specifically how 
Gilman’s “fictions of progress” serve as crucial indices of “early-twentieth-century 
feminism’s campaign to free white women from masculine hegemony through a 
commitment to popular science, specifically ‘eugenic discipline’” (64).  Though What 
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Diantha Did makes only cursory reference to eugenic ideas, the novel’s focus on 
numerical data as a means of establishing and maintaining social order speaks to the 
increasing application of mathematics to solve social “problems,” legitimize popular 
science, and validate racial difference.4  Gilman’s frequent deferral to statistical 
reasoning and pseudo-mathematical logic in her 1908 nonfiction essay “A Suggestion on 
the Negro Problem,” signals both her alliance to eugenic “science” and her appeal to 
mathematics as the purveyor of reason and paradigm of civilized society.5  Ferber, 
however, exhibits much more ambivalence toward mathematical analysis, recognizing 
quantitative skills as professionally advantageous, but also fearing the loss of individual 
expression in a number-crunching business world.  Ferber’s protagonist feels 
compassion for and even identification with the less privileged manual laborers she 
encounters in urban New York and Chicago, and yet Ferber is intent on establishing the 
exceptional nature of Fanny’s skills and distinguishing her expert labor from that of the 
non-white and immigrant domestic servants.  While the practice of bookkeeping might 
appear to offer transcendence from markers of gender, race, and class by linking 
“authority to training rather than inherited status,” both authors elide questions of 
educational access and institutional power structures that preserve white middle-class 
privilege, in effect solving problems of inequality by leaving racial and working-class 
others out of the equation.6  We thus stand to gain a fuller sense of bookkeeping as both 
a literary trope and an historical phenomenon by asking not only who’s counting but 
also who counts. 
     
I.  
In the following brief overview of the history of women’s entry into bookkeeping, I 
explore how Freeman, Cather, Lewis, Harper, and particularly Gilman and Ferber, 
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grapple with the implications of women’s historical relocation from the home to the 
office.  By placing these literary texts in this historical context, I examine the ways in 
which these writers participate in cultural debates about women’s access to positions 
and professions previously reserved for men and increasingly critical in delineating 
social status.  The mathematical practices these narratives depict not only animate 
anxieties about shifting gender and ethnic divisions of labor but also become an 
important means to renegotiate gendered, racial, and economic power relations within 
an emerging technoscientific culture. 
In the period after the American Revolution, women’s knowledge of basic 
arithmetic and bookkeeping became a subject of public concern.  Evidently aware that 
many women could not evaluate their family finances or property values, prominent 
statesmen such as Benjamin Franklin and Benjamin Rush advocated women’s education 
in arithmetic and bookkeeping so that they could assist their families in business 
ventures.7  “Some knowledge of figures and bookkeeping,” Rush declared in 1787, “is 
absolutely necessary to qualify a young lady for the duties which await her” (70).  Over 
the next few decades, well-known female educators, including Emma Willard, Almira 
Phelps, and Catherine Beecher, established schools for women and curricula that 
emphasized instruction in arithmetic and some higher forms of mathematics such as 
algebra and trigonometry.  In attempts to preserve a gendered hierarchy within the 
field, some educators were opposed to teaching women geometry, deeming it 
unnecessary and even corrupting.8  Nonetheless, young women continued to study 
higher mathematics, particularly in preparation for becoming secondary school teachers, 
and by the 1890s girls were not only following the same curriculum as boys but were 
more often enrolled in public high school science courses (Tolley 149).  Advocates of 
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women’s math education, however, continually met opposition from educational 
administrators who considered mathematical training unnecessary to women’s eventual 
role as homemakers.   
The emergent field of domestic science, beginning with Catherine Beecher’s 
widely reprinted 1841 A Treatise on Domestic Economy, played a role in women’s 
educational development by providing a persuasive social and moral basis for their 
scientific training, while also reinforcing the domestic impetus for such development.  
Beecher considered bookkeeping an emancipatory tool for women to achieve greater 
independence: “if a woman has never kept any accounts, nor attempted to regulate her 
expenditures by the right rule, nor used her influence with those that control her plans, 
she has no right to say how much she can or cannot do” (173-4).  But she also 
emphasized the strictly domestic applications of math instruction: “How strange it 
appears that so many ladies take charge of a husband’s establishment without having 
had either instruction or experience in one of the most important duties of their station” 
(188).  Despite the popularity of Beecher’s text at the time of its publication, domestic 
science did not become a widespread model for high school and collegiate curricula until 
the end of the nineteenth century, the period during which women also began to enter 
the professional workforce.  The appeal and growth of domestic science and its emphasis 
on vocational training thus emerged in large part as a response to anxieties over 
women’s relocation from the home to the office and threats to the masculine profile of 
scientific knowledge.9   
Mary Wilkins Freeman’s 1885 story “An Old Arithmetician” uses the trope of 
mathematics to explore this fraught relation between domesticity and professionalism 
and the constraining expectation that maternal proclivities should take precedence over 
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all other pursuits.  The story depicts an aging woman, Mrs. Torry, who obsessively 
works on arithmetic problems, often to the neglect of her household responsibilities, 
including watching over her adolescent granddaughter Letty.  While her 
compulsiveness might be interpreted as typical behavior for naturalist heroines, as 
Jennifer Fleissner’s reevaluation of naturalism might suggest, I see this turn toward 
calculation as a means for the heroine to participate in and contribute to a world beyond 
the domestic, a new plot device for women to avoid becoming “stuck in place.”  Indeed, 
solving arithmetic problems brings purpose to Mrs. Torry’s otherwise isolated 
existence and gives her a sense of individuality and self-worth: “There’ll be something’ 
in ‘em that everybody else ‘ain’t got; somethin’ that growed, an’ didn’t have to be 
learned. I’ve got this faculty; I can cipher…it’s a gift” (611).  She becomes so absorbed in 
one particularly difficult problem that she fails to keep track of her granddaughter, who 
becomes lost while traveling by train with a classmate.  Distraught, Mrs. Torry 
denounces her arithmetic practices as all-consuming and alienating: “‘I didn’t know 
nothin’ but them figgers, an’ now Letty’s lost, an’ it’s my fault’” (614).  Even though she 
appears to reach an epiphany about the dangers of valuing individual endeavors over 
family or community—of “a-lettin’ my faculty for cipherin’ get ahead of things that’s 
higher an’ sacreder”—she struggles against the urge to return to the problem, unable 
“to help thinkin’ about that awful sum now after all that’s happened” (614).  Despite its 
overt admonition, the story simultaneously emphasizes the pleasures of intellectual 
activity and the sense of purpose that might come from taking on roles beyond those of 
mother or caretaker.  While she remains physically tied to her home, her interest in 
arithmetic allows her to interact with the male schoolteacher (who provides her these 
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problems) and the minister (who delivers them), giving her, if only temporarily, a means 
to participate in an intellectual discourse outside the home.   
By the turn of the century, the practice of bookkeeping formed a bridge between 
home and workplace.  On the one hand, it served the efforts of domestic science 
advocates to professionalize household tasks.  In the home of Mrs. Trenor, Lily Bart’s 
confidante in Wharton’s The House of Mirth (1905), “the chaos of letters, bills and other 
domestic documents” gives her writing-table a “commercial touch,” suggesting the 
conversion of her domestic space into a record-keeping office (34).  On the other hand, 
bookkeeping was also becoming a professional option for women seeking work outside 
the home.  In Sinclair Lewis’s The Job (1917), the protagonist Una Golden lands her 
first job at an insurance firm based solely on her efforts “to balance Captain Golden’s 
account-books, which were works of genius in so far as they were composed according 
to the inspirational method” (12).  Her ability to untangle the chaos of figures convinces 
the manager to hire Una on the spot.  As Lewis’s novel suggests, the training that 
women received for their household bookkeeping eventually could translate into 
marketable professional skills; but for Lewis, the office is ultimately a new site where 
women can engage in romantic liaisons rather than, as Cather, Harper, Gilman, and 
Ferber envision, a place for women to establish a new mode of autonomy apart from 
their traditional roles as wives and mothers.  
One of first office positions women occupied in the decades after the Civil War 
was as “calculator.”  Beginning in 1875, Edward Pickering, director of the Harvard 
Observatory, began hiring women as “computers” to process large volumes of numerical 
information.  Similar positions soon emerged within the social and biological sciences, 
which were increasingly reliant on a flexible, affordable staff who could perform 
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statistical analysis.10  While their work as calculators was often perceived as unskilled 
labor, it eventually began to open doors for women to assume more prestigious and 
profitable positions in bookkeeping and financial analysis.11  Census data corroborates 
these developments: although women made up only 5.7 percent of bookkeepers in 1880, 
they constituted 31 percent by 1910, and by 1930, 63 percent of all bookkeepers were 
women (Strom 18).  But while the percentage of women bookkeepers rose, male 
bookkeepers continued to enter the field in increasing numbers; thus, unlike other office 
professions, bookkeeping did not enforce a strictly gendered division of labor—that is, it 
was not explicitly coded as a female domain until the 1950s (Strom 83).  
Anxieties about women competing with men for positions manifested themselves 
in several significant ways.  Because many male bookkeeping jobs were converted to 
accounting positions, which were often off-limits to women and required professional 
credentials, bookkeeping could now be considered lower within the office hierarchy and 
was often perceived as a more feminized and thus lesser trade, despite ongoing 
ambiguities about its limits.12  There were some attempts to reestablish masculine 
superiority within the field of bookkeeping.  A 1905 New York Times article, 
sarcastically entitled “St. Louis Lady Board Calls in Mere Man” and followed by several 
subheadings (“Never Asked Masculine Aid in Spending Money; But As To 
Bookkeeping! Well, There’s A Male Person Figuring on the Accounts and Fixing Up a 
Report for Congress”) details the accounting failures of the Board of Lady Managers of 
the World’s Fair, who were forced to call upon a male bookkeeper to rescue them from 
financial disaster.13  The article mocks the women’s attempts at self-sufficiency and their 
failure to recognize earlier their computational ineptitude and their need for heroic male 
intervention.  
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The introduction of computing machines to the office, while creating new 
opportunities for women workers, also undermined the skills necessary for traditional 
bookkeeping.  A 1925 advertisement for the Monroe adding machine assures readers 
that its product demands no expertise: “Monroe simplicity and lightening speed keep 
her work moving rapidly, without mental or physical effort. Any girl in your office can 
be a Monroe girl if you provide a Monroe Adding Calculator” (qtd in Strom 75).  The 
Monroe girl’s identity and skill set are not valued apart from the machine’s capabilities. 
Nonetheless, men feared replacement by women-operated machines, which could, as one 
merchant acknowledges, perform “the work of six men with great ease” (Page 7683).  
This fear becomes reality for the protagonist of Elmer Rice’s 1923 play The Adding 
Machine, which follows the decline of Mr. Zero, who is fired after twenty-five years as a 
bookkeeper in a department store.  Though he took the job hoping to rise up the office 
ranks, his dreams of becoming the boss’s assistant (a more appropriately masculine title 
that would make him superior to his female coworker Daisy) is thwarted when the boss 
explains that his “efficiency experts have recommended the installation of adding 
machines” (28).  In a gesture that renders women workers inferior to technology, the 
boss only later clarifies that these machines will be human-operated: “they can do the 
work in half the time and a high-school girl can operate them” (28).   Rice’s play attests 
to male anxieties over the feminization of bookkeeping and also reinforces the 
perception that the position involves little more than a rote, mindless recording of 
figures. 
In Willa Cather’s “Ardessa” (1918), the association of women with computing 
skills also serves as a disciplining tactic for maintaining proper gender roles.  The story 
features three strong businesswomen working in a magazine office, including the 
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ambitious and numerically-savvy Becky Tietelbaum, who “never forgot dates or prices 
or initials or telephone numbers” (107).  Becky is no match for her competitive 
colleague, Rena Kalski, who the male boss considers to be “as cold-blooded as an 
adding-machine” (115).  Both the flattering representation of Becky and the 
dehumanizing comparison of Rena to an adding machine illustrate the ambiguous 
nature of women’s professional personas; on the one hand, women were praised and 
rewarded for their computational abilities and perceived proclivity for tedious clerical 
work, and at the same time, derided for adopting the “calculating,” aggressive demeanor 
typically associated with male professionals.14  This limited range of acceptable behavior 
for women calculators exemplifies the ongoing policing of gender boundaries within the 
accounting field.15  
Cather’s story also reveals the policing of ethnic boundaries within the 
workplace.  As Francesca Sawaya argues, “Cather indicts the current close relation 
between commercialism and journalism—a relation she charts out through the contest 
between the lady on the one side and the Jewish ‘girl’ on the other” (89).  She associates 
the calculating persona with derogatory Jewish stereotypes, describing Rena Kalski as a 
“slender young Hebrew, handsome in an impudent” way and with a “rapacious mouth,” 
and Becky Tietelbaum as a “thin-tense faced Hebrew” who wears “cheap, gaudy clothes” 
(112, 110).  In contrast, Cather’s portrait of the stenographer Ardessa seeks to retain a 
kind of unspoiled white femininity, invulnerable to the masculinizing pressures of the 
modern office that she instead transposes onto the Jewish women characters: 
“[Ardessa] shuddered at the cold candor of the new business woman, and was 
insinuatingly feminine” (105).  To some extent Cather criticizes Ardessa’s inferior work 
ethic—her work was like “exercise without exertion. She read and embroidered…and 
 43 
she liked to be seen at ladylike tasks and to feel herself a graceful contrast to the crude 
girls in the advertising and circulation departments across the hall (102).  And yet, she 
also implies the indecorous nature of Becky and Rena’s work, establishing a racialized 
hierarchy between the dignified, even if unproductive, work of the white stenographer 
and the tedious, menial labor of the Jewish bookkeepers.  “Ardessa” reveals how the 
trope of the calculating woman could be simultaneously mobilized toward feminist and 
racist ends—that is, celebrated as a sign of female competency and empowerment and 
demeaned as an inferior from of labor, more suitably belonging to racial and ethnic 
minorities.  While census records indicate that the majority of professional female 
bookkeepers between 1870 and 1930 were white and U.S. born, there is evidence that 
domestic bookkeeping was among the responsibilities given to black and immigrant 
servants before emerging as a platform for white women’s professionalization.16   
For example, the 1868 memoir of Elizabeth Keckley, a former slave turned 
seamstress and business liaison to Mary Todd Lincoln, details the financial troubles of 
Mrs. Lincoln that lead to Keckley’s role as her personal secretary and behind-the-scenes 
bookkeeper.  In debt and forced to sell off her dresses for money, Mrs. Lincoln asks 
Elizabeth to leave her self-established seamstress business so that the first lady might 
avoid the embarrassment of the “delicate business” of haggling for prices and settling up 
accounts.  She thus transfers accountability to Elizabeth, who she relies on to “dispose of 
them quietly” (269).  Keckley’s choice to reproduce a numeric inventory of these items 
serves both as supporting evidence for her own account of past events and as a self-
authorizing device, through which she establishes an objective valuation of her labor:  
          ARTICLES SOLD. 
                                                           1 Diamond Ring 
                                                           3 Small do. 
                                                           1 Set furs 
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                                               1 Camel hair shawl 
                                                           1 Red do. 
                                                           2 Dresses 
                                                           1 Child’s shawl. 
                       1 Lace Chantilly Shawl.  (328) 
 
“The charges of the firm,” she details, “amounted to eight hundred dollars. Mrs. Lincoln 
sent me a check for this amount. I handed this check to Mr. Keyes, and he gave me the 
following receipt” (328-9).  If not for her detailed documentation in Behind the Scenes, 
Keckley’s significant role as Mrs. Lincoln’s account manager would likely remain 
invisibilize and unattributed.  Moreover, Keckley’s account serves as a crucial indicator 
of bookkeeping’s gradual transition from white woman’s burden to her specialized 
privilege.   
Likewise, in Francis Harper’s Iola Leroy (1892), a “tragic mulatto” story set 
during the Civil War, the eponymous heroine’s uncle, Robert Johnson, describes how 
his slave master’s wife taught him to “cast up accounts” because it “was handy for her to 
have some one who could figure up her accounts,” or the work she finds beneath her 
(46).  Once freed, Robert eventually capitalizes on these skills and opens his own 
hardware store in the North, where he is “doing a good business” (183).  For Harper, 
keeping accounts encodes both racial as well as class significations.  While for Robert 
bookkeeping skills offer the kind of class mobility and economic security that become 
markers of racial progress, Iola’s job as an accountant in a predominately white 
department store simultaneously exposes the racial exclusivity of white working-class 
culture and at the same time represents an unbefitting, temporary means toward greater 
professional ends.  Much like Ferber’s Fanny, Iola aspires toward more socially activist 
work because “to be an expert accountant is not the best use to which I can put my life” 
(270).  For Iola, accounting establishes her business know-how and strong work ethic, 
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but also, like Fanny, entails her isolation and disconnection from the black community 
with whom she seeks to reconnect.  
Issues of gender, race, and class figure heavily in fictional representations of 
bookkeeping, motivating its depiction both as a thankless, behind-the-scenes position 
and as a rewarding and intellectually challenging one, demanding computational skills 
that often go unrecognized.17  In the trope of bookkeeping writers found a way to draw 
on the cultural and intellectual authority of mathematics to establish and regulate an 
individual or group’s position within a social hierarchy.  Especially for Gilman and 
Ferber, the calculating woman is not construed as pitiable, submissive, or corrupt, but 
as a necessary and alluring departure from traditional, limiting models of middle-class 
white femininity. 
 
II.  
What Diantha Did (1909-1910) has attracted little sustained critical attention to date, 
with most commentators emphasizing its parallels to Gilman’s better-known fiction.  
The novel invokes the critique of marriage fundamental to “The Yellow Wall-paper” 
(1892) and The Crux (1911), and articulates a vision of matriarchal power similar to that 
of Herland (1915).  But in reflecting Gilman’s abiding interest in domestic reform and 
women’s economic independence, Diantha shares more in common with her most well-
known non-fictional book, Women and Economics (1898).  More than any of her other 
fiction, Diantha echoes the primary agenda of this sociological treatise in its effort to 
challenge Victorian notions of men and women as inherently stable categories.  In 
Women and Economics, Gilman highlights mathematics as a practice used to preserve 
distinctions between men and women’s work, citing the work of Mary Somerville, a 
prominent nineteenth-century mathematician and astronomer, who “struggle[d] to 
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hide her work from even relatives, because mathematics was a ‘masculine’ pursuit” (53).  
Mathematics likewise functions in Diantha as a device for reimagining traditional 
gender characteristics.  Rationality, for which mathematics serves as a primary model, is 
no longer the sole province of men, nor sentimentality the exclusive province of women.   
In Diantha, Gilman uses mathematical notation not simply as a way of excising 
emotional responses but of subjecting emotions to rational analysis.  This is a process 
Gilman put into practice in her own impersonal and quantitatively-oriented diaries, 
which reinforce her determination to control, contain, or redirect sentiment and 
emotion toward socially or economically productive ends.18  For Gilman, numerical 
description functions not only as a more incisive measure of the economic realities and 
underlying gender dynamics than ordinary language, but it is also a medium through 
which our emotional responses can be channeled into a more effective form of 
argumentation.  Perhaps more than any of her fellow novelists, Gilman brings into 
relief the connection between numerical literacy and female empowerment.  The novel 
testifies to the power of numbers to support rhetorical persuasion, to yield financial 
profit, and to reform social organization.  This use of numbers as a means of 
establishing social order is, however, also deeply imbricated in Gilman’s xenophobia and 
her belief in eugenics as a way of preserving white superiority and legitimizing racial 
and ethnic “difference.”  Indeed, in her 1908 essay “A Suggestion on the Negro 
Problem,” Gilman assumes the position of social scientist, drawing on pseudo-
mathematical logic to prove quantitatively the different “rates” of evolution between 
white and blacks:   
Given: in the same country, Race A, progressed in social evolution, say, 
to Status 10; and Race B, progressed in social evolution, say, to Status 4. 
Given: That Race A outnumbers Race B as ten to one. 
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Given: That Race B was forcibly imported by Race A, and cannot be 
deported. 
Given: That Race B, in its present condition, does not develop fast 
enough to suit Race A. (79)   
 
In her analysis of this series of “facts,” Gilman considers that both “races have served 
each other in many ways,” but dismisses this thought as dangerously sentimental and 
unscientific: “These points may be laid aside. They arouse our feelings and do not clear 
our thoughts” (79).  Gilman thus defers to mathematics as a neutral mediator for 
otherwise emotionally charged and “irrational” discussions of race.   
It is perhaps not surprising that Gilman turns to quantitative data as a means of 
tempering emotions and rationalizing social hierarchies given her abiding admiration 
for the work of sociologists such as Herbert Spencer, Lester Ward, and Edward Ross, 
who relied heavily on mathematical and statistical data to buttress their claims for racial 
and ethnic taxonomies.  Though Diantha appears to be the least overt example of 
Gilman’s eugenicist beliefs, they are subtly manifest in Diantha’s fiancé and eventual 
husband Ross Warden, whose name likely pays homage to both Edward Ross and 
Lester Ward.  Lester Ward, often deemed the father of American sociology, wrote 
extensively about the application of mathematics to social phenomena in Dynamic 
Sociology (1883) and Outlines of Sociology (1898), recognizing math, even if at times 
ambivalently, as the “general gauge by which the position of every science is to be 
determined” (“Outlines” 7).  Through Ward, Gilman met Edward Ross, with whom she 
developed a lifelong close friendship.19  Well known for his writings on “race suicide,” 
Ross called on statistics to formulate arguments about sustaining the white majority.  In 
response to “the healthful slackening in the rate of growth” of African Americans 
(according to 1900 census data), Ross argues that “viewed in the light of actual statistics 
[the negro question] solves itself.”20  Like Ross, Gilman also deploys quantitative data 
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as a way of deflecting accountability while still providing an “objective” referent for her 
views on racial hierarchies, population control, and social management.  
This coming of age tale centers on Diantha Bell, a twenty-one year old 
schoolteacher who moves out of her parents’ home to pursue a career as a house servant.  
Though this line of work is considered improper for someone of Diantha’s middle-class 
stature, she is determined to increase her salary and earn enough money to start life 
with her fiancé Ross.  Gilman stresses marriage as a fundamentally economic 
transaction by showing how Ross and Diantha must work to overcome the financial 
barriers that prevent them from marrying.  Overburdened with providing for his 
widowed mother and two sisters and ineptly operating the family’s already mismanaged 
general store, Ross has neither sufficient savings nor prospects to marry Diantha.  
Rather than waiting for several years for Ross to make enough money to marry, 
Diantha strives for financial independence as a way to control her matrimonial fate.  She 
achieves this success by faithfully relying on bookkeeping, by which she tracks and 
controls her finances and her eventual business ventures.  It is also becomes for her an 
authoritative mode of self-expression, a way to account for her needs and desires. 
Diantha first puts her accounting skills to use as a self-authorizing gesture when 
she tries to convince her father that she has “paid her dues” and should be permitted to 
leave the house to follow a career.  When Mr. Bell protests (“How about what you owe 
to me—for all the care and pains and cost it’s been to bring you up?”), Diantha allows 
herself only a brief moment of emotional reflection—she “flushed. She had expected this, 
and yet it struck her like a blow”—before she redirects these emotions into a series of 
numerical reports on her household expenses and contributions (47):   
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‘I have considered that position, Father…So I’ve been at some pains to work it 
out—on a money basis. Here is an account—as full as I could make.’ She handed 
him a paper covered with neat figures. The totals read as follows: 
Miss Diantha Bell, 
To Mr. Henderson R. Bell, Dr. 
To medical and dental expenses…………………………… $110.00 
To school expenses………………………………………….76.00 
To clothing, in full…………………………………………..1,130.00 
To board and lodging at $3.00 a week………………………2,184.00 
To incidentals………………………………………………..100.00 
$3, 600.00     (47) 
That these tables are reproduced for the reader rather than simply alluded to reinforces 
the rhetorical power of numbers; not only does Diantha rely on these figures as an 
unequivocal record of her financial obligations, but the narrator also presents these 
calculations as solid proof of Diantha’s fiscal acumen.  These numerical tables 
momentarily interrupt the narrative, acting as substantiating evidence for an otherwise 
incomplete account.21  In this way, the novel privileges numerical representation over 
language as a more precise and accurate account of Diantha’s experience: “This account 
was as clear and honest as the first and full of exasperating detail” (49).  What Rebecca 
Connor writes about eighteenth-century female bookkeepers also applies to Gilman’s 
heroine; accounting offered women an alternative mode for recording experience as well 
as a means to establish their literal and figurative self-worth: “identity is configured 
through a template of numbers…Her identity depends on what she can count as hers” 
(108-9).  But what Diantha counts as hers are not so much her material possessions, 
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which are modest at best, but rather the numeric value she places on her skilled labor or, 
in essence, on herself.  In a sense, then, she “counts” because she counts.  She positions 
herself as the sole “accountant” of her experiences and asserts her individuality and 
independence from her family through this numerical data.  Her computational skills do 
not simply give her control over her own finances, but more importantly, they enable 
her to advocate persuasively on her own behalf.    
Mr. Bell resists the idea of putting numerical values on familial obligations—to 
him “it looked strange to see cash value attached to that unfailing source of family 
comfort and advantage”(48)—but it is difficult for him to deny the numerical proof of 
Diantha’s hard work.  Though represented much more sympathetically, Diantha’s 
efforts are reminiscent of Frank Norris’s Trina, who uses numeric data to convince 
McTeague to move to a cheaper apartment: “Trina had induced her husband to consent 
to such a move, bewildering him with a torrent of phrases and marvelous columns of 
figures by which she proved conclusively that they were in a condition but one remove 
from downright destitution” (170).  Similarly, Diantha’s father cannot recall the past 
expenditures that these tables so precisely record, but he immediately trusts the 
accuracy of the figures. “He knew he had never spent $1,130.00 on one girl’s clothes. 
But the items explained it”:   
Materials, three years at an average of $10 a year………………….$30.00 
Five years averaging $20 each year…………………………………100.00 
Five years averaging $30 each year…………………………………150.00 
Five years averaging $50 each year…………………………………250.00 
                            $530.00  (47-8) 
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While Diantha offers some commentary to justify her calculations, she relies primarily 
on the numbers rather than rhetoric to plead her case: “She laid before him the second 
sheet of figures and watched while he read, explaining hurriedly” her reasons for 
counting the work that “a servant would have done for $5.00 a week” (49).  She would 
rather the accounts speak for themselves: 
Mr. Henderson R. Bell,  
  To Miss Diantha Bell, Dr.  
For labor and services— 
  Two years, two hours a day at 10c. an hour………..$146.00 
  Two years, three hours a day at 10c. an hour………219.00 
  One year full wages at $5.00 a week………………..260.00 
  Six years and a half, three hours a day at 20c………1423.50 
               $2048.50 
…Then came the deadly balance of the account between them: 
Her labor……………………………………………..$2047.00 
Her board…………………………………………….936.00 
Her ‘cash advanced’…………………………………1,164.00 
                                      $4, 147.00 
His expense for her………………………………….$3,600.00 
Due her from him……………………………………$547.00       (49-51) 
Even the narrator, who presents the “deadly balance” sheet, relies on the numeric 
figures to make a more dramatic impact than traditional narration might offer.  By 
subtracting her childhood expenses from the labor and services she has provided the 
family, Diantha makes the final argument that her father in fact owes her money, thus 
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relieving her of any financial or moral obligation.  Rather than present an emotional 
plea to her father, Diantha relies solely on quantitative reasoning to impersonalize her 
decision to leave and thus to diffuse her father’s emotional response.  She understands 
that crying “would by no means strengthen her position” (59).  For Diantha, the 
persuasive power of numbers lies in their power to transform emotional expression—in 
this case, familial love and support—into a rational, authoritative form.  
 Gilman broadens traditional gender roles by opposing Diantha’s calm and 
collected demeanor against her father’s emotional and impulsive behavior.  Where 
Diantha relies on logic, her father turns to pathos: “You think it’ll be good for your 
Mother’s health to lose your assistance, do you?” (46).  While she recalls her childhood 
in quantitative terms, he becomes nostalgic over forgotten memories: “Perhaps there 
was a tender feeling too, as he remembered that doctor’s bill—the first he ever paid, 
with the other, when she had scarlet fever” (47).  Or again, when he reflects: “it brought 
up evenings long passed by, the sewing wife, the studying children” (48).  His emotions 
continue to build until he unleashes his final angry outburst at Diantha’s unfeeling and 
detached calculations: “‘This is the most shameful piece of calculation I ever saw in my 
life’…You go and count up in cold dollars the work that every decent girl does for her 
family and is glad to!...It’s a shameful thing—and you are an unnatural daughter” (51).  
Again, Diantha keeps her emotions in check, responding “coldly” in the face of her 
father’s unrestrained anger.  His sense that she is “unnatural” suggests that her rational 
demeanor and emotional control—and implicitly her mathematical competence—appear 
to him as transgressions against her traditional role as a dutiful daughter.  
 This father-daughter relationship recalls Fleissner’s attention to the recurring 
dynamic in naturalist narratives between the rational, “realist” woman and the 
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“sentimental,” nostalgic man, a dynamic reproduced in Diantha’s relationship to her 
fiancé.22  Although Diantha’s ambitions cause Ross some distress, this rational 
woman/sentimental man dialectic is not the result of a crisis of masculinity or the 
“feminization” of culture, as Fleissner suggests for the texts she spotlights, but rather 
part of Gilman’s effort to create more flexible gender identities and to relieve the 
heroine from driving the romantic storyline.23  Ross’s emotional sensibilities are an 
essential counterpoint to Diantha’s logical, pragmatic disposition.  He sustains the 
romantic narrative and tries to convince Diantha not to desert him in pursuit of her 
career, relying, like Mr. Bell, on an emotional appeal: “Let somebody else do the gold-
mine, dear—you stay here and comfort your Mother as long as you can—and me. How 
can I get along without you?” (61).  In their final exchange before she leaves, Ross 
“turned to her—was holding out his arms” and pleads, “You won’t go my darling!,” to 
which Diantha matter-of-factly responds: “I am going Wednesday, on the 7.10” (62).  
That Diantha embarks on a quest while Ross stays to tend to the home radically 
rewrites conventional gender roles.  Indeed, Ross’s narrative resembles that of a typical 
naturalist heroine who finds herself “stuck in place.”  Even after they are married and 
Diantha continues to expand her hotel business, he assumes the role of lonely housewife 
and she, the distant breadwinner: “When she rolled away in her little car in the bright, 
sweet mornings, a light went out of the day for him. He wanted her there, in the 
home….it was harder [for Ross] than for most men, because he was in the house a good 
deal” (182).  Diantha, on the other hand, follows a narrative of upward mobility, moving 
from a contracted housekeeper for the wealthy Porne family, to managing a 
housekeeping service for beach cottages in Santa Ulrica, to lecturing and training 
groups of women in the fundamentals of domestic science, and finally establishing the 
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Union House, a cooperative business that provides for the middle and upper-class 
families of Orchardina.  All of these achievements depend on her financial savvy and 
careful bookkeeping, or what are for Ross “the alien tasks of calculation” (127).  
 Despite the narrator’s insistence on rationality as an alternative to 
sentimentality, however, both the men and women characters register different affective 
responses to accounting.  Ross “strove with it, toiled at it,” but “longed always to be free 
of the whole hated load of tradesmanship,” day-dreaming about “selling out the business 
and buying a ranch” (127).  Mr. Porne, much like Mr. Bell, reacts with exasperation 
over Diantha’s calculated salary demands: “this amazing and arithmetical young woman 
makes us feel as if we were giving her wampum instead of money—mere primitive 
barter of ancient days in return for her twentieth-century services!” (82).  While the 
male characters show an aversion to an economically disciplined lifestyle, the women 
find keeping accounts and performing calculations invigorating.  Mrs. Bell, who “always 
loved arithmetic,” comes to help with the accounts for Diantha’s new housekeeping 
service.  As the “months passed” and “the work steadily grew,” Mrs. Bell “became more 
and more cheerful…Her thin shoulders lifted a little as small dragging tasks were 
forgotten and a large growing business substituted” (147).  Similarly, Mrs. 
Weatherstone, a rich resident of Orchardina, transforms herself from a depressed 
widow, a “pale, sad-eyed girl,” to an energetic, successful businesswoman by financing 
Diantha’s Union House business and establishing others like it around the country.  
Also inspired by Diantha, her younger sister Dora “amazed and displeased her family” 
by “going over to Diantha’s side and learning bookkeeping” (185).  Rather than 
providing an escape or transcendence from feeling, these mathematical practices incite 
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strong emotional and affective responses that propel the characters toward or away 
from a disciplined lifestyle.    
 But while bookkeeping and financial investment improve the emotional and 
psychological lives of the middle and upper-class white women, brief references to the 
African-American cook Julianna, the Danish immigrant Mrs. Thorald, and to the 
unnamed group of servant “girls” who work under Diantha reflect the very power 
differential among working women that bookkeeping otherwise portends to overcome.  
As Charlotte Rich argues, “Diantha’s project is a profitable scheme based on others 
performing tasks that are unavoidably menial—a fact all the more discomfiting in an era 
in which hierarchies of “mental” versus “menial” labor coalesced” (22).  Indeed, 
Diantha’s specialized mental labor not only places her at the top of this scheme, but also 
serves as a continual marker of her exceptional expertise.  Moreover, Diantha exploits 
her role as keeper of the accounts to justify and more often elide the professional 
pecking order she creates.  The narrator describes Julianna, for example, as “a person of 
color,” adding the derogatory caveat that she is “not the jovial and sloppy personage 
usually figuring in this character” (129).  Diantha implies Julianna’s intellectual 
inferiority after Julianna is unable to recall her last name because of her numerous 
marriages, or as Diantha refers to them, “marital difficulties in bulk” (129).  The 
narrator frequently contrasts Diantha’s “hard but exciting” work with that of the 
“simple” methods used by Diantha’s thirty employees, whom she refers to 
condescendingly as “girls” or “little helpers” (135).  She also points to the varying skill 
levels of her employees and her own internalized ranking system for them: “among her 
thirty employees Diantha found four or five who were able and ambitious” (138).  And 
yet she continues to tout her systematic training—“the speed, the accuracy, the 
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economy”—as way to reform the “old slipshod methods of the ordinary general servant” 
and believes that the more mathematically precise her business model, the more equal 
and fair are her working conditions (142).  Diantha’s calculations offer solid proof of her 
seemingly egalitarian organization:  
UNION HOUSE.  
Food and Service. 
General Housework by the week……………$10.00 
General Housework by the day………………...2.00 
           Ten hours work a day, and furnish their own food…. 
Additional labor by the hour……………..        .20 
Special service for entertainments, maids and waitresses 
by the hour…………                                         .25      (137)                                     
While this carefully calculated system holds Diantha accountable to her employees and 
offers them financial stability, she relies primarily on her calculations to determine her 
business practices and to avoid direct engagement with the racial and ethnic inequalities 
that exist within her domestic labor force.  
Though Gilman shows little sympathy for the underprivileged working ‘girl,’ 
she strategically draws on sentimental tropes to underscore the need for (white) 
women’s financial and professional independence.  The novel’s dramatically emotional 
ending depends on two conciliatory gestures.  Ross begins to pursue a career in genetic 
research (Gilman’s most obvious reference to eugenist ideas)—a move that places him in 
a more traditionally masculine role and allows him to accept the value of Diantha’s 
work.  In a concluding letter to her, Ross acknowledges that he now understands “what 
brave, strong, valuable work you have been doing for the world. Doing it scientifically, 
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too. Your figures are quoted, your records studied, your example followed…As man to 
man I’m proud of you” (188).  Ross’s phrase “man to man” suggests that he has come to 
see her as his equal and embraces the masculine subject position that Diantha assumes 
throughout the narrative.  Diantha reacts uncharacteristically by kissing the letter 
“hard, over and over” and giving “way to an overmastering burst of feeling,” exclaiming 
“thank you!” between “long, deep sobbing sighs” (189).  This final burst of emotion 
places her in a more traditionally feminine role; now that she has achieved success and 
gained the final approval of her husband, she allows herself to unleash the feelings she 
has heretofore needed to control.  At the same time, this final scene reveals the powerful 
emotional desires that motivate Diantha’s scientific endeavors.  Rather than submitting 
the heroine to a traditional romantic conclusion, Gilman invokes sentimental 
conventions to validate Diantha’s professional aspirations.  Moreoever, Diantha’s sense 
of herself as a practitioner of science becomes crucial to this final moment of self-
actualization.   
 
III.  
Like Diantha, Ferber’s novel Fanny Herself (1917) is a narrative of triumph in which the 
heroine achieves both professional and romantic fulfillment after negotiating several 
identity conflicts.  Gilman and Ferber’s novels not only share similar narrative 
structures, they also feature heroines who rely on quantitative skills to achieve 
professional success, establish cooperative, intellectually nurturing bonds among 
women, and assume the role of the rational, “calculating” woman in contrast to the 
sentimental man.  The quantitative skills of Ferber’s protagonist Fanny are hardly 
unique among her female characters.  Fanny shares many of the same characteristics as 
Miss Kelly, the number-juggling accountant in Emma McChesney and Co. and Mrs. 
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Carrie Payson in The Girls (1921), who “can add a double column in her head, just like 
her father” and even “does them by way of amusement” (4); and Jean Stoddard in the 
play $1200 A Year (1920), who compares her role as homemaker and household 
accountant to that of an “expert mathematician,” working to “make the housekeeping 
money come out right at the end of the week” (28).  Ferber’s portraits of bookkeeping 
women reinforce the view that these skills are typical rather than exceptional.  But 
while Ferber identifies mathematics as an enfranchising tool for women to assert 
themselves in both the public and domestic spheres, she is equally interested in what 
women compromise in adopting these hard-nosed, methodical roles.   
For Fanny, the number-crunching world of big business threatens to erase the 
particulars of her Jewish identity as a place where she feels compelled to hide her 
ethnicity.  Through the trope of mathematics, Ferber illustrates the clash between the 
economic individualism of the ideology of the New Woman and the desire for ethnic 
identification and solidarity.  Fanny struggles to reconcile these dual aspects of her 
identity: one, “generous, spontaneous, impulsive, warm-hearted,” the qualities she comes 
to associate with a distinctly Jewish identity; the other “cold, calculating, deliberate,” the 
characteristics she sees as necessary to excel in mainstream corporate America  (108).  
While Fanny ultimately trades her corporate identity for a more philanthropic line of 
work after witnessing the hardships of immigrant women factory workers and 
embracing her Jewish heritage, Fanny’s desire for assimilation also carries with it a 
nativist attitude, and like Gilman, naturalizes a racial and ethnic taxonomy built on a 
model of mental versus menial labor, even as she attempts to highlight and critique such 
classifications.  There is a tendency among Ferber’s critics to see her work as 
conciliatory, “catered to sentimental tastes” or committed to a “benevolent picture of a 
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multiethnic America.”24 However, I see Ferber’s turn to the trope of mathematics as a 
way of engaging the question of who counts in a number-driven, corporate culture and 
what role sentiment plays in scientifically grounded, rational modes of representation. 
Fanny Herself is a semi-autobiographical story that follows a young Jewish girl, 
Fanny Brandeis, from her youth in a small midwestern town to her rise in the Chicago 
business world.  Like Ferber’s own father, Fanny’s father, who dies in the first chapter 
of the novel, is a struggling shopkeeper.  Mrs. Brandeis, described reverentially as a 
“superpersonality” and a “very definite person,” heroically takes over her husband’s 
failing business while also caring for her children, serving as the primary role model and 
guiding force in Fanny’s development.  In this respect, this narrative, like Diantha, is a 
story of matriarchal power, in which women by necessity are placed into the role of 
primary breadwinner, a situation that calls upon them to develop skills and a passion for 
their work that exceeds those of their male counterparts.  Much like the male/female 
relationships in Diantha, Mr. Brandeis is clearly the sentimental counterpart to Mrs. 
Brandeis’ rational nature, just as Fanny’s pragmatism and analytical skills contrast to 
her brother Theodore’s idealism and the free-spirited nature of her future partner, 
Clarence.  While Mrs. Brandeis could “add a double column of figures in her head as fast 
as her eye could travel” better than she could “set a table without forgetting the 
spoons,” Mr. Brandeis “had been a dreamer, and a potential poet, which is bad 
equipment for success in the business of general merchandise” (4).  Mrs. Brandeis uses 
her bookkeeping skills—“a little figuring on paper”—to transform the business into a 
profitable venture (19).  Fanny’s mother instills in her the importance of mathematical 
proficiency from an early age; though the adolescent Fanny “loathed arithmetic” and the 
“eight-grade horrors” of story problems, Mrs. Brandeis insists that she “crack her own 
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mathematical nuts,” because it is “good mental training, not to speak of the moral side of 
it” (65).  A common tenet of late-nineteenth-century domestic science and conduct 
literature, this association of mathematics and morality plays out in Fanny’s disciplined 
and “calculatingly ambitious” nature (275).25     
After her mother passes away, a pivotal moment in the narrative when Fanny 
must find her own source of strength and motivation, she initially turns to her Jewish 
heritage as the moral imperative for her ambitions:  
[S]he would be cold, calculating, deliberate, she told herself…Thousands of 
years of persecution behind her made her quick to appreciate suffering in others, 
and gave her an innate sense of fellowship with the downtrodden. She resolved 
to use that sense as a searchlight aiding her to see and overcome obstacles. She 
told herself that she was done with maudlin sentimentality. (108)  
Fanny rejects “maudlin sentimentality” as a blinder to the realities of oppression and 
discrimination.  In what appears to be a conscious rejection of sentimental models of 
femininity, she pledges to mold herself as “a hard, keen-eyed, resolute woman, whose 
godhead was to be success, and to whom success would mean money and position” 
(107).  Ironically, however, Fanny’s determination to succeed compels her to hide the 
Jewish heritage that motivates her, believing it to be an impediment to her professional 
achievement.  She vows to “admit no handicaps. Race, religion, training, natural 
impulses—she would discard them all if they stood in her way” (107).  When Fenger, 
her new boss, asks her directly, “Jew?,” Fanny replies “no” without hesitation (136).  
Fenger acknowledges her cover-up with a demeaning response: “You’ve decided to lop 
off all the excrescences, eh? Well, I can’t say I blame you. A woman in business is 
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handicapped enough by the very fact of her sex” (136).  His response confirms Fanny’s 
initial belief that her individual identity is a liability in the workplace.  
As a newly employed sales associate at a large, Chicago-based clothing 
manufacturing company, Fanny quickly learns that numbers are the language of 
business and sentimentality a mere profitable marketing tool.  Fenger calls Fanny’s 
suggestion to wrap the children’s clothing in pink and blue packages “sentimental slush” 
until she convinces him that they can use this to their financial advantage: “Sentimental, 
yes….but then, we’re running the only sentimental department in this business. And we 
ought to be doing it at this rate of a million and a quarter a year” (149).  The narrator 
stresses the mathematization of corporate America, repeatedly describing Haynes-
Cooper in numeric terms: “The firm began to talk in tens of millions…Lucky ones who 
had bought [stock]…with modest visions of four and a half per cent in their 
unimaginative minds, saw their dividends doubling, trebling, quadrupling” (139).  
Visitors to the manufacturing plant are awed by the tour guide’s casualness about the 
company’s sky-high profits: “How he juggles figures: how grandly they roll off his 
tongue. How glib he is with Nathan Hayne’s millions” (139).  Fanny adapts well to this 
profit-driven environment and embraces the once dreaded exercise of mathematical 
calculations: “Fanny had statistics. Fanny had arguments. She had determination” (204).  
Like Diantha, Fanny builds a strong, self-confident identity by means of her 
mathematical skills.  But while her ability to excel in the business world rests on her 
proficiency with numbers, Fanny feels pulled between her technical and artistic 
impulses, a tension that stands in for the larger conflict between her professional and 
ethnic identities.   
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Troubled as Fanny seems to be about workplace gender and ethnic 
discrimination, in several instances she exhibits her own anxieties about ethnic and 
foreign “others” and rationalizes a racialized professional order.  Fanny represents her 
African-American servant Princess as “naturally” gifted at housekeeping and cooking, as 
someone who could “come out of the process with an unruffled temper and an 
immaculate kitchen” (178), and Princess’ husband is condescendingly described as “a 
very black and no-account husband,” a revealing association between his worthiness and 
his net worth (177).  After Fanny’s brother Theodore returns from a long stay in 
Germany, his declaration—“I feel like an immigrant”—spurs Fanny’s sense of American 
superiority and exclusiveness, prompting her rejection of Theodore’s German wife 
(she’s “all that’s vile”) and her assurance that “you’re going to have your chance here [in 
America]” (274).  In a brief encounter with Fenger’s Japanese janitor, Fanny again 
deploys racist rhetoric and an implicit defense of a professional pecking order: “She saw 
the little Jap dart suddenly back from a doorway, and she stamped her foot and said, ‘S-
s-cat!’ as if he had been a rat” (302).  As scholars such as Carol Bakter and Christopher 
Wilson argue, these unsympathetic, racist characterizations undercut Ferber’s other 
attempts to render sympathetic portraits of Jewish immigrant workers, such as the 
“over-read, under-fed, emotional, dreamy little Russian garment worker” who Fanny 
observes marching in a suffrage parade and who moves her to tears (251).26  These 
characterizations not only reveal Fanny’s struggle between her Jewish and American 
identities, but also point to Ferber’s strategic appropriation and disavowal of 
sentimentality as a tool for representing gender, race, and class dynamics.  
Clarence emerges in the narrative to “rescue” Fanny from her materialist 
pursuits and reconnect her with her Jewish heritage.  He locates the origin of Fanny’s 
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success in her religious identity and believes that a renewed connection to her religion 
will prevent her from selling her soul to serve capitalist interests: 
I don’t object to this driving ambition in you. I don’t say that you’re wrong in 
wanting to make a place for yourself in the world. But don’t expect me to stand 
by and let you trample over your immortal soul to get there…I tell you, Fanny, 
we Jews have got a money-grubbing, loud-talking, diamond-studded, get-there-
at-any-price reputation, and perhaps we deserve it. But every now and then, out 
of the mass of us, one lifts his head and stands erect, and the great white light is 
in his face…You’re suppressing the thing that is you. You’re cutting yourself off 
from your own people—a dramatic, impulsive, emotional people. (189-90)        
Clarence associates a calculating business persona with the most negative of Jewish 
stereotypes and instead identifies artistic and creative skills as morally rewarding and 
essentialized Jewish characteristics, a notion he further supports by citing famous 
Jewish artists: “You see it all the way from Lew Fields to Sarah Bernhardt; from 
Mendelssohn to Irving Berlin; from Mischa Elman to Charlie Chaplin” (190).  Though 
Clarence appeals to Fanny’s growing sense of identification with her Jewishness—as 
evidenced by her tearful proclamation “These are my people! These are my people!” after 
she identifies with the Jewish garment worker—she still sees the allure of financial 
security.27  She initially resents his advice and defends her desire for money: “I’m 
getting the things I starved for all those years. Why, I’ll never get over being thrilled at 
the idea of being able to go to the theater, or to a concert, whenever I like” (238).  But, 
as the narrative develops, Fanny finds the corporate environment increasingly stifling, 
even as she glamorizes the high-rolling world of business and maintains a sense of pride 
about rising in its ranks.  
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 She locates this frustration in her disinterested practice of calculation.  Feeling 
disillusioned by her work, “her voice grew dry and lifeless as she went into the figures” 
(220).  The narrator explains Fanny’s situation by returning to the idea of a divided self; 
she is “working with her head, not her heart,” not the “hollow muscular structure,” but 
“the secondary definition” which “has to do with such words as emotion, sympathy, 
tenderness, courage, conviction” (228).  The narrator presents mathematics as the 
source of Fanny’s dispassionate attitude toward her work and is at times quick to 
critique her objectives—“Big business seems to dwarf the finer things in her”— but at 
the same time attests to Fanny’s continued attraction to this line of work (151): “Self-
confidence was there, and physical vigor, and diplomacy. But above all there was that 
sheer love of the game; the dramatic sense that enabled her to see herself in the part” 
(243).  Working with figures might leave her “dry and lifeless,” but there is also 
something seductive and stimulating for her about “talking in six-figure terms” and 
becoming a master of “the game.”  Unwilling as she may be to reduce Fanny’s qualities 
to the realm of sentiment, the narrator tentatively embraces Fanny’s mathematical 
inclinations.   
In a conclusion that appears to trade the narrative of professional development 
for the romantic plotline, Fanny leaves her job and heads to Clarence’s Colorado cabin 
to reconnect with him and to contemplate her professional future.  Fanny’s journey, like 
Diantha’s move to a fictional California town, reinterprets the familiar naturalist 
narrative of man’s westward adventure and “return to nature” as a woman’s passage to 
self-discovery.  However, her “progress” is marked, also like Diantha’s, by the shedding 
of her calculating persona and subsequent display of emotional vulnerability: “Her lower 
lip trembled. She caught it between her teeth in a last sharp effort at self-control…in a 
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panic, her two hands came up in a vain effort to hide her tears. She sank down…and the 
proud head came down to her arms” (320).  Though she is finally able to reveal her 
affection for Clarence, she quickly interrupts this emotional scene to discuss her desire 
to return to the city and to work.  Her plans to pursue a new career as a newspaper 
illustrator suggest her continued professional ambitions, even if they represent a clear 
shift to a more creative and humanitarian line of work than computing “lifeless” figures.   
This career change also marks Fanny’s return to her Jewish faith, as suggested 
by the subject of her first published illustration: the young Russian Jewish marcher.  But 
even within this new profession Fanny values a dispassionate approach: “[She] had 
done her with that economy of line, and absence of sentimentality which is the test 
separating the artist from the draughtsman” (258)—again exemplifying Ferber’s 
insistence on distinctions of expertise and her skepticism toward purely sentimental 
representation.  While Ferber appears intent on opposing rationality and sentiment, 
calculation and creativity, these dual impulses inform Fanny’s actions throughout the 
novel and act not simply as antagonists but as foils for one another.  The ambiguous 
ending suggests the difficulty for Ferber in either embracing or rejecting a model of 
womanhood based primarily on rationality, discipline, and professionalism.  It is 
tempting to interpret this ambiguity as Ferber’s attempt to appease a broad audience by 
creating a “calculatingly ambitious” yet emotionally sensitive heroine, a sentimental 
heroine caught in a realist paradigm.  However, we might also see Fanny’s divided 
selves as a critique of the either/or logic that imposes on women a limited range of 
acceptable roles, desires, and behaviors from which they must chose.  Her novel 
underscores the difficulty of constructing a new model of femininity in which a woman 
can be calculatingly ambitious—and also mathematically adept—without the risk of 
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being labeled masculine or feeling pressure to revert to traditional feminine roles.  
Ferber’s repeated description of Fanny as “paradoxical” is significant; a paradox, of 
course, is a seemingly self-contradictory statement that is nevertheless true.  Her novel, 
in other words, expresses the possibility for these dual aspects of Fanny’s identity to 
coexist without contradiction.    
The novel’s ambiguous ending also corresponds to Ferber’s dialectical 
representation of bookkeeping and quantitative reasoning as practices that both 
construct and constrain modern conceptions of selfhood.  Ferber’s novel, along with the 
other texts considered here, offer a potential alternative to dominant interpretations of 
mathematical imagery in fiction of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
Rather than simply a symbolic means of reinforcing the qualities of rationality, 
abstraction, objectivity, and detachment, these mathematical tropes offer writers a new 
lexicon for defining, interpreting, and delimiting subjective experience, indicating a 
more complex, co-constructive relationship between science and subjectivity than 
scholars of these traditions tend to suggest.  The trope of the female keeper of accounts 
is an important indicator of how the same technoscientific developments and the 
emergent “calculating spirit” that Max Weber famously claimed as the sources of 
modern disenchantment and objectification are also integral to how modern subjects—
and women in particular—think about and negotiate their relationships to a changing 
social and economic environment.  This perspective might thus open up further avenues 
for thinking not just about how literature borrows from or communicates with science, 
but also how literature functions as crucial interpreter of the cultural dimensions of 
science.  
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1 Challenging traditional notions of naturalism as a male-centric genre involving 
deterministic narratives that end either in decline or triumph, Fleissner not only 
repositions women as central to naturalist narratives, but also shows how the modern 
woman’s story resists conventional closure.  Ending neither in complete failure or 
success, naturalist women find themselves in a kind of perpetual stasis, or a “stuckness 
in place” (9). Fleissner replaces “the notion of naturalist determinism with the more 
nuanced concept of compulsion,” to account for the “repetitively compulsive everyday 
actions” on which so many fin-de-siècle heroines fixate (9). I build on Fleissner’s 
analysis by arguing that the quantitative impulse serves as a transformative act that 
turns narratives of stuckness into narratives of success. 
2 For a discussion of the correlation of masculinity and scientific reasoning, see, for 
example, Susan Bordo’s The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture. 
Buffalo: SUNY Press, 1987.  Public discourse on suffrage entailed a policing of affect. 
Opposers aligned women with excessive emotionality, decrying the suffragettes as 
“shrieking” and “hysterical.” A 1907 article focuses on the differences between men and 
women’s affective responses at an anti-suffrage society meeting: the women were 
“combative” while the “quiet, unassuming men” were “‘attacked’ by the ‘infuriarated’ 
suffragettes.” See “To Keep Women in Her Place.” New York Times, 26 May 1907, 13. 
Conversely, advocates for suffrage turned this argument against the opposition, using 
the term “sentimental” to describe efforts to preserve traditional gender roles.  In a 
letter to the editor, one Massachusetts suffragette declares: “There is no reason except a 
sentimental one why women should not vote.” See “They Do Not All Belong to 
Organizations that Meddle.” New York Times, 2 Oct 1905, 8. The word “sentimental” 
thus became a term of opprobrium in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
public discourse, shifting from a notion of emotional intelligence to one of emotional 
indulgence. Prominent literary figures of this period similarly criticized the “excesses” 
of sentimental fiction and celebrated the “economy” of realist fiction.  For a detailed 
account of how realist writers disparaged (while still drawing on) sentimental writing, 
see, for example, Hildegard Hoeller’s Edith Wharton’s Dialogue with Realist and 
Sentimental Fiction. Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 2000. 
3 Miranda Hickman’s study of the geometric inclinations of modernist writers argues, 
for example, that “geometric gestures were enlisted in a phobic project of countering the 
‘effeminacy’ that had come to be linked in the public mind with Aestheticism” (xviii). 
The Geometry of Modernism: The Vorticist Idiom in Lewis, Pound, H.D., and Yeats. 
(University of Texas, 2005).  Ann Ardis similarly points to the modernist appropriation 
of scientific rhetoric as a means of establishing objectivity and expunging emotion and 
sympathy in Modernism and Cultural Conflict, 1880-1922 (Cambridge, 2002). Both 
Hickman and Ardis consider how modernist writers themselves insisted on such 
interpretations in their own non-fiction writings, urging associations between their 
work and the “impersonal,” unsentimental aesthetics of science. Kathleen Woodward’s 
recent book, Statistical Panic: Cultural Politics and Poetics of the Emotions (Duke, 2009) 
invites the question of how statistics can produce or offset powerful emotional responses 
(albeit mostly negative ones) and thus opens up ways in which we might begin to think 
about science and sentiment as more closely intertwined.  
4 As stated in my Introduction, I do not intend to demonize mathematics here, but quite 
oppositely to urge the awareness of mathematics as a culturally embedded set of 
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practices and ourselves as agents and practitioners of the field, responsible for its ethical 
and just applications. For a more detailed account of the rising social dimensions of 
mathematics during the late-19th and- early-20th centuries, see Theodore Porter’s The 
Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-1900. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, and 
Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996.  For a more specific account of the quantitative underpinnings 
of eugenics and craniometry, see Stephen Jay Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996.  
5 Louise Newman elucidates Gilman’s preoccupation with the idea of “civilized” society 
and the racist logic Gilman deploys to distinguish “white civilization” from those at less 
“advanced stages of evolution,” or those perceived as “primitive” others. See Newman, 
White Women’s Rights, 132-157.  
6 Sawaya, Modern Women, Modern Work, 3. In her study of modern professionalism, 
Sawaya argues that professionals’ claim to egalitarianism underhandedly “enforced 
social exclusivity”: “The ideology of meritocracy—the notion that everyone has an equal 
chance to succeed through education and training—ostensibly promoted equal 
opportunity, but through its prohibitive forms of accreditation and refusal to 
acknowledge the power of institutions, it functioned to rationalize white, male, middle-
class authority” (3).   
7 Mary Beth Norton, “Eighteenth-Century American Women in Peace and War: The 
Case of the Loyalists,” in William and Mary Quarterly 3 (1976): 286-409. 
8 In an 1824 letter to the editor of the Philadelphia Portfolio, one man responds to the 
news that women have begun to study geometry: “The proper object of geometry is the 
development of the abstract properties and relations of space. In this science it cannot be 
expected that females will make much proficiency. Nor ought geometrical knowledge to 
be considered as a necessary object of their pursuit.” Quoted in Patricia Cohen, A 
Calculating People: The Spread of Numeracy in Early America. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982, 143.   
9 Tolley points out that this new emphasis on vocational courses and the practical uses 
of education led many schools to convert upper-level science and mathematics courses 
into electives, particularly for girls, and that these domestic science program 
precipitated the decline of women’s enrollment in science and especially mathematics 
courses in the early 1900s (169).  
10 See David Alan Grier, When Humans Were Computers. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005.  
11 Sharon Hartman Strom points to several additional factors that contributed to the 
increasing demand for women calculators and bookkeepers in the early twentieth 
century: the rise of large corporations dependent on record keeping, data management 
and large bodies of “cheap” clerical labor, including life insurance companies, saving and 
loan companies, public utilities and government agencies such as the Internal Revenue 
Service; the introduction of new technologies such as the typewriter, the adding 
machine, the Arithometer, and the Comptometer that increased efficiency, productivity, 
and information trafficking; and finally, but significantly, labor shortages as a result of 
WWI. See Strom, “’Machines Instead of Clerks’: Technology and the Feminization of 
Bookkeeping, 1910-1950.” Computer Chips and Paper Clips: Technology and Women’s 
Employment. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987, 64-5.  See also Charles 
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W. Wootton and Barbara E. Kemmerer, “The Changing Genderization of Bookkeeping 
the United States, 1870-1930,” The Business History Review, 70.4 (1996), 541-586.   
12 Wootton and Kemmerer offer a detailed analysis of the difference between 
bookkeeping and accounting, a distinction that began to emerge by the end of the 
nineteenth century. Generally speaking, bookkeeping was understood as a practice of 
recording and describing financial data, while accounting involved interpretive and 
predictive skills (543-544). However, Strom points to the difficulty of establishing 
universal standards for clerical positions since some stenographers performed the work 
of bookkeepers and vice versa and some women employed as bookkeepers were actually 
performing the work of an accountant, in some cases, successfully passing CPA exams 
without accounting degrees (82-93).      
13 New York Times. 1905. “St. Louis Lady Board Calls in Mere Man.” June 16.  
14 Men often feared replacement by women-operated machines, which could, as one 
merchant acknowledges, perform “the work of six men with great ease” (Page  
7683).  This fear becomes reality for the protagonist of Elmer Rice’s 1923 play The 
Adding Machine, which follows the decline of Mr. Zero, who is fired after twenty-five 
years as a bookkeeper in a department store.  Though he took the job hoping to rise up 
the office ranks, his dreams of becoming the boss’s assistant (a more appropriately 
masculine title that would make him superior to his female coworker Daisy) is thwarted 
when the boss explains that his “efficiency experts have recommended the installation of 
adding machines” (28).  In a gesture that renders women workers inferior to technology, 
the boss only later clarifies that these machines will be human-operated: “they can do 
the work in half the time and a high-school girl can operate them” (28).   Rice’s play 
attests to male anxieties over the feminization of bookkeeping and also reinforces the 
perception that the position involves little more than a rote, mindless recording of 
figures. 
15 One of first office positions women occupied in the decades after the Civil War was as 
“calculator.”  Beginning in 1875, Edward Pickering, director of the Harvard 
Observatory, began hiring women as “computers” to process large volumes of numerical 
information.  Similar positions soon emerged within the social and biological sciences, 
which were increasingly reliant on a flexible, affordable staff who could perform 
statistical analysis (Grier 81-88). While their work as calculators was often perceived as 
unskilled labor, it eventually began to open doors for women to assume more 
prestigious and profitable positions in bookkeeping and financial analysis. Census data 
corroborates these developments: although women made up only 5.7 percent of 
bookkeepers in 1880, they constituted 31 percent by 1910, and by 1930, 63 percent of all 
bookkeepers were women (Strom 18).  But while the percentage of women bookkeepers 
rose, male bookkeepers continued to enter the field in increasing numbers; thus, unlike 
other office professions, bookkeeping did not enforce a strictly gendered division of 
labor—that is, it was not explicitly coded as a female domain until the 1950s (Strom 83). 
For more detailed accounts of specific factors that contributed to the increasing demand 
for women calculators and bookkeepers in the early twentieth century, see Sharon 
Hartman Strom, “’Machines Instead of Clerks’: Technology and the Feminization of 
Bookkeeping, 1910-1950.” Computer Chips and Paper Clips: Technology and Women’s 
Employment. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987, 64-5, and Charles W. 
Wootton and Barbara E. Kemmerer, “The Changing Genderization of Bookkeeping the 
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United States, 1870-1930,” The Business History Review, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Winter, 1996), 
pp. 541-586.   
16 Wootton and Kemmerer provide further demographics about these women workers: 
99.7 percent were white, mostly single; approximately 49 percent were U.S. born with 
U.S.-born parents, and 42 percent were born to parents who were born outside the U.S. 
(568-9). 
17 Bookkeeping, and clerical work more generally, underwent similar transformations in 
Britain during this period. George Bernard Shaw’s 1894 play Mrs. Warren’s Profession, 
features Vivian, the central character and daughter of Mrs. Warren, who happily works 
as an actuary, performing “calculations for engineers, electricians, insurance companies, 
and so on” (18). She is described favorably in the stage notes as “prompt, strong, 
confident, self-possessed” (16). When her mother’s friend Praed wonders about the 
sacrifices of her personal life to her work, asking “Are you to have no romance, no 
beauty in your life?,” Vivian explains that she doesn’t “care for either” and that she not 
only “likes working and getting paid for it,” but that she has “never enjoyed myself more 
in my life” (19).  Vivian’s profession allows her an independent and cosmopolitan 
lifestyle, full of Beethoven and Wagner concerts, trips to the National Gallery, and long 
stays in London, and she thus considers herself a “perfectly splendid modern young 
lady.”    
18See The Abridged Diaries of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Ed. Denise D. Knight . 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998. After 1903, Gilman suspended her 
diary writing, which was already quite reserved and straightforward, to record instead 
only financial accounts, appointments, shopping lists. In these records, earnings, dates 
and times—that is, numerical information—take precedence over prose.  
19 Louise Newman writes about their relationship of mutual respect and their frequent 
exchange of letters. Gilman also relied on Ross for advice on “Standard Authors on 
Scientific Subjects” that she might use rectify the “unscientific method of [her] work” 
(144).   
20 “America On the Eve of A Great Moral Revival: Prof. Ross, Analyzing Growth of 
National Conscience, Favors Restriction of Birth Rate.” New York Times. 2 January 
1910. Ross details his views on racism and “race suicide” in his article, “The Causes of 
Racial Superiority.” Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science 18 (July 1901): 
67-89.  
21 The literary use of quantitative charts as both persuasive, concrete evidence and as a 
means toward one’s self-realization warrants broader consideration than this essay 
permits and could include, for example, the revealing of Gatbsy’s childhood daily 
schedule and “GENERAL RESOLVES” that “prove” Gatsby’s earnest and self-
disciplined beginnings, or Dick’s cost sheet in Horatio Alger’s Ragged Dick that 
underscores how his life hangs in financial balance. 
22 Fleissner observes this gender role reversal in earlier naturalist novels such as Sister 
Carrie and McTeague, in which the woman is “cold, pragmatic, rational; the man, pitiful 
and hopeless” (162). In both these novels, the women characters become financially 
independent while the male protagonists are forced to beg their partners for money in 
order to scrape by. Within this “selfish woman and the begging man” dynamic, the 
naturalist woman could be seen as “a ‘realist’ character, while he—steeped in a passive 
nostalgia, pleading only for an ounce of sympathy from both her and us—could be 
called a ‘sentimental’ one” (163).  As she summarizes in her Introduction, “the deepest 
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repositories of sentimental, therapeutic, indeed nostalgic culture in the 1890s may have 
belonged to the era’s manly men” (17).    
23 In Women and Economics, Gilman argues that gender boundaries are more fluid than 
our cultural narratives about them suggest: “The most normal girl is the ‘tom-
boy’…The most normal boy has calmness and gentleness as well as vigor and courage.” 
Women in Economics: The Economic Factor Between Men and Women as a Factor in Social 
Evolution. New York: Harper & Row, 1966, 56.  
24 Though attentive to Ferber’s implicit critique of capitalism, Joyce Antler overlooks 
some of the tensions in Ferber’s fiction, instead emphasizing her “benevolent picture of 
multiethnic America” and the way that she “seamlessly joined her American, female, and 
Jewish identities in a romantic vision of possibility” (160,166). Antler, The Journey Home: 
Jewish Women and the American Century. New York: The Free Press, 1997. Donna 
Campbell notes the misrepresentation of Ferber’s fiction in the decades following her 
critical acclaim in the 1920s in “Written with a Hard and Ruthless Purpose: Rose 
Wilder Lane, Edna Ferber, and Middlebrow Regional Fiction” in Middlebrow Moderns: 
Popular American Women Writers of the 1920s. Eds. Lisa Botshon and Meredith 
Goldsmith. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2003, and even more recently 
Lauren Berlant elucidates the complexity of Ferber’s racial politics in her novel Show 
Boat in The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American 
Culture. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.  
25 Where an earlier generation of conduct manuals defined femininity according to 
proper behavioral and emotional practices—promoting the idea that good conduct alone 
could elevate one’s social status—nineteenth and early-twentieth-century domestic 
science literature fused moral and behavioral guidance with scientific rhetoric, making 
emotional, psychological, and spiritual fulfillment a product of systematic, rational, and 
economic practices.  As one writer declares, “Let your expenditures be regulated, not 
merely by a regard to your ability, but to your accountability as a steward of the divine 
bounty. Regard economy as a virtue, and never be unwilling to be seen in the practice of 
it.” See, The Lady’s Own Book: An Intellectual, Moral, and Physical Monitor. Glasgow: 
Dunn & Wright, 1859, 55.  
26 See Carol J. Bakter, Reforming Fiction: Native, African, and Jewish American Women’s 
Literature and Journalism in the Progressive Era. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000, and Christopher P. Wilson, White Collar Fictions: Class and Social Representation in 
American Literature, 1885-1925. Athens: Georgia, 1992. 
27 For a more detailed analysis of the link between Fanny’s Judiasm and feminism, see 
Eileen H. Watts, “Edna Ferber, Jewish American Writer: Who Knew?” Modern Jewish 
Women Writers in American. Ed. Evelyn Avery. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 
41-61.  
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Chapter 2: 
Mathematical Modalities in Modernist Fiction:  
Frances Newman, Mina Loy, and H.D.  
 
This chapter establishes a crucial link between what we might call the “middlebrow 
moderns” of the previous chapter and the conventionally modernist poetics of H.D., 
Mina Loy, and Frances Newman by exploring how these latter writers draw similarly 
on mathematical imagery as a mode of self-definition and as a means of disassociating 
themselves from sentimentalism.1  Though H.D., Loy, and Newman’s interest in 
geometric imagery (in addition to metaphors of arithmetic and calculation) might seem 
to reinforce the qualities of abstraction, non-referentiality, and elitism thought to 
distinguish high from middle- and low-brow literatures, a closer examination of these 
geometric tropes reveals less of a formal or aesthetic rift between “rival” groups of 
women writers and instead an extension or intensification of the use of mathematical 
tropes as an expressive and empowering mode of self-representation.  More specifically, 
for writers such as H.D., Loy, and Newman, math becomes a vehicle not so much for 
talking about professional identity or social positioning, as is the case for Gilman and 
Ferber, but rather for talking about sexual identity, sexual pleasure, embodiment, and 
emotional and psychological states of being.  This new emphasis on sexuality, intimacy, 
and psyche can be understood in the context of the burgeoning and increasingly 
popularized sciences of sexology and psychology as well as within what Dale Bauer 
describes as the literary historical move from “sentimentality to sexuality,” that is, the 
shift from “self-expression—with the self understood as an autonomous and private 
being” to “a focus on intimacy and sexuality as the primary modes of personal 
expression” (3).  Women authors, according to Bauer, “helped fashion a dominant idiom 
of sexual expression (with intimacy as the necessary condition for inter-relational 
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equality) to replace self-expression as the primary goal of the modern self” (3).  Within 
this new lexicon of sex expression, I explore how modernist women writers like H.D., 
Loy, and Newman push the limits of this emergent sex discourse by merging it with the 
language of arithmetic and especially geometry.  I show how these women writers use 
math both to critique repressive, heteronormative, and masculinist models of sexuality 
and to consider the liberatory potential of new sexual arrangements.  
 The language of mathematics offers these writers more than simply a new 
vocabulary for distancing themselves from sentimental fiction and legitimizing sex as a 
worthy object of study.  The women writers on whom I focus capitalize on the 
principles of mathematical abstraction—by eliminating characteristics or attributes of 
the particular in favor of the general or universal case—to bring a new perspective to 
existing social and sexual norms.  For example, Newman, Loy, and H.D. all invoke 
metaphors of calculation and arithmetic as a way of linking personal constructions of 
identity to broader social constructs, or to the cultural calculus that regulates our 
behaviors and attitudes.  In this way, these women writers anticipate central aspects of 
Lauren Berlant’s analysis of “the female complaint” in that they, like Berlant, recognize 
the lure of conventionality, but also turn a critical eye toward these normative, recursive 
practices that position women as the purveyors of love and feeling while also rendering 
them politically and intellectually passive.  For Loy and H.D. in particular, depictions of 
persons and bodies as abstract geometric objects—including, for example, 
parallelograms, cylinders, and concentric circles—also function to deemphasize the 
particularities of gender in relation to or as a determining factor of sexual preference.  
When Loy depicts a sexual encounter as the “lucid rush-together” of “human cylinders,” 
or H.D. as “rings on rings that made a geometric circle,” they depict sex as mutually 
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desiring and non-hierarchical, and thus resist masculinist notions of sex as male directed 
and dominated and also, paradoxically, the objectification of the female body as a mere 
physical object.   
Perhaps even more profoundly, these gender-neutral, generic geometric figures 
shift focus away from sex identity to sexual activity or pleasure.  Rather than stable, 
fixed entities prior to their sexual encounter, their bodies co-create these geometric 
formations through their interactivity with one another.  In some sense, then, the 
implications of these geometric bodies anticipate Judith Butler’s sense that sex and 
gender are illusory and performative rather than simply corporeally determined: “‘sex’ is 
an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through time.  It is not a simple fact or 
static condition of a body, but a process whereby regulatory norms materialize ‘sex’ and 
achieve this materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms” (1-2).  While I 
do not want to overstate the incipient post-structural, queer theoretical aspects of 
Newman, Loy, and H.D.’s work, a closer investigation of the expressive nature of these 
geometric tropes reveals the extent to which these women writers understood sex and 
sexuality as central components of feminist political and literary agency.  
By examining how these modernist women writers repurpose the “masculine” 
subject of mathematics toward developing a more equivalent, reciprocal, and gender-
independent model of sex, I also offer a new way of approaching the “abstract” 
mathematics of modernism, one that moves beyond the notion of math imagery as a sign 
of degenerate, elitist, or masculinist modernism and toward an understanding of how 
such imagery engages questions of modern subjectivity and literary representation.  
Beginning with Newman and moving to Loy and H.D.’s work, I trace the use of 
mathematical terms and themes toward the development of a politically motivated 
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critique of existing literary and cultural traditions, moving from the subject of sexual 
awakening in Frances Newman’s The Hard-Boiled Virgin (1926), to marital sexuality in 
Mina Loy’s “Parturition” (1914), “Virgin Plus Curtains Minus Dots” (1915), “The 
Effectual Marriage or The Insipid Narrative of Gina and Miovanni” (1917), and 
“Human Cylinders” (1917), and finally to sexual liberation in H.D.’s HERmione (1927) 
and Nights (1935).  Through close readings of these texts, I aim to explore the 
seemingly unlikely connections between mathematical rhetoric and modernist gender 
politics.   
 
I. From Object to Subject: Francis Newman’s The Hard-Boiled Virgin  
“She would rather be the subject of any verb than its passive object”—Francis Newman 
 
 
Though still somewhat on the margins of the modernist canon, Francis Newman’s 
provocative writing captured public attention during her tragically short lived career.  
In between her work as a librarian at Florida State College and Georgia Institute of 
Technology, Newman wrote numerous book reviews, or what one critic describes as 
“corrosive and sparkling essays in literary criticism” (Baugh v).  She soon turned to 
writing fiction, completing The Gold-Fish Bowl (written in 1921 but unpublished until 
1985), the O. Henry Prize winning short story “Rachel and Her Children” (1924), the 
bestselling The Hard-Boiled Virgin (1926), and Dead Lovers Are Faithful Lovers (1928) 
before suffering a fatal cerebral hemorrhage in 1928.2  By far Newman’s most successful 
work, The Hard-Boiled Virgin became an instant bestseller and provoked the 
admiration—and in some cases scorn—of her fellow writers and critics.  Author James 
Branch Cabell, Newman’s longtime friend and mentor, wrote enthusiastically about the 
novel: “I can think of no book ever written by any woman which I like better. This 
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appears to be the most brilliant, the most candid, the most civilized, and…the most 
profound book yet written by any American woman” (Letters 213).  Others were shocked 
by Newman’s relatively frank discussion of female sexuality and sexual development, 
and like fellow writer Rebecca West, felt the need to criticize the novel publicly for the 
way it “hurls the sexual facts of life around like custard pies” (West 327).  The novel 
was banned in Boston for “obscene, indecent, impure language,” and Newman herself—
in her typical tongue-in-cheek fashion—commented that Atlanta was “shocked almost 
into convulsions over it” (Blake 308; Letters 226).  In an irony Newman likely would 
have enjoyed, the Southern culture she criticizes in her novel for its repressive and 
restrictive attitudes toward women proved to be just that in many of the harsh attacks 
on the “vulgarity” of the novel.3  
Indeed, critics struggled to fit Newman into an existing literary mold because of 
her ambivalent relationship to Southern culture; though she wrote mostly from and 
about the South, her satirical perspective and stylistic experimentation appeared to 
some as more in line with the European modernist tradition and compared her to 
Virginia Woolf and Marcel Proust rather than her fellow Southern writers such as 
Ellen Glasgow and Mary Johnson.  Early critics considered Newman’s innovative 
merging of Southern and modernist perspectives as paradoxical: “a strange mixture of a 
very modern woman, intellectually emancipated from conventionality and a Southern 
girl who has been carefully reared to remember all the proprieties” (qtd. in Wade 2).  
Newman herself indicated her fraught relationship to the South in numerous interviews 
and letters.  After fleeing Atlanta for New York in 1926, Newman wrote about feeling 
“homesick” until she sees “a copy of the Atlanta paper” and remembers “that I can never 
stand it again,” while later admitting to her inability to “write at all in New York” 
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(Letters 187; 295).  In The Hard-Boiled Virgin (hereafter HBV), loosely based on 
Newman’s own life, this ambivalence toward the South is manifest in the protagonist 
Katherine Faraday’s frustrated participation in the traditional Southern female rituals of 
chaste courtship, débutante balls, and finishing school.  The story follows Katherine 
from her early childhood at the turn of the century through her early adult years just 
following WWI, unfolding in a series of episodes in which she learns about the 
pressures and expectations of womanhood.  While she concedes to perform publicly an 
image of virginal femininity in an effort to secure a husband, the narrator offers 
glimpses of Katherine’s private, internal struggle to define her sexuality on her own 
terms, discover and explore her own body, nurture her intellect, and express herself as a 
writer.  
 One of the most distinctive features of this female bildungsroman is the persistent 
use of quantitative and geometric figures as a narrative device for describing Katherine’s 
calculated world.  As one critic writes, “Newman’s prose itself is remarkably, almost 
pathologically, saturated with repeated numerical references: dates, ages, and quantities 
are repeated so compulsively that they cease to be informational details and become 
instead an obtrusive rhetorical strategy” (Benson 641-2).  These numerical references 
generally emphasize the rigidly structured way of life that Katherine must navigate.  
She determines her actions according to “probability” and counts even the smallest 
gestures, taking “three sips of water” or adding “six cloves and two candied cherries” to 
her tea (110, 66).  Events are coordinated according to strict measures of time—“the 
first hour of five nights” or “during the fifteen hours of five days”—and clothing must be 
worn to mathematical perfection—hats are worn at the “correct angle,” skirts placed 
“four fashionable inches above her waist” complete only with “a pair of sixteen button 
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black glacé gloves” (106, 25, 88).  On a deeper level, Newman is particularly interested 
in exploring the effects of this calculating ethos on the female psyche—how it becomes 
internalized and transformed into a tool for self-scrutiny.  Katherine repeatedly subjects 
herself to self-measurement in order to assess her sexual desirability, as when she 
“remembered with mortification that her own chest and her own waist and her own hips 
had almost exactly the same circumference” (39).  Katherine’s hyper-rationalized world 
makes impossible any authentic expressions of sexuality and sensuality, as each move 
becomes a highly orchestrated effort to achieve “the right quantity and volume of 
laughter” in order to prove herself worthy of marriage (138).    
Though Katherine subjects herself to strict numerical analysis, her interest in 
practicing mathematics, or undertaking the “easy triumphs of mental arithmetic,” serves 
paradoxically as a refuge from all the external pressures imposed on her—a rare 
opportunity for introspective thought as opposed to superficial interactions.  Her 
voracious and early interest in reading mathematical and scientific textbooks pulled 
from her father’s library indicate her keen academic abilities and desire for intellectual 
stimulation. Katherine’s mother, however, perceives these talents as a liability and 
encourages her daughter instead to take up lessons in domestic science, or what 
Katherine sees as little more than “broiling chops and folding napkins” (168).  But 
Katherine realizes early on that her intellectual abilities are not valued above her ability 
to attract the opposite sex; she finds that both boys and men are “not usually taken with 
romantic attachments for little girls who can spell words of five syllables and who can 
find the eighteenth terms of an arithmetical progression” (46).  Both her entrapment 
within and transcendence through mathematical reasoning reinforce the double bind she 
finds herself in: she feels pressure to abandon her intellectual pursuits in favor of honing 
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her sexual attractiveness and wifely potential, at the same time that the expectation of 
chastity and sex within marriage lead her to believe that scholarly discipline is her only 
means of self-realization, lest she fall prey to “deviant” sexual temptations.  Indeed, the 
fundamental irony of the novel is that Katherine’s quest to attract a suitor with whom 
she can finally explore her budding sexuality actually precipitates her fear of sexual 
contact and makes her more vigilant about resisting temptations.  Forced into 
rationalistic overdrive by a strict set of social and sexual codes, Katherine struggles to 
relinquish these codes and allow herself to experience real pleasure.  When she does 
finally lose her virginity at the end of the novel, she so fears getting pregnant out of 
wedlock that she renounces marriage and sexual companionship to pursue instead her 
career as a writer.  Though she ultimately breaks away from the conventions of 
Southern belledom, she does so at the expense of suppressing her own sexuality.  
Katherine’s compulsion to quantify herself and her social world thus serves as a way for 
Newman to highlight the systemic constraints placed on sexual practices within a 
society that privileges rationalism, analysis, and classification.   
 And yet, on a narrative level, this recourse to mathematical description also 
enables Newman to represent sexuality outside of a sentimental framework—not as a 
symbolic, abstract concept but as a natural, biological phenomenon that can be 
scientifically validated.  As a Southern belle reared on traditional Victorian values, 
Katherine has no language for describing her own anatomy except to observe the 
geometric qualities of her body; through the “convex reflections” of her bathtub faucets, 
she hopes that time will “enlarge” and “curve” her “thin and very straight” legs, and she 
observes “between her flat chest and thin legs…a line she never noticed before—a 
delicate line which was slightly browner than the area she thought was her stomach” 
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(35).  This use of the “line” metaphor throughout the novel to refer to her genitalia 
reinforces Katherine’s sheltered upbringing while also allowing Newman to 
acknowledge a subject rarely discussed in such a candid way.  Katherine’s self-
exploration marks a significant step away from the romanticized and “purified” 
representations of sexuality and embodiment that she finds in the Victorian conduct 
manuals and sentimental novels that make up her early “education” and instead moves 
her toward an unfiltered and frank acknowledgement of her own anatomy.  This 
discovery also leads her to a “sudden revelation” about one of the functions of her 
anatomy: giving birth.  She conjures a dramatic scene of future childbirth, relying on 
Greek mythology as her only point of reference: 
She had a sudden revelation that…the part of herself which she thought was her 
stomach would burst along the delicate brown line, and that she would naturally 
shriek and that her daughter would dart into the world like Pallas Athena 
darting from the brain of Zeus, and that a doctor would give her ether and sew 
her up. (36)   
Despite this description’s childlike naiveté, she recounts this revelation in a relatively 
frank and unreserved way and indicates her incipient interest in the physiological and 
medical aspects of giving birth rather than the symbolic nature of childbirth and 
motherhood. 
One contemporary critic saw this frankness as HBV’s downfall, arguing that the 
novel “hovers between the unseen and the obscene” for the way that it is “scientifically 
frank in frequent references to certain biologic facts of feminine anatomy and 
physiology” (qtd in Wade 156-7).  But it is precisely this matter-of-fact approach that 
Newman self-consciously undertakes.  She viewed developments in the behavioral and 
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biological sciences as an opportunity rather than a constraint on sexual expression.  In 
an 1928 interview Newman credited modern psychology for recognizing sex as “one of 
the fundamental instincts of life” and therefore making it the rightful province of any 
literature “which deals with human beings.”  While still “not considered polite to 
mention it or be conscious of such a force existing,” Newman believed “it is far better to 
tell the truth about life from the beginning and thereby avoid disillusionment” (qtd in 
Wade 157). Rather than opposing scientific interpretations of sexuality, Newman’s 
heroine draws on the authority of science to legitimize her revelations about sexuality.  
In fact, this overlap of science and sexuality would hardly seem surprising or 
unexpected to Newman given the mathematical nature of late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century sexology and psychology, as I discuss in my Introduction.  
Indeed, it is only through medical and scientific texts that Katherine finds 
reliable and direct information about sex, especially in comparison to reading novels 
such as J.M. Barrie’s Sentimental Tommy (1896), through which Katherine learns only 
moral codes based on deeply subtextual references to sexuality.4  She first learns about 
male anatomy from Gray’s Anatomy of the Human Body (64); mating and reproduction 
from Darwin’s Origin of the Species (84); and venereal disease from Nelson’s Encyclopedia 
(171).  These resources offer her a culturally acceptable means of learning about her 
own body and a foundation for her later observations.  When Katherine begins to 
communicate her findings about men and women’s sexual behaviors and desires, she 
assumes the role of social scientist, observing and analyzing her subjects from a cool-
headed distance and even comparing her findings to scientific discoveries.  She feels “all 
the satisfaction of a scientific discovery” when “she realized how much her future life 
might be influenced by the knowledge that if a girl sits down and smiles up at a man 
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who is looking down at her, he will certainly kiss her if he takes either an honorable or 
dishonorable interest in her (186).  When she draws a similar conclusion about the 
seemingly unabashed sexual advances of men and the burden placed on women to resist 
them, she again feels “all the satisfaction of a scientific discovery, because she realized 
how much her future life might be influenced by the knowledge that if a woman tells a 
man she is hopelessly virginal, he will almost immediately try to prove that she is 
mistaken” (253).  With characteristic wit, Newman traces her heroine’s efforts to 
uncover fundamental truths about the relations between men and women—truths that 
seem to carry the weight of scientific fact.  Despite their humorous tone, these recurring 
“discoveries” also convey the importance Newman places on sexual education as an 
empowering and protective measure; Katherine understands the value of having access 
to “knowledge” that might “influence” her “future life.”    
Melanie Benson interprets these scientific and mathematical references as an 
“obtrusive rhetorical strategy” implemented to reinforce “the repressive devices of 
narcissism and arithmetic [that] circumscribe Katherine faithfully and increase 
exponentially until the end” (641).  While Newman draws on mathematical description 
to emphasize and critique the rigidly gendered and constraining social codes of 
Southern belledom, this appeal to mathematics is descriptive as well as prescriptive; her 
numerically saturated prose enacts a new way of representing sexuality that trades the 
rhetoric of sentiment for that of science.  It is also the novel’s sharp and extended 
critique of sentimentalism that has often been overlooked by critics, who tend to focus 
primarily on her satire of Southern culture.  From the very title of the novel, the term 
“hard-boiled” suggests to readers that the heroine will prove to be more tough and 
world-wise than the female characters who populate sentimental fiction, and Newman 
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likely shocked if not offended her public with the use of “virgin” as a proud moniker, 
particularly for her readers in the South, where, according to Newman, “no lady was 
supposed to know she was a virgin until she had ceased to be one” (175).  But it is 
Newman’s substitution of emotional content for mathematical description that most 
evidently establishes her anti-sentimental perspective.  From the novel’s first sentence, 
the narrator declares Katherine as the “sixth pledge of [her parent’s] love,” and caps off 
this opening chapter with Katherine’s first step toward disillusionment: the realization 
that “the holy bond of matrimony sometimes follow the horrors of connubial fury” and 
thus to the conclusion that her mother and father “are not only one flesh, but two” (9, 
11).  The narrator describes their relationship numerically to indicate Katherine’s naïve 
formulation of the realities of her parents’ sexual lives.  Numerical description functions 
as a key device through which the narrator communicates—while also distancing 
herself—from sensitive or taboo subjects.  This mathematical rhetoric provides just 
enough abstraction to open up a candid discussion of sexuality while also offering the 
narrator a critical, “objective” distance from such subjects.   
Katherine’s emerging writing career follows her move away from sentimental 
tropes and toward more realistic, deeply introspective subject matter.   Her style is not 
one drawn from inspiration as much as it is the result a carefully honed method and 
diligent practice.  In the evenings after reading the popular romance novel The Rosary 
(1909) by Florence Louisa Barclay, Katherine attempts to write her own romance, 
imagining herself as the heroine:  “[The Rosary] sent her to bed early every evening so 
that she could plan carefully punctuated stories about Katherine Faraday and a husband 
as handsome and as romantically broken in the hunting field as young Mr. Dugdale” 
(71).  It is only in the fictional world that Katherine can live out her romantic fantasies, 
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and yet in these early attempts at writing she feels compelled to conform to the 
conventions of nineteenth-century romantic fiction, leading her to construct storylines 
that contrast sharply with her reality.  After reading the meticulously detailed The 
History of England by Lord Macaulay (1864) and Walter Tyndale’s Below the Cataracts 
(1907), she likewise sketches her own precisely orchestrated romantic adventures, 
“plan[ing] carefully punctuated little stories about the evening, a correct year away, 
when Robert Carter would return to her…”(75).  But Katherine’s stories hardly capture 
the moments of sexual awakening that preoccupy her and which form the fundamental 
plot of Newman’s novel.  For Katherine, reading is an erotic experience, often 
accompanied by a “hot bath at night” and giving way to intimate moments of self-
exploration.  Writing, however, particularly as she initially conceives it, seems to 
require the sublimation of any erotic feeling.  Just after she plots out this rather chaste 
love story involving Robert Carter, the narrator offers a glimpse of the highly charged 
feelings Katherine cannot represent in her fiction: “And sometimes she did not read 
anything or plan anything, and a fountain rose and fell and dropped its electric spray 
through her thin brown body” (75).  Though somewhat disguised in metaphor, this rare 
reference to masturbation offers no illusion about the sexual desires of women that so 
often are elided in the Victorian literature Katherine diligently tries to imitate.  On the 
one hand, Katherine’s methodical, “calculating” approach to writing implicitly critiques 
the formulaic nature of romantic fiction—a genre that Newman suggests can be 
mastered simply through practice and repetition; on the other hand, her approach also 
mirrors the perspective of many contemporary modernist writers such Eliot and Pound, 
who sought to distinguish themselves from their literary predecessors by stressing 
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disciplined writing practices and establishing what they argued were certain “objective” 
standards of composition and literary evaluation.   
 But despite Katherine’s prudent, sometimes even compulsive, efforts at writing 
romantic fiction—in which she spends “hours planning letters,” “carefully calculat[ing] 
every sentence,” occupying “four years with writing and rewriting letters” that she 
hopes will be “sufficiently ardent”—she never quite masters the genre, just as her own 
life fails to conform to the model she finds in the sentimental fiction she reads (233-4, 
236).  It is only when she determines to write a more personal, “hard-boiled” story that 
she finds her voice and begins to garner critical success.  Her play, wittily titled “No 
Sheets,” depicts “a girl who could not face the idea of marriage or even seduction” (257), 
and marks Katherine’s first attempt to capture her true feelings in her fiction as well as 
her decision to eschew the pressures of courtship and marriage.  However, it is ironic 
that in doing so she fulfills the model of chastity that initially restrains her.  Katherine 
draws much satisfaction and self-confidence from her play’s success—which “had been 
admired by all the dramatic critics”—and begins to “feel at last that a peg has at least as 
much right to be square as a hole has to be round” (281).  Her revision to this familiar 
expression suggests that she embraces her noncomformity and relishes her new, even if 
frowned upon, career.  Through Katherine’s success as an author of a definitively 
modern, unconventional drama, Newman cleverly embeds a defense of her own style.  
Ultimately the novel’s numerically saturated prose seems less a device to ensnare or 
limit her heroine and instead one that frees both author and protagonist from the 
limitations they find in sentimental representations of femininity.   
In significant ways, Newman’s novel anticipates aspects of Lauren Berlant’s 
analysis of the sentimental; Newman, like Berlant, is attentive to the ways in which 
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sentimentality links women through narratives of common experience and suffering—
hence Katherine’s anxious anticipation of the pains of childbirth, the shame of premarital 
pregnancy, and the triumph of marriage gleaned from the sentimental novels she reads. 
As importantly, both Newman and Berlant are also critical of sentimentality’s ability to 
obscure the systematic inequalities and limitations imposed on women through its focus 
on empathetic identification over social activism and political reform.5  Through her 
hard-boiled heroine, Newman actively resists emotional identification and evocation in 
favor of illustrating her protagonist’s enculturation in a larger system of hierarchical 
authority.  The language of mathematics serves as an essential tool in Newman’s effort 
to not only to disassociate her writing from sentimentalism, but also to signify the 
deeper structural logic that shapes gendered power relations.  Newman finds in the non-
subjective, impersonal language of math a way to articulate not just Katherine’s 
personal trials and tribulations, but her entanglement in the patriarchal regulation of 
women’s sexual and artistic expression.  That Katherine internalizes this quantitative 
perspective further emphasizes the indivisibility of her private (sexual) world from the 
public (patriarchal) sphere.  Her attempts at self-calculation indicate a breakdown 
between the subjective and objective; she is no longer able to distinguish between her 
own desires and those imposed on her through social conditioning.   
 Within the tradition of modern American women’s writing (in so far as a 
coherent tradition exists), Newman’s novel serves as an important marker of how sexual 
expression came to be seen as the locus of women’s artistic and cultural liberation.  HBV 
stages the struggle to transition, as Dale Bauer observes in her recent study, “from 
sentimentality to intimacy” or from “a praxis of self-expression to a praxis of sexual 
expression” (4).  While Katherine struggles to move beyond self-expression to vocalize 
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her sexual desires, the narrator revels in sexual expressivity, refusing to be guarded and 
self-censored like her protagonist, unlocking the sexual and bodily realities that 
Katherine cannot comfortably articulate and which therefore inhibit her full self-
realization as both a sexual being and an unguarded writer.  Newman’s novel thus offers 
a useful lens through which to read the work of Mina Loy and H.D. for the way it 
contextualizes their continued investment in sexual expression as an emancipatory 
discourse connected to other forms of power.  What Newman, Loy and H.D. all have in 
common is their use of mathematical tropes to create a more politically charged, 
“objectively” grounded rhetoric that approaches sexuality not simply through an 
individualist framework but instead as a signifier of a culturally and structurally 
embedded logic.  For these writers, mathematics serves as a means both to critique 
existing paradigms and to create new forms of representation.   
 
II.  Plus/Minus Identities: Selected poems by Mina Loy 
Though now recognized primarily for her poetry, Mina Loy jump-started her writing 
career with a couplet of manifestos in 1914, titled “Aphorisms on Futurism” and 
“Feminist Manifesto.”  In a reverse move to many of her American writerly colleagues, 
Loy expatriated from Europe to America, settling in Greenwich Village in the 1920s 
and making New York and eventually Colorado her permanent home after 1936.6  
Despite her strong connection to the American writing scene, Loy’s creative influences 
were artistically and geographically varied.  Like H.D.’s association with the Anglo-
American, male-driven movements of Imagism and Vorticism, Loy was closely linked to 
Italian Futurism and its founder and her one-time lover F.T. Marinetti.  Loy and H.D.’s 
ambivalent relationships to these movements and their founders would become the 
source of much critical debate then and still now.7  What critics seem to find most 
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difficult is the problem of interpreting Loy and H.D.’s use of scientific and mathematical 
tropes—or what many interpret as unambiguous indicators of their aesthetic allegiance 
to these movements—in light of their otherwise fraught relationship to Vorticist and 
Futurist values.  This tendency to correlate mathematics and masculine aesthetics, 
however, ignores or misreads the feminist ends to which Loy, like Newman and H.D., 
deploys mathematical imagery.  To even greater political ends than Newman, I show 
how Loy draws on mathematical tropes to expose the patriarchal control of women’s 
romantic, sexual, and reproductive lives and also to envision a more companionate form 
of intimacy. 
 In her “Feminist Manifesto,” Loy introduces readers to some of the major 
concerns—marriage, sexuality, and the relationships among men and women—that 
animate her poetry.  Here, as in her poem “Virgins Plus Curtains Minus Dots” (1915), 
Loy seeks to expose the cold calculus of patriarchal marriage, in which women become a 
negative value:  
The woman who adapts herself to a theoretical valuation of her sex as a relative 
impersonality is not yet feminine. Leave off looking to men to find out what you 
are not. Seek within yourself to find out what you are. As conditions are at 
present constituted you have the choice between Parasitism, Prostitution, or 
Negation. (269) 
She laments women’s economic codependence, which leaves them little choice but to 
marry (parasitism), lest they turn to prostitution or destitution (negation).  Within the 
“economics” of marriage, she argues, “the value of woman depends entirely on chance,” 
or whether she can attain the “advantageous bargain” of marriage and thus “obtain a 
concrete value” (270).  She urges women to resist defining themselves in relation to men 
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or within a system that privileges and normalizes male experience.  While Loy argues 
that men and women’s sexual interests are pitted against one another, her work stays 
firmly within the boundaries of heterosexual coupling and even suggests that the act of 
sex (albeit disassociated from marriage) might bring men and women together: “The 
only point at which the interests of the sexes merge is the sexual embrace” (269).   She 
advocates for women’s sexual and reproductive rights, including the right to 
reproduction outside marriage, and for the removal of the stigma against sex.   
At the same time, her feminist values are underpinned by a troubling eugenic 
logic, through which she advocates for an “adequate proportion” of “women of superior 
intelligence” to “unfit or degenerate members of her sex” (270).  Ironically, she deploys 
the same logic of calculation to express her eugenic ideas as she does to critique the 
economic realities of marriage.  Like the writers on whom I focus in Chapter 1, these 
competing applications of quantitative description indicate its ongoing use as means to 
both construct and constrain particular qualities of personhood (an empowered 
femininity and a resolute ideal of whiteness).  Though the writers on whom I focus in 
this chapter engage less explicitly with issues of race and ethnicity than those I discuss 
in Chapter 1, Loy’s manifesto, along with the relative silence of H.D. and Newman on 
the subject of race, in effect normalizes white women’s experience and exemplifies first-
wave feminism’s exclusionary politics, or, as Dana Seitler observes, “early-twentieth-
century feminism’s campaign to free white women from masculine hegemony through a 
commitment to popular science, specifically ‘eugenic discipline’” (64).  Loy, H.D, and 
Newman are certainly also much more attuned to the gendered history of science and 
mathematical praxis than to the ways their methods have been used to rationalize racial 
discrimination and categorization.     
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 Like her “Feminist Manifesto,” the title of Loy’s poem “Virgin Plus Curtains 
Minus Dots” (1915) similarly points to the economic equation of marriage by which 
virginal brides must give up their dots (shorthand for dowries) to become captives of 
their homes.  The poem elaborates on the results of this equation: while men “are going 
somewhere/ And they may look everywhere,” houses “hold virgins,” who “without 
dots/ Stare beyond probability” (36).  Loy stresses the unlikelihood of a woman’s 
mobility without a husband or financial resources by deeming it a statistical 
improbability.  Women buy into the fantasy of love while the underlying economic 
motivations of marriage are obscured:  
We have been taught 
Love is a god 
White  with soft wings 
Nobody shouts 
VIRGINS FOR SALE 
Yet where are our coins 
For buying a purchaser 
 
Love is a god 
Marriage expensive 
 
A secret well kept.  (37) 
 
The poem addresses women as a collective body in its use of “we” and “our” to 
emphasize these sexual and marital conventions as widespread, systematic, and 
recursive. Women “have been taught” that love is an intangible, priceless quality, while 
“the secret well kept” is the literal and figurative price that one pays to be worthy of 
purchase, having no “coins” of her own “For buying a purchaser.”  If this poem focuses 
on the initial “transaction” that leads to women’s physical, social, and emotional 
confinement, “The Effectual Marriage or The Insipid Narrative of Gina and Miovanni” 
(1917) (commonly interpreted as a reference to Loy’s own relationship to Giovanni 
Papini, an Italian journalist and writer), points to her eventual complacency toward 
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domestic entrapment.  In their house, they are physically separated according to 
traditional gender roles—he in his library, she in the kitchen: 
In the evening they look out their two windows 
Miovanni out of his library window 
Gina from the kitchen window 
From among his pots and pans 
Where he so kindly kept her 
Where she so wisely busied herself.   (31) 
 
Loy satirically suggests that Gina might feel herself “immaterial” if it were not for her 
important role as a “correlative” to her husband, an “instigation of the reaction of man” 
(31).  Her critique of the idea that a woman’s significance is defined in relation to male 
needs and desires recalls her manifesto’s demand for women to be more than a “relative 
impersonality.”  As the instigator of “the reaction of man,” or the “mollescent irritant of 
his fantasy,” Loy also critiques the subordination of women’s sexual pleasure to that of 
men (31).  In its place, Gina busies herself with frivolous domestic activities, or the “pet 
simplicities of her Universe,” and convinces herself that she lives in a perfect world, 
“where circles were only round/Having no vices” (35).  Like a circle, her daily routine 
has no clear start or finish and every day, as with every given point on a circle, is 
identical to every other.  These two concluding lines of the poem suggest that Gina is 
tragically and unknowingly trapped in the geometry of her domestic surroundings, 
unaware, as one critic observes, of what keeps her within “circumscribed gender limits.”8  
 While Loy relies on mathematical imagery to reinforce marriage as a zero-sum 
game (“Virgin Plus”) or as a cyclical repetition of domestic tasks (“Effectual Marriage”), 
she also frames childbearing in mathematical terms, as an act that might lead women 
from a negative to a positive self-image.  “Parturition” (1914) begins with a woman in 
the throes of giving birth—a still-taboo subject, rarely if ever before represented in such 
vivid detail.9  The woman initially experiences the breakdown of her external and 
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internal selves: “I am the centre/Of a circle of pain/Exceeding its boundaries in every 
direction” (67).  During labor, she sees herself as little more than the bearer of intense 
pain, or the “infinitely prolonged nerve vibrations,” a mere vessel for the birth of her 
child: “I am the false quantity/In the harmony of physiological potentiality” (67).  As 
delirium sets in, she again senses the “Negation of myself as a unit,” but when she feels 
the “Stir of incipient life/Precipitating into me,” she begins to recognize her own value 
and strength:       
Mother I am 
Identical 
With infinite Maternity 
     Indivisible 
     Acutely 
     I am absorbed 
     Into 
The was-is-ever-shall-be 
Of cosmic reproductivity.  (70) 
 
She identifies herself assertively as a mother and feels an instant, unbreakable bond with 
all other mothers, to whom she now feels cosmically linked.  This gives her a sense of 
positive definition, a feeling of revelation and release (infinitude) and wholeness rather 
than negation (indivisibility).  As she senses herself “unfolding” and becoming a 
“woman-of-the-people,” she revels in the multiplicity of her identity and her inclusion in 
a larger collective subjectivity (70-1).  Here, the mathematical language reinforces the 
breakdown of the internal/external, the subjective/objective, wherein her individual 
experience is expressed within a collective discourse.   
 While these mathematical modifiers might seem little more than playful 
projections of a Futurist aesthetic of abstraction and aggression, as many critics have 
suggested, Loy’s use of math registers a much deeper and dynamic feminist agenda.  
Loy, like Newman and H.D., draws on math to envision a model of companionate love 
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that displaces gender as a determining factor and instead focuses on the social 
frameworks from which sexual identity is constructed.  Loy and H.D. in particular draw 
important links among patriarchal authority, scientific determinism, and gender and 
sexual essentialism.  For Loy, these links are best demonstrated in her poem “Human 
Cylinders” (1917), in which she laments the “scientification” of sex—and with it the 
universalization of male sexuality—while also imagining a more sensual, reciprocal 
form of sex.  She begins with a critique of mechanical and detached sexual interactions: 
“The human cylinders/Revolving in the enervating dusk/” fail to reach “the mystery of 
singularity” by simply going through the motions, “Having eaten without 
tasting/Talked without communion” (12).  In “the lucid rush-together of automatons,” 
the lack of meaningful connection prevents these lovers from finding out if they “Could 
form one opulent wellbeing” (12).  This subordination of erotic love to robotic coupling 
recalls a similar critique of a mechanistic male libido and the subsequent deferment of 
female pleasure in her “Love Songs to Joannes” (1915-17): “Something the shape of a 
man…/More of a clock-work mechanism/Running down against time/To which I am 
not paced” (92).  In the second stanza of “Cylinders,” Loy connects these “clock-work” 
sexual relations to a broader cultural privileging of logic and intellect over intuition and 
sensuality.  Through the “[s]implifications of men,” or the “frenzied reaching out of 
intellect to intellect,” sex becomes an intellectual rather than a bodily experience, a 
suppression of the physical or somatic aspects of intimacy: 
Concordance of respiration 
Shames 
Absence of corresponding between the verbal sensory 
And reciprocity 
Of conception 
And expression 
Where each exudes beyond the tangible 
One thin pale trail of speculation  (12) 
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In a results-oriented, rationalistic modern culture, Loy suggests, we become 
disembodied beings seeking to reason our way toward some kind of transcendence or 
move “beyond the tangible,” bringing us closer to that “one last tentacle of intuition” 
left “[t]o quiver among the stars” (13).  But intellectual discourse, or the “verbal 
sensory,” she urges, can hardly be a substitute for the physical connection that arises 
from the “concordance of respiration” and brings us no closer to transcendent truth, but 
only to a “thin pail trail of speculation.”      
 The third and final stanza moves toward greater generalization by linking 
sexual and scientific determinism.  In our desire for concrete answers and definitive 
subject positions, we reach for “the impartiality of the absolute,” which collapses or 
“routs the polemic,” reducing our unique qualities and perspectives to a destructive 
sameness.  Loy contends that our compulsion toward the absolute is what brings us 
dangerously close to our own undoing: 
Or which of us 
Would not 
Receiving the holy-ghost 
Catch it and caging 
Lose it 
Or in the problematic  
Destroy the Universe 
With a solution (13) 
 
In recognizing our ability to “destroy the Universe/ With a solution”—a plausible 
reality during an ongoing world war—Loy warns against the technoscientific 
domination of human nature.  She posits a kind of proto-ecofeminist argument by 
showing that the same logic that seeks to constrain women’s sexual and emotional lives 
also propels the desire to dominate the human and natural world.  As a whole, the poem 
draws analogies between the battle of the sexes and large-scale warfare and establishes 
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a causal link between sexual and bodily disconnection and the potential for human 
destruction.  
 And yet, despite the poem’s critique of a mathematized and mechanized culture, 
Loy’s version of the geometric body, the human cylinder, also envisions the potential for 
intimate interactions that transcend prescriptive gender roles.  As equal forces, these 
two bodies hold the possibility that they might “wrap each closer,” engage in nonverbal 
and sensory communication, and realize their potential to “form one opulent wellbeing” 
rather than succumb to an isolating self-absorption.  Loy laments a shared intimacy 
never fully realized with frequent references to cooperative terms—“communion,” 
“leaning brow to brow,” “communicative,” “concordance,” “corresponding,” and 
“reciprocity”—qualities integral to her vision of an ideal partnership.  For Loy, such a 
partnership is not a call for absolute sameness and stability, but instead for a 
relationship that is “revolving” or ever changing and does not try to “rout the polemic” 
or eradicate difference.  Though Loy’s use of the geometric body is not as sustained or 
as self-consciously deployed as H.D., it nonetheless reflects Loy’s frequent turn to 
mathematical imagery as a mode of feminist critique and inspiration.  Her “repurposing” 
of mathematics to describe and interpret a female worldview complicates traditional 
interpretations of her math aesthetic as an extension of a masculinist, Futurist agenda.  
Her work also offers a broader perspective on what modernist writers find so 
compelling about mathematics; it is not simply a rote tool of calculation or a symbol of 
absolute certainty but rather a vehicle through which we might alter or reshape our 
perceptions and patterns of living.  
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III. Concentric Configurations: H.D.’s HERmione  and Nights  
H.D.’s semi-autobiographical novel HERmione (1927) sketches the interior world of its 
protagonist Hermione “Her” Gart as she navigates familial expectations and romantic 
relationships.  The novel is sprinkled with first person declarations –“I am Hermione 
Gart”—but is predominately told by a third person omniscient narrator who 
occasionally undercuts Hermione’s self-revelations—“She was not Gart, she was not 
Hermione” (4).  The novel is at once an intensely personal and introspective character 
study and also a detached analysis of a woman trapped in a world shaped by those 
around her.  As Susan Friedman writes, the novel “demonstrates a self-conscious play 
with splitting, then doubling, the self into analyst and analysand” and documents “the 
endless process of ‘working through’ the tangled forest of female subjectivity within a 
culture and language that perpetually positioned her as an object” (81-3).  Hermione 
oscillates between subject and object status throughout the novel.  The nickname Her—
as both proper name and object pronoun—“intensifies the split between the narrating ‘I’ 
and its object, the narrated ‘Her’” (Friedman 83).  This deliberate blurring of boundaries 
between subjectivity and objectivity is part of H.D.’s larger effort to challenge the 
division of art and science.  Particularly through the trope of mathematics, HER 
explores the capacity for science to construct, constrain, and express subjectivity, and 
conversely, the artist’s ability to analyze, objectify, and experiment with her subject.    
 For H.D., reconciling the hierarchical divisions between science and art, 
objectivity and subjectivity, certainty and creativity was a deeply personal issue.  She 
comes from a long line of distinguished scientists, including her maternal grandfather, 
Francis Wolle, a well-known botanist; her father, Charles Doolittle, an accomplished 
professor of astronomy and mathematics at Lehigh University and first director of the 
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Flower Astronomical Observatory at the University of Pennsylvania; and her older 
brother Eric, who succeeded his father as a professor of astronomy at Penn.  H.D. felt 
the weight of her father’s expectations from an early age:  he “wanted eventually (he 
even said so) to make a higher mathematician of me or research worker or scientist like 
(he even said) Madame Curie.  He did make a research worker of me but in another 
dimension” (qtd in Psyche Reborn 200).  H.D. suggests that her writing methods and 
techniques owe something to her father’s profession, though she claims to “derive my 
imaginative faculties through my musician-artist mother” (TF, 121).  As the only child 
in the Doolittle family not to graduate from college, H.D. felt like a failure, especially to 
her father; she wrote about this struggle to define herself in relation to her parents: “she 
was a disappointment to her father, an odd duckling to her mother, an importunate 
overgrown unincarnated entity that had no place here” (qtd in Guest 22).  H.D. often 
refers to the pull she felt between her scientist father and artistic mother and her 
continual search for her place on the spectrum between them.  As she writes in Tribute 
to Freud, “I am on the fringes or in the penumbra of the light of my father’s science and 
my mother’s art” (145).   She later sought to reconcile these forces—her father’s science 
and her mother’s art, mathematics and myth, intellect and imagination—in her analysis 
of a particularly vivid dream in which she leads her father to meet “the Queen, the 
mother”: 
They and the dream reconcile my father’s purely formal, rational, scientific 
mathematics + astronomy with the inner mystery of the letter and numbers + 
the astrology + star lore + ‘myth’ of the Kabballe….Mathematical Astronomy + 
‘mystical’ religious or esoteric Astrology are reconciled. Or reality + fantasy…or 
intellect + imagination…or science + art…+ so on. (qtd in Psyche Reborn 188)  
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The plot of HER involves a similar path toward self-discovery that depends on 
Hermione’s ability to reconcile these seemingly oppositional forces—to make science a 
vehicle for art and art an interpreter of science.   
The novel opens with an emotionally distraught and confused Hermione, who 
has left college after failing a geometry course, much like H.D.’s early withdrawal from 
Bryn Mawr.  Uncertain about her direction in life, Hermione “went round in circles,” 
feeling “nebulous” and considering herself  “a failure” (3-4).  She identifies her “failure to 
conform to expectations” as her inability to pass a mathematics course, specifically conic 
sections, or the study of curves formed by the intersection of a plane with a cone:  
[C]onic sections was the final test she failed in. Conic sections would whirl 
forever round her for she had grappled with the biological definition, transferred 
to mathematics, found the whole thing untenable. She found the theorem tenable 
until she came to conic section and then Dr. Barton-Furness had failed her, failed 
her…they had all failed her. Science, as Bertram Gart knew it, failed her…and 
she was good for nothing. (5-6) 
 
    Ronnie Woo, Shane Harris 2008 
 
While Hermione assumes some of the blame for this failure, she suggests that her male 
professor and her scientist brother Bertram (modeled on her brother Eric)—and 
masculinist science more generally—are also to blame for her ultimate exclusion from 
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the realm of science.  Interestingly, H.D. takes some creative liberties with her 
biography in this respect: although she was doing poorly in her other classes at Bryn 
Mawr, it was a literature and not a mathematics course in which she received her only 
failing grade.10  Her protagonist’s failure in mathematics, however, points to the 
powerful effect that H.D.’s father had on her sense of “valuable” work.  Hermione 
laments her lack of success in the sciences because, as for H.D., it would have given her 
the validation and acceptance from her father she craved: “Her mathematics and her 
biology hadn’t given her what she dreamed of.  Only now she knew that failing at the 
end meant fresh barriers, fresh chains, a mesh here.  The degree almost gained would 
have been redemption” (12).  Throughout the novel, mathematics functions dialectically 
as a field that excludes and alienates Hermione, but one to which she is also continually 
attracted and through which she expresses and validates her emotional, sexual, and 
bodily desires.  She finds mathematics both disabling and enabling; on the one hand, the 
subject triggers a crippling self-doubt about the value and significance of her work and 
acts as a symbolic specter of domestic entrapment and heteronormative expectations, 
while, on the other hand, it provides her an unbiased vocabulary to talk about her 
innermost fears and desires.   
 No longer in school and uncertain about her future, Hermione is thrown back 
into the tedium and tensions of family life in her parent’s Pennsylvania home, which the 
narrator describes through a series of arithmetic metaphors.  Her brother Gart and his 
new wife Minnie, also take up residence in Gart Grange, disrupting the family dynamics 
and leaving Hermione to recalculate her position within the household.  Minnie, in her 
neediness and attention-seeking behavior, seems to Hermione “like some fraction to 
which everything had to be reduced” (15).  Minnie’s introduction to the family makes 
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Hermione feel like the odd person out; at the dinner table she looks on as “Gart and 
Gart sat facing Gart and Gart,” their even pairing further naturalizing the heterosexual 
coupling that so far eludes Hermione (35).  Minnie’s conventional femininity makes 
Hermione feel inadequate, eliciting anxious memories of grade school arithmetic:  
Minnie made her feel eight, nine with a page of those fractions which all have to 
be resolved to something different because one of them is of a different 
common…. something. Denominator. Even the least thought of add, subtract 
made Her feel blurred, she could never again casually deal with fractions in 
composite values. Minnie however was, she knew it, the one fraction that 
reduced them all, as family, to that level. (17)  
Minnie provokes Hermione’s regression to childhood feelings of jealousy, 
competitiveness, and inadequacy.  This scene of the traumatic math class returns again 
and again in Hermione’s most emotionally vulnerable moments, a referent for the 
feelings of inadequacy she has difficulty expressing.  The overbearing and controlling 
nature of her on-and-off again lover and one-time fiancé George Lowndes (a nod to 
H.D’s affair with Ezra Pound) draws out Hermione’s insecurities as both a writer and 
lover; he “brought back hunched shoulders, little desk…and the heated scrape of slate 
pencil across slate surface. Numbers jogged and danced and long division made a stop in 
her brain…” (66).  When she later breaks her engagement with George, having fallen 
deeply in love with Fayne Rabb (likely a stand-in for H.D.’s lesbian affair with Frances 
Gregg), the nervous responses from her family again prompt her math anxiety: “[S]he 
dreamt she was waiting for examinations and had forgotten logarithm. Logarithms. 
Something binomial and something conic that was a section” (196).  Hermione 
correlates all her subsequent “failures,” particularly her failure to conform to 
 101 
heterosexual norms, with her failure to become a successful scientist like her father and 
brother—that is, her failure to the follow the “Gart formula.”  H.D. uses this math 
imagery both as a symbol of the emotional barriers she constructs for herself and as 
mode of expression for her feelings of anxiety and “failure” to conform to external 
expectations.   
The narrator also uses arithmetic and geometric terms to emphasize Hermione’s 
feelings of social and spatial confinement.  Hermione is critical of the women in her 
social circle, who seemed to her “flamingly parasitic,” desperately striving to model 
themselves on European bourgeois culture, collecting things that “could hardly have 
been distinguished from that of Chelsea or certain sectors of the Rive Gauche” (48).   
Hermione finds this careful, calculated self-fashioning daunting and even distorting: “A 
convex Victorian mirror above the head of the girl opposite showed Nellie and 
Hermione tilted sidewise….careful lines of the oblong pattern where the folded cloth 
had been carefully unfolded, making two careful lines bisecting teacups” (52).  It occurs 
to Hermione that she “was not made for any of these groups” because she is unable to 
conform like the others, who “were assorted, out of different boxes, yet all holding to 
some pattern, they had the trademark of nonentity” (55).   Though George has little 
money, he offers Hermione the potential for escape from this rigidly structured life, but 
she cannot ignore her attraction to Fayne, leaving her feeling “broken like a nut 
between two rocks” and unable to break from the house that confines her (81):   
We are set like a problem on a blackboard. The house is a columns of figures, 
double column and the path at right angles to the porch steps is the line beneath 
numbers and the lawn step is the tentative beginning of a number and the little 
toolshed and the springhouse at the far corner of the opposite side is bits of 
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jotted-down calculations that will be rubbed out presently…Suffocating…it’s 
suffocating. It’s like breathing in a crowded schoolroom. (83) 
Metaphors of calculation and accounting reinforce Hermione’s financial conundrum: 
George cannot offer her stability, but neither can she establish an independent life with 
Fayne without the monetary support of her father.  When Hermione asks her mother to 
join her in breaking from the “Uncle Sam, Carl-Bertrand-Gart God” that “shuts us up in 
a box,” her mother responds, “your father and his work are more important” (96).  
Hermione pleads further: “Why don’t you see—don’t you see? There are numbers 
fencing us in. We are being fenced in with numbers, one I love, two I love, three I love” 
(96-7).  Numbers function as metonymies for the patriarchal, heteronormative practices 
that lead her mother to sacrifice her own desires to support her husband’s career and 
keep Hermione under her father’s control, discouraging her self-sufficiency and denying 
her the possibility of a life with Fayne.  And yet, by “fencing her in,” these numbers also 
work to define Hermione’s sense of self; the numbers function as an “external” mode of 
order that paradoxically constitutes her and those she loves as subjects.    
What appears to save Hermione from the depths of despair is her discovery of 
writing as a means of escape from her calculated, regulated lifestyle: “some scheme of 
biological mathematical definition left Her dizzy. It had not occurred to Her to try and 
put the thing in writing” (71).   Though she earlier associates mathematical imagery 
with her feelings of inadequacy and her entrapment within a carefully orchestrated, 
homogenized social environment, she begins to claim writing as scientific research “in 
another dimension.”  While Bertrand “later turned to mathematics. Hermione, in the 
same spirit, later turned to Bertrand’s bookshelves” (18).  She comes to see writing as a 
companionate if not superior tool for understanding the world around her:  
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Now I will reveal myself in words, words may now supercede a scheme of 
mathematical-biological definition. Words may be my heritage and with words I 
will prove conic sections a falsity….mythopoeic mind (mine) will disprove 
science and biological-mathematical definition. (76)  
Finally able to assume the first-person perspective, Hermione recognizes her authorial 
power to create a particular reality and to develop her own sense of truth just a scientist 
seeks to establish a “mathematical-biological definition.”  Moreover, as Adelaide Morris 
argues, Hermione’s declaration reflects H.D.’s overarching critique of “the foundations 
of the Order of Gart,” or some of the basic premises of Newtonian-Cartesian science, 
“among them the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, the notion of absolute 
space and absolute time, and the feasibility of precise linear statements” (161).  Rather 
than “imitating, complementing, or assimilating science,” Morris argues persuasively 
that H.D. overturns the foundations of classical science “by following intuitions that 
share their matrix with the insights that generated relativity, quantum mechanics, and 
chaos theory,” or the so-called post-classical sciences that embrace relativism, 
contingency, and indeterminacy (176).  In this sense, she does something quite different 
from her contemporaries Pound and Eliot; she does not seek to model her fiction on 
science, but instead to use fiction as a vehicle for interpreting and interrogating our 
assumptions and beliefs about science and mathematics as well to explore their creative 
and aesthetic dimensions.  
 In some instances H.D. appears to privilege fiction writing over scientific 
communication; words, as Hermione suggests, supercede mathematical expressions in 
their ability to elicit emotional responses and assume multiple meanings.  When her 
mother Eugenia divulges the poignant details of Hermione’s birth, every word is 
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weighted with meaning: “Words of Eugenia had more power than textbooks, than 
geometry, than all of Carl Gart and brilliant ‘Bertie Gart’” (89).  And yet, while H.D. 
celebrates the creative, expressive, intuitive power of writing, it is also the deeply 
personal, almost confessional nature of writing that often drives her to take refuge in 
the less emotionally charged, value-neutral language of mathematics.  Particularly in 
her attempts to represent the morally laden, socially contentious subjects of female 
sexuality and lesbian desire, H.D.’s narrator frequently relies on geometric imagery.  
She reappropriates the subject of geometry from a practice that alienates her (her failure 
to pass conic sections) to a mode of expression for her most intimate desires.  These 
mathematical metaphors succeed in couching controversial subjects behind the 
authoritative, impartial discourse of science and also reinforce the inadequacy of 
ordinary language to convey the complexities of human experience, especially with 
regard to sexuality: “There were things she would never get into words, mixed up with 
mathematics” (17).  Rather than functioning as empty signifiers, however, these 
geometric figures are crucial to H.D.’s effort to defamiliarize conventional 
representations of sexuality as biologically fixed and gender-based and at the same time 
to naturalize and normalize new, more fluid and multi-dimensional models of sexuality.  
Hermione is introduced to Fayne at the same tea party she initially describes as 
overly calculated and confining; however, seeing Fayne actually changes the geometry 
of the room, opening up the space to new possibilities:   
A face drew out of people grouped like teacups and people bisected by long lines 
of blue curtain…Across the table, with its back to the little slightly convex 
mirror, facing Her Gart and Jessie, was this thing that made the floor sink 
beneath her feet and the wall rise to infinity above her head. The wall and the 
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floor were held together by long dramatic lines of curtain falling in straight 
pleated parallels. (52) 
Hermione cannot yet name this “thing,” this magnetic attraction to a “girl who was 
seeing Her” and whose stare seem to encode their mutual desire (52).  In their 
entrancement with one another, they are suspended in time and space, liberated from 
the bisecting lines that once divided the room but now appear as straight parallels 
stretching to infinity.  The room’s infinite expansion suggests the possibility of 
breaking from conventional relationship patterns and creating new social arrangements.  
While Fayne provokes Hermione to imagine new spatial (and sexual) orientations, 
George can only divide her from herself, offering no alternative to or transcendence 
from the existing structure of her life.  Though she does have feelings for him, he 
cannot fully satisfy her desires:  “She wanted George with some uncorrelated sector of 
Her Gart, she wanted George to correlate for her, life here, there.  She wanted George 
to define and make definable a mirage, a reflection of some lost incarnation” (63).  Up 
until this chance meeting with Fayne, Hermione looked to Gart to satisfy her unfulfilled 
desire, the “lost incarnation,” that had yet to materialize or to take shape.  As in other 
instances, the narrator abstracts Hermione’s physical and emotional desires into a 
vaguely spatial image, and here this serves to emphasize that the part of her—the 
“sector”—that loved and desired George was only a fraction of her whole self.  At least 
initially George seems to hold the promise of a “correlated” or “normal” life, but 
Hermione cannot suppress her intense attraction for Fayne, an attraction she 
communicates through the language of geometry.  
When she kisses George, she does not feel transformed into another dimension 
as she does with Fayne: George’s kisses “smudged out circles and concentric 
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circle…The kisses of George smudged out her clear geometric thought but his words 
had given her something” (73).  George interrupts her “clear geometric thought”—her 
visions of synchronized, concentric bodies—with his linear efforts to make love to her.  
Though George does inspire her to take up writing, Hermione describes their physical 
interactions as overly courteous and somewhat contrived: “the recurring, rather 
chivalrous really, kiss of George…doesn’t affect the back of my head” (74).  Even as she 
shares this intimate moment with George in the forest, her mind wanders back to the 
moment she and Fayne first met.  Recharged with erotic tension, Hermione recalls that 
Fayne, “had made walls heave and walls fall and straight lines run to infinity in the 
polished surface left between groups of people talking” (74).  Whereas arithmetic 
computations evoke anxiety, failure, and entrapment for Hermione, she begins to 
associate geometric figures with clarity, openness, and erotic energy.  The narrator 
relies primarily on geometric terms to describe the intimate, bodily interactions 
between Hermione and Fayne during their only fully realized sexual encounter of the 
novel:  
Her Gart saw rings and circles, the rings and circles that were the eyes of Fayne 
Rabb. Rings and circles made concentric curve toward a ceiling that was, as it 
were, the bottom of a deep pool.  Her and Fayne Rabb were flung into a 
concentric intimacy, rings on rings that made a geometric circle toward a 
ceiling, that curved over them like ripples on a pond surface. (164) 
For H.D. geometry is thus not only, as Hickman argues, “linked with erotic intensity,” 
but rather enables the expression of “deviant” sexuality, safeguarding her sexual desires 
in a universally accepted, culturally authoritative idiom.  As Susan Friedman writes, 
“desire—forbidden desire—cannot speak itself directly, in public,” however, “fiction can 
 107 
disguise forbidden desire so that it can escape the censor to find some sort of screened 
expression” (24).  In HER, geometric figures encode the explicit details of Hermione’s 
sexual encounters while still offering readers veiled access to these intimate, private 
moments.  
 Although this novel went unpublished during H.D.’s lifetime (a fact that might 
suggest her effort to suppress her bisexual identity), her gesture toward geometry 
appears less an act of concealment than an attempt to naturalize homosexual desire and 
to frame it in unbiased, gender-neutral terms.11  Just like the concentric circles that 
occur in nature—“on a pond surface,” for example—Her and Fayne are drawn into, 
“flung into,” a mutually supportive, symmetrical relationship.  Unlike the divisive, 
phallic imagery she associates with George—“static, upright, parallel, the static upright 
tree shafts held parallel crossbeams of polished oak wood” (92)—the circular imagery 
she associates with same-sex coupling represents the appealing qualities of wholeness, 
equality, and dynamism.  Though the language of geometry offers a degree of protective 
abstraction, H.D. hardly shies away from exploring lesbian desire as an alluring 
alternative to heterosexual monotony. 
Suspended in time and space, H.D.’s geometric bodies are not only free from the 
typical constraints of societal expectation and judgment, but also more specifically from 
traditional demarcations of gender.  Though modernist scholars insist on the 
correlation of mathematical imagery and masculinist aesthetics, what is so compelling 
about H.D.’s use of math, as well as that of the other women writers on whom I focus, is 
their insistence on math as a means of critiquing heterosexual and sexist culture as well 
as unsettling and denaturalizing conventional gender roles and relationships.  Math is 
instead a contested discourse through which male writers often seek affiliation and 
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resolution and through which women writers such as H.D. envision escape from the 
burdens of gender.  Indeed, HER renders problematic any easy equation of sex, gender 
and desire; concentric circles signify love, intimacy, and togetherness irrespective of any 
gender inflections.   
This transcendence of the gendered body through geometry is taken to new 
heights in H.D.’s Nights (1935), in which the protagonist, Natalia, longs to be “embodied 
in long parallelograms and in square and cube and rectangle” to escape the pressures of 
heterosexual coupling and maternal expectation.  As a semi-autobiographical novella 
about a woman’s journey toward sexual self-discovery, Nights is strikingly similar to 
HER, though in many ways a more tragic depiction of a journey toward self-realization.  
Like Hermione, Natalia struggles with the burden of sexual choice.  Unable to salvage 
her marriage to her unfaithful husband Neil, who has run off to Italy to rendezvous with 
a group of young male companions, she begins an intense, twelve-day affair with the 
much younger David in the hopes that he will assuage her despair, all the while 
struggling with her attractions to her sister-in-law’s friend Una, who “with her damned 
homosexuality, had kept that other light burning in a secret crypt” (69).  Natalia 
struggles to make sense of Neil’s infidelity, speculating that she might have driven him 
away by her resistance to having children: “Was her fervour [for David], after all, an 
illicit escape, an inhuman intolerance of the casual, tiresome things of this life? Should 
she have Neil’s children?” (53).  Renne, her sister-in-law and confidante, tries to 
dissuade her from thinking about children as a solution to her marital problems: “I’ve 
told you a thousand times, that would spoil everything. If you have his child then you 
are woman, he is man, that’s smashed” (46).  Though Renne believes that Natalia and 
Neil simply need a “spot of good analysis,” Renne also understands Natalia’s desire to 
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resist conventional marital roles and recognizes her deep ambivalence about bearing 
children.   
 Natalia turns to David with the expectation that she can escape the “tiresome 
things in life” through a series of intense, but non-committal sexual encounters carried 
out over a string of nights.   But she soon learns the self-sacrifice she must undergo in 
her lovemaking sessions with David: “she would hold her muscles tense, herself only a 
sexless wire that was one wire for the fulfillment” (51).  Their non-reciprocal and even 
suffocating sexual encounters (“her breath was taken into his body, then she stopped 
breathing”) lead Natalia to pleasure herself once David has left (“after you left….then I 
excited myself more”) (63-4).  In the description of her ninth evening with David, 
geometric imagery functions to restructure her relationship to David and to herself; she 
dreams of transforming herself via geometric reconfiguration—a transformation that 
suggests her desire for self-pleasure over self-erasure:  
She must get away, must lie alone, must let lines and patterns and the two 
interlocked triangles of light and shadow, like the drawing-book illustration of 
light and shadow, draw her out. She wanted to watch triangles of light and 
shadow, on her ceiling. She wanted to lie, parallel with a ceiling and she wanted 
to be a parallel, running to infinity and never touching that twin other line. She 
wanted David there. But she must be free. (90) 
Natalia longs to be transported to another reality and to be free, like a parallel line that 
never converges with the other.  She longs, like Loy’s female subjects, for a sexual 
identity that exists apart from and is not defined by men.  Her re-embodiment in 
“square and cube and rectangle” promises an escape from the physical constraints of 
femininity, and more specifically, as Hickman argues, from “childbearing and its 
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entailments” (167).  The geometric simplicity and sleekness of her house offers her a 
model of ideal bodily form that bears none of the usual markers of identity:  
The house was her spirit—she had never so loved any house. It was parallel and 
modern and ran level with lines of mountain, it was squares to be bisected and 
parallelograms and rhomboids. In the sparse and geometric contour of the house, 
there was all wisdom… She would be so embodied in long parallelograms and in 
square and cube and rectangle. She wanted those things. (90)   
Rather than a tragic “erasure of the feminine,” this desire for geometric embodiment 
imagines a self-contained, self-fulfilled, and independent subjectivity (Friedman 270).  
Natalia’s desire for bodily transcendence and ultimately her death by suicide—both 
figured through geometric metaphors—are as much a comment on the physical and 
sexual restrictions imposed on women by a patriarchal culture as they are about what 
might be gained through denaturalizing and reconfiguring traditional gender and 
sexual roles.   
 In both HER and Nights, the fantasy of geometric embodiment is a radical 
solution to the problem of phallocentric power structures, though neither protagonist 
ultimately succeeds in overcoming the social pressures that characterize her existence.  
In Nights, for example, Natalia’s personal, introspective account of her affair, which 
makes up Part 2 of the novella, is filtered through the lens of a male writer, John 
Helsforth, an acquaintance of Natalia’s who is asked to introduce her story (making up 
Part 1) and who provides the pseudonym for the novel’s initial publication.12  John’s 
“scientific training” and his work as a publisher of “semi-popular scientific brochures” 
make him the rational, controlled counterpart capable of making Natalia’s “erratic” 
behavior and her “fervid stream-of-consciousness” prose more accessible to her 
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readership.  John assumes the role of authoritative interpreter of Natalia’s 
“mathematically simple” suicide, in which she skates “two straight lines, on a flat surface 
on an Alpine lake, running to infinity,” or until the lines “met in a dark gash of the 
luminous ice-surface” (5, 10).  The only way for Natalia to solve the “problem” of 
heterosexual coupling—the problem of how to make parallel lines meet—is through her 
symbolically charged suicide.  John corroborates her motivation: “for all her erotic 
experiments, she could not make an equation that answered, only that last one, two 
parallel lines meet,” but the “dark gash” in the ice “had demonstrated perfectly” (4-5).  In 
her death, Natalia essentially chooses not to chose, refusing to constrain her fluid sexual 
identity and, at the same time, she surrenders control over her own self-representation, 
leaving behind a narrative which can now only be realized through masculine 
intervention.     
  Likewise in the conclusion of HER, metaphors of calculation reemerge and 
replace the dream of geometric transcendence.  Also unable to resist the pressures of 
heterosexual norms, Fayne betrays Hermione by engaging in a brief affair with George.  
Hermione’s response to Fayne’s confession is one of cold calculation: “One I love, two I 
love. I am in love with…nothing” (219).  An earlier, tender moment shared between 
them now appears to foreshadow this betrayal; reading aloud from Swinburne’s “Itylus,” 
Hermione pauses on the line, “O sister my sister O singing swallow, the world’s division 
divideth us” (179).   The “world’s division” serves as a metonymy for the larger 
patriarchal culture that divides and creates competition among women, turning the 
affection Fayne and Hermione once had for one another into rivalry for the same male 
figure.  To escape her romantic woes, Hermione schemes a plan to expatriate to Europe, 
which she imagines to be a “place for grown-up people” in contrast to America, which 
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still conjures anxious images of “desks with stooping shoulders” (232).  She sees Europe 
as the antidote to American conformity and homogenization and characterizes the U.S. 
as one large scientific laboratory: “There was nothing in America for them but rows of 
desks and stabilization and exact formalization (Uncle Sam pressing things down in test 
tubes), there was nothing but standardization or dancing at a carnival…In between 
there were no nuances” (233).  This characterization of America also implicitly refers to 
the regulation of gender and sexual practices: the rituals of heterosexual bonding—such 
as dances at carnivals—leave little room for “nuances” and demand “the exact fitting to 
one type” (233).  Though a much more hopeful ending than Nights, Hermione’s plans for 
a new life in Europe are rendered ambiguous when she returns home to find Fayne 
“alone upstairs in [her] little workroom,” a potential threat to Hermione’s newfound 
resolve to be “at one with herself” and “with the world,” as she finds herself once again 
trapped by Fayne’s fickle affections (234).  In some sense, then, Hermione moves from 
one convention (heterosexual marriage) to another (monogamous coupling), unable to 
escape the imposition of heterosexual patterns onto her romantic and sexual desires.  As 
a whole, H.D.’s arithmetic and geometric imagery work in tandem to reveal the tensions 
between phallocentric and “concentric” modes of sexual discourse—that is, the tension 
between normative, determinate conceptions of sexual identity and more fluid, multi-
dimensional formations.    
Like many of her female contemporaries, as Mary Galvin suggests, H.D. 
understood that “modernism’s break with the structure of tradition could only be 
realized if sexual politics were understood to be among the major undergirdings of that 
structure,” and that “the continued privileging of masculinity would undo any modernist 
attempts to restructure our modes of perception” (63).  Both HER and Nights identify 
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mathematical determinism, gender essentialism, and heteronormativity as part of the 
same phallocentric logic—a logic that leads Hermione to deem herself “a failure” and 
Natalie to plot her suicide.  What H.D. does ingeniously is highlight the role of 
mathematics in the privileging of masculine authority and reasoning while at the same 
time repurposing the subject toward feminist, liberatory ends and, more specifically, 
toward envisioning new sexual and aesthetic paradigms.  This entanglement of 
mathematics and sexual politics is where H.D.’s “geometrics” diverges from the 
approaches of her male contemporaries Pound and Lewis, and thus where my reading of 
H.D. differs from that of Miranda Hickman.  Though Hickman acknowledges that H.D’s 
geometric body “encodes a wish for sexual ecstasy” that can be seen as “liberatory and 
empowering” insofar as it “has nothing to do with maternal nurture,” she focuses on 
showing how this body encodes the Vorticist qualities of “severity, intensity, strength, 
and austerity” so forcefully advocated by Pound and Lewis (184, 248).  Hickman further 
aligns H.D. with the masculine posturing of Vorticism:  
[H.D.’s] geometric body seems to suggest a fantasy of imperviousness and 
detachment that compensates for a fear of fragility and pain. If the qualities of 
Vorticism are aimed to counter effeminacy, H.D.’s imagination here, celebrating 
Vorticist qualities through the construction of the geometric body, may 
analogously counter weakness and vulnerability. (184) 
But it is precisely masculinist science—“Gart and the formula and Uncle Sam”—that 
H.D. critiques and against which she launches her feminist counter-aesthetic.  Her 
geometric images emphasize openness and fluidity more than severity or stasis; they 
enable her artistic experimentation, her desire to “become the thing that is really 
irreconcilable, a sort of scientific lyrist” (Nights 24).  For H.D., geometry is not a means 
 114 
for detachment, indifference, or impersonality, deployed to fend off emotional 
vulnerability, but instead conveys a powerful desire to break from conventional sexual 
and aesthetic codes.  Moreover, she reveals a desire not to be disembodied but embodied 
differently in relation to gender and sexual norms.   
And yet, despite these powerful invocations for self-transformation and social 
change, it is hard to dismiss the ill-fated conclusions of both novels, and in particular, 
the protagonists’ apparently inevitable return to convention, even in spite of their keen 
awareness of the constraining practices and rituals of heteronormative culture.  What 
Lauren Berlant calls women’s “love affair with conventionality”—their continual return 
to the performance of “normative, generic-but-unique femininity” in the hopes of feeling 
a sense of belonging through a shared struggle over “love’s complexities”—provides a 
useful perspective for making sense of the attraction/repulsion dynamic that afflicts the 
protagonists of H.D.’s fiction as well as the female subjects of Newman and Loy’s work 
(2, 6).  Though Berlant’s analysis of this phenomena focuses primarily on middlebrow 
fiction and film, the work of these characteristically modernist women writers illustrates 
a similar desire to form an “intimate public” in which women are “emotionally literate in 
each other’s experience of power, intimacy, desire, and discontent, with all that entails: 
varieties of suffering and fantasies of transcendence; longing for reciprocity with other 
humans and the world; irrational and rational attachments to the way things are” (5).  
Though Loy and especially H.D.’s geometric imagery encodes a desire for escape from 
convention, these repeated tropes simultaneously work to construct some kind of 
external order that validates and normalizes desires that are perceived as deviations 
from the norm.  Though modernist writing is often perceived as hostile to 
conventionality, these texts indicate a desire for belonging, solidarity, and normativity, 
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even if transposed onto new social configurations.  This tension between “making it 
new” and establishing new aesthetic and social norms deserves further consideration, 
particularly if we are to build on our understanding of modernist writing a set of 
competing and often contradictory interests.  
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1 Studies of “middlebrow” literature and culture have begun to emerge over the last 
twenty years, namely Joan Shelley Rubin’s The Making of Middlebrow Culture (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), and more recently, the essay collection 
Middlebrow Moderns: Popular American Women Writers of the 1920s, edited by Meredith 
Goldsmith and Lisa Botshon (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2003), and from 
whom I draw the above characterization.  
2 Though Newman’s cause of death was initially reported as a cerebral hemorrhage 
onset by advanced pneumonia, later reports surfaced that she had died by accidental—
and some even claimed intentional—overdose of a barbiturate called Veronal.  Some 
newspapers exploited this rumor, calling her suicide attempt an unsurprising result of 
her spinsterhood and salacious imagination.  In one writer’s sexist summation, Newman 
“had succumbed to futility, heightened with spinsterish complications,” or, as another 
wrote maliciously: “Like the types she wrote about—those deliberate sensualists, for 
example—she was above the vulgarity of reason. She simply wanted to die” (qtd. in 
Wade 18).  Several of Newman’s close friends sought to defend her honor by putting 
together a report that documented her consultation with doctors just prior to her death. 
According to their typescript and Newman’s own personal letters, doctors had 
diagnosed her with inflammation of the optic nerve days before she passed away—a 
condition that likely lead to her cerebral hemorrhage, the ultimate cause of her death.  
That so much controversy surrounded her death suggests that Newman had made quite 
a polarizing impression on her audiences in her short-lived career.    
3 Among the most scathing reviews was that of Elmer Davis, who considered the novel 
a blasphemy against the South: “Only a Southerner can appreciate it fully,” later 
addingthat “every line of this is grounds for lynching, unless Georgia and the South 
have lost their pristine vigor” and that she has “committed treason against her 
fatherland” as well as “against her sex” (449). The Baptist Convention of Georgia echoes 
this criticism, though in much less sensational terms, calling the novel “blasphemous 
stuff which reeks with vulgarity and with unmentionable implications” (qtd in Blake 
308).   
4 From Sentimental Tommy she learns only that “Tommy ran away with Grizel because 
Grizel would have ceased to be respectable if she had run away alone,” and it is this 
relatively benign revelation about the sanctity of marital sexuality that leads almost 
immediately—and quite contrastingly—to her disillusionment about her “delicate line” 
and its connection to reproduction (Newman 35). 
5 See Lauren Berlant’s The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in 
American Culture. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.  
6 Critics often align Loy with the American modernist movement. Virginia Kouidis, for 
example, claims: “Although British by birth, Mina Loy has been considered an American 
modernist poet since her arrival in New York in 1916” (167).  According to Kouidis, 
Loy’s innovative work found a more sympathetic audience in America and a home in 
several American little magazines (167).  Virginia Kouidis. “Rediscovering Our Sources: 
The Poetry of Mina Loy.” boundary 2, 8.3 (1980): 167-188.   
7 See, for example, Miranda Hickman’s The Geometry of Modernism, Sheri Benstock’s 
Women of the Left Bank, Paris 1900-1940. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987, and 
Julie Schmid’s “Mina Loy's Futurist Theatre.” PAJ: A Journal of Performance and Art, 
18.1 (1996) 1-7.  
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8 Suzanne W. Churchill. The Little Magazine Others and the Renovation of Modern 
American Poetry. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2006, 205-6.  
9 See Linda A. Kinnahan. Poetics of the Feminine: Authority and Literary Tradition in 
William Carlos Williams, Mina Loy, Denise Levertov, and Kathleen Fraser. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, 50.  
10 Barbara Guest, Herself Defined, 5.  
11 Rachel DuPlessis and Susan Friedman speculate that H.D. might have chosen not to 
publish this novel because she did not want to compromise or disguise her open 
“celebrations of lesbian eroticism,” which were likely to be censored by publishers and 
which might alienate her readers, as it had for her contemporary Radclyffe Hall (103).  
See Susan Friedman, Penelope’s Web: Gender, Modernity, H.D.’s Fiction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 102-104.  
12 According to Susan Friedman, “H.D. privately printed 100 copies of Nights in 1935 
under the name John Helsforth, a screen which particularly delighted her, even though 
it surely couldn’t have deceived the friends to whom she sent copies of the book” (270).  
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Chapter 3:  
 “Numbers Have Such Pretty Names”: 
Gertrude Stein’s Mathematical Poetics 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the now familiar descriptions of Stein’s writing as modeled 
on science—accounts of how her work draws on neuroscience or psychology, for 
example—tend to overlook the extent to which her work illustrates congruencies 
among different fields, particularly between mathematics and writing.  It is not so much 
that she borrows from or models her writing after the methods and idioms of 
mathematics, but that her work is about the convergence or points of intersection 
between these two realms, at a time when both literature and mathematics are seeking a 
more robust disciplinary foundation.1  Mathematics functions in Stein’s work neither 
simply as an analogy for writing methods nor as a mere aesthetic tactic; instead, she 
deploys mathematical concepts and methods to explore the structural, syntactical, and 
semantic possibilities of linguistic expression, and, as importantly, to reinforce the 
feminist perspectives that underpin her fiction and poetry and to consider fundamental 
aspects of subjectivity and perception.  
 I thus share with scholars such as Steven Meyer, Maria Farland, and Jennifer 
Ashton an interest in exploring Stein’s writing as conversant with contemporaneous 
scientific and mathematical developments; however, my goals differ in two significant 
ways.  The first is that my focus is less on tracking “the circulation of intact ideas” 
between disciplines and more on how Stein’s work reinforces literature and mathematics 
as what Gillian Beers calls “open fields”—fields whose parameters are continuously 
under revision and subject to transformation through their interactivity.2  What 
connects Stein to her mathematical contemporaries—namely Bertrand Russell, Alfred 
North Whitehead, Georg Cantor, Gottleb Frege, and theoretical physicist Niels Bohr—
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more than a common search for order, exactitude, and determinacy, is a struggle over 
the representational limits of language and an awareness of the interdependency of 
ordinary language and mathematics.  In other words, they are connected more by 
logical ambiguities and linguistic paradoxes than by any of the conclusions of their 
work.  This perspective might thus help to resolve some of the ongoing critical debates 
about how to categorize Stein’s work.  Critics have tended to position her fiction as 
either committed to “the determinacy of meaning” (Jennifer Ashton) or to a “poetics of 
indeterminacy” (Marjorie Perloff), and accordingly label her either a modernist or 
proto-postmodernist.  However, placing her work alongside these contemporaneous 
mathematicians offers a way to understand this determinacy/indeterminacy dialectic as 
a defining characteristic of both modern literary and mathematical inquiry rather than 
as a divisive wedge separating rival literary or mathematical paradigms.  
My analysis also diverges from approaches that focus primarily on explicating 
the formal qualities and methods of Stein’s work.  Though I am likewise interested in 
exploring Stein’s formal techniques, I also show how her engagement with mathematics 
also leads us to reconsider the content or the referential aspects of her writing.  More 
specifically, I explore how she draws on concepts in set theory, logic, and arithmetic to 
critique patriarchal literary standards, to explore the dynamic between individual 
perception and external reality, and to consider the ontological status of subjects and 
objects, individuals and things.3  For Stein, mathematical thought and expression are 
crucial to how we perceive ourselves as individuals in relations to others and to how we 
make sense of external reality.   
I begin by tracing Stein’s own assessment of the relationship between her 
writing and mathematical thought as well as some of the more recent criticism on her 
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scientific impulses, using both to contextualize my understanding of her critical 
responses to various fields of mathematics as they arise in works such as Q.E.D. (1903), 
Tender Buttons (1914), “Patriarchal Poetry” (1927), “Four Saints in Three Acts” (1932), 
and The Geographical History of America (1936).  I show how the shift in her fiction from 
more realistic modes of representation (e.g. Q.E.D.) toward greater and greater 
abstraction (e.g. Tender Buttons) coincides with her move away from a realist conception 
of mathematics and toward a non-Platonist, material-discursive view of the discipline.4  
Paradoxically, her move toward abstractionism leads her to engage more fully with 
questions of subjectivity, materiality, embodiment, and cognition—experiential 
phenomena that are for Stein indivisible from the subject of mathematics. 
 
I.   
Stein’s critical assessment of her own work, to which she devoted much attention 
throughout her career, stresses the connection between her writing and mathematics.  
As she notes in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (1933), “In Gertrude Stein, the 
necessity was intellectual, a pure passion for exactitude. It is because of this that her 
work has often been compared to that of mathematicians” (A 198-9).  But this is a 
comparison that Stein observed more readily than her readers, considering that a 
number of her contemporary critics often deemed her work meaningless or senseless 
rather than noting its exactitude, precision, or formality.5  Despite perceptions that her 
writing is primarily an exercise in disrupting conventional modes of grammar, syntax, 
and narrative construction, Stein and other more sympathetic critics have argued 
persuasively that there is a carefully conceived method to her presumed literary 
madness, even if the effect of this method can indeed sometimes be maddening.  In her 
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1935 essay “How Writing is Written,” Stein explains her overarching effort to achieve 
the kind of semiotic precision attributed to mathematics:  
While I was writing I didn’t want, when I used one word, to make it carry with 
too many associations. I wanted as far as possible to make it exact, as exact as 
mathematics; that is to say, for example, if one and one make two, I wanted to 
get words to have as much exactness as that…I made a great many discoveries, 
but the thing that I was always trying to do was this thing. (H 157)   
She not only suggests an effort to achieve a close correspondence between word and 
referent—so that each word does not “carry with too many associations”—but also 
offers a basic formula for sentence construction to emphasize the idea that each unique 
word (each “1”), when put together in a particular sequence, can add up to different 
meanings (as in 1+1=2).  It is not just the individual word that counts, but also that its 
associations with other words combine to create different meanings and effects.   
Those familiar with Stein’s writing know well that she trades metaphoric 
richness and referential transparency for calculated repetition and syntactical 
rearrangement.  She approaches each word as an individual unit that can be combined 
with other units to form a sequence, even if that sequence does not add up to a cohesive 
idea: “I took individual words and thought about them until I got their weight and 
volume complete and put them next to another word” (TI 15).  This metaphor is 
significant to understanding the mathematical nature of Stein’s methodology: meaning 
and connotation—what she calls weight and volume—are literally translated into a 
mathematical procedure.  Stein understood this method as a distinctive feature of her 
writing; her critical essays repeatedly emphasize this highly self-conscious effort to 
explore the structural similarities between mathematical and linguistic expression.    
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Her admission of mathematics’ role in her literary experimentation has no doubt 
fueled scholarly attention to its various manifestations in her writing, as has Stein’s 
background in science and her continuing relationships to psychologist William James 
(under whom she studied) and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead (whom she 
befriended and stayed with for an extended time after England declared war on 
Germany in WWI).  Scholars such as Steven Meyer and Maria Farland argue for the 
importance of considering her stylistic conventions and devices in light of her earlier 
career as a medical student and researcher and in the context of contemporaneous 
developments in medical and neuropsychological science.  Meyer argues that her 
writing was not just informed by science, but “turns out to be a form of experimental 
science itself” (xxi).  For Meyer, Stein’s work, like that of William James in psychology 
and Alfred North Whitehead in mathematical philosophy, should be seen as part of a 
larger tradition of “poetic science” or scientific experimentalism, which sought to 
radicalize nineteenth-century empirical science and to consider the role of experience as 
integral to the construction of knowledge rather than simply as a medium through 
which knowledge is obtained or transmitted.  While Meyer acknowledges that Stein’s 
“‘fundamental intuition’ remained scientific,” he ultimately aims to show that her 
background in neuropsychology provided the foundation for her later attempts to 
challenge traditional scientific conventions (4).  
Robert Chodat has taken issue with approaches like Meyer’s that privilege 
science as the primary context through which to understand Stein’s work; in contrast, 
he justifies her “enigmatic writings without dubious appeals to ‘exactitude’ and 
mathematics” (582).  Chodat challenges claims that her work is “scientific,” asking 
whether her texts “could actually be used in the formation of general predictive 
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hypotheses” or if we could “even repeat it to see if we could achieve the same outcome” 
(592).  He concedes that “[n]o literature is ‘scientific’ in the sense I have just described,” 
because it lacks the nomological function that “makes science ‘scientific,’” adding that 
“[w]e should not expect portraits of persons to be as sharply predictive as scientific 
accounts of other phenomena, nor be disappointed when they fail to live up to such 
demands” (592).  According to Chodat, Meyer’s “impoverished” understanding of 
scientific inquiry as primarily a descriptive enterprise ignores one of its most important 
functions: to predict or “anticipate future phenomena” (591).  But Chodat’s own limited 
conception of scientific inquiry focuses more on the applications and the accuracy of 
scientific results than on the processes and practices through which scientific knowledge 
is constructed and communicated.  He also dismisses a long tradition of interdisciplinary 
investigation, particularly within science studies, that illustrates the reciprocal 
conceptual and methodological influences of art and science.  While considering Stein’s 
writings as science is problematic for some of the reasons Chodat identifies, his reading 
disregards Meyer’s effort to show how questions of knowledge, experience, and 
observation cut across seemingly distinct domains, belonging no more to science than 
to literature, and thus necessitating the placement of Stein’s work in the context of these 
competing and overlapping modernist discourses.  Stein scholars need not “appeal” to 
science in order to explicate her work, but they need to recognize the interplay of 
literary and scientific impulses already present in her writing.  
Whereas Meyer and Farland highlight the link between Stein’s experimental 
fiction and her early scientific training, Jennifer Ashton shifts from a biographically 
centered analysis to a more historicist and formalist approach that considers Stein’s 
work as contiguous with certain aspects of modern mathematics.  One of the few 
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scholars to consider Stein’s engagement with mathematical ideas in any kind of 
sustained way, Ashton focuses on Stein’s persistent interest in the idea of wholeness, 
which shifts among literary, philosophical, and mathematical contexts.  For Stein, she 
argues, “these categories were not distinct; the grammatical question of what counts as 
a completed sentence is as central to defining the conditions of wholeness as the 
mathematical question of what it means to count” (288).  Stein herself explains this 
interest in wholeness in “How Writing Is Written”:  
You see, I had this new conception: I had this conception of the whole 
paragraph, and in The Making of Americans I had this idea of a whole thing. But if 
you think of contemporary English writers, it doesn’t work like that at all. They 
conceived of it as pieces put together to make a whole, and I conceived it as a 
whole made up of its parts. (H 153) 
She reinforces this effort to treat each word as a unique entity or integer that plays a 
distinct part in the sum of the paragraph.  In The Making of Americans, Stein attempts to 
capture a “history of every one” by accumulating and repeating particular descriptions 
that make up a whole person.  As Ashton observes, “the projected history of everyone 
becomes a projected list of kinds of persons,” as every one in Stein’s words is “a part of 
some kind,” and thus part of “a universal grouping” (298).  Though not explicitly stated 
in Ashton’s article, the mathematical ideas she considers central to Stein’s work are 
strikingly similar to the basic premises of set theory, which were introduced primarily 
by Georg Cantor in the 1880s.6  
Before returning to the subject to Stein criticism, I want to first offer a brief 
overview of the basic premises of set theory as well as examples from Stein’s writing 
that share these characteristics, both to illuminate the structural impetus behind much 
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of her experimental writing and also to demonstrate her sustained interest in the 
connections between mathematics and grammar.  In an 1874 paper, Cantor made the 
important discovery that not all infinite sets are the same.  For example, he showed that 
the set of all real numbers has a higher power or cardinality (or is, in a sense, larger) than 
the set of rational fractions.7  In order to describe the cardinality of sets, Cantor 
introduced the concept of countability, whereby a set is countable only if it has the same 
number of elements as the set of all positive integers.8  His early work on infinities led 
him to this general conclusion, offered in an 1883 lecture: “every set of distinct things 
can be regarded as a unitary thing in which the things first mentioned are constitutive 
elements” (Johnson 36).  This relation of a part to its whole within set theory is called 
membership; for example, the set of all British novelists is a member of the set of all 
novelists.  A set is defined by its elements, and the number of elements determines the 
power or cardinality of the set.  This basic notion—the idea that mathematical objects 
can be grouped according to sets—gave rise to a distinct branch of mathematics devoted 
to the formalization of all mathematical concepts and inspired questions about the 
foundation of mathematics that were taken up by logicians such as Russell, Whitehead, 
and Gottlob Frege.  For these mathematicians, set theory offered a means to establish 
elemental principles that would provide validity for the whole of mathematics.  
Comparably, Stein experiments with the most basic ingredients of composition—the 
interplay of words, phrases, syntax, and punctuation—as a means of determining the 
semantic permutations of a particular phrase or sentence.  
 Her specific interest in sets and their constitutive elements arises not only in The 
Making of Americans but also in her 1923 poem “Are There Arithmetics,” an early 
exercise in considering the relations of smaller to larger sets of linguistic elements—
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smaller to larger groups of syllables, words to sentences, sentences to lines or 
sections—all of which are part of the whole piece. An excerpt of the poem reads:   
Are there arithmetics. In part are there 
arithmetics. There are in part, there 
are arithmetics in parts.  
Are there arithmetics.  
In part 
Another example.  
Are there arithmetics. In parts.  
As a part.  
Under.  
As apart.  
Under.  
This makes.  
Irresistible.  
Resisted.  
This makes irresistible resisted. Resisted.  (AR 198) 
 
Lines 2-5 are all “parts of” the first and longest line.  While lines 1-5 become 
progressively shorter, relying on fewer words in each line, each set of words connects to 
the previous line by way of its relation to the first.  The syntactical reordering allows 
each word to serve different roles within the structure of the sentence so that no 
hierarchy is created among the words and no regular or fixed pattern dictates their 
position as the poem “progresses.”  In line 6, Stein offers “another example” of the 
“arithmetics” of linguistic expression.  “As a part” and “as apart” use the same letters of 
the alphabet and contain the same number of elements but yield different meanings, 
demonstrating the possibility of multiple answers to the same grammatical equation 
(and perhaps why Stein pluralizes the word ‘arithmetic’).  Judy Grahn points out Stein’s 
demonstration of the “correspondence between small numbers being a part of larger 
numbers, and small groups of syllables being a part of larger groups of syllables” in 
lines 13-15, as “the ‘resist’ is part of ‘resisted’ is part of ‘irresistible’—and then 
irresistible itself is a part of the larger language structure” (255).  For Stein, each part is 
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critical to the whole; the repetition and re-ordering of words typical of her writing 
insures that her readers pay attention to the particular construction of each part rather 
than the collective meaning or the sum total of the piece.    
 Considering her work in relation to basic set theoretic ideas also provides a 
context for understanding some of her lesser known books such as To Do: A Book of 
Alphabets and Birthdays (1940) and her libretto Four Saints in Three Acts (1932).  In To 
Do, a children’s book, Stein moves through each letter of the alphabet, under which she 
associates four proper names—“B is for Bertha and Bertie and Ben and Brave and a 
birthday for each one” (AB 5).  Names and birthdays are common denominators of 
identity, and this is what unifies all the individuals described in the text: “And so each 
one had to have one one birthday…even their mother Bertha had to have one” (5).  Stein 
moves from the largest set (all those with names and birthdays) to subsets (all those 
whose names begin with a particular letter from the set {A, B, C…X, Y, Z}).  Each 
individual is then further distinguished from another by a set of particular 
characteristics: “Orlando liked to lick stamps but he did not like to keep them, Olga 
hated stamps, Only liked stamps but he could not read” (36).  Stein thus calls attention 
to various modes of identity categorization and the common impulse both to classify 
and individuate.  As I later show in works such as Q.E.D. and The Geographical History of 
America, this interest in mathematical concepts is as much a formal exercise as it is her 
way of reflecting on questions of subjectivity and self-perception:  
There were two brothers and two sisters James, Jonas, Jewel and Jenny, they 
used to quarrel about which was the biggest, they used to quarrel about which 
was the oldest they used to quarrel about which was the tallest they used to 
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quarrel about which was the smallest and when they quarreled they used to say 
that they would take away each other’s birthday. (20-1)   
These siblings are grouped not only by their relation to one another but by the first 
initial of their names, though they attempt to differentiate themselves from one another 
according to size and age, only to threaten each other with the removal of their unique 
birth dates.  Even in the most playful of texts like To Do, the underlying structure bears 
close resemblance to a fundamental problem of set theory: determining whether a set 
can be characterized based on the properties of its members.9  The key difference, 
however, is that Stein focuses on distinguishing elements (i.e. persons) of a set (groups or 
populations), while mathematicians are generally more concerned with establishing the 
properties of sets rather than the objects that make up a set.  
  In Four Saints in Three Acts, Stein focuses principally on two saints, St. Therese 
and St. Ignatius, references thirty-some saints, both real and fictional, and includes four 
acts.  While the title might thus seem to be a misnomer, it highlights the opera’s 
preoccupation with the division and quantification of characters and acts, as reflected by 
recurring questions such as, “How many acts are there in it,” or “How many saints in 
all.”  More specifically, the title refers to subsets of elements—saints and acts—
contained within the whole text.  According to Katherine Kelly’s account of the opera’s 
production history, “Virgin Thomson commissioned Stein to write the libretto for the 
opera.  The two collaborators eventually settled on the subject of saints, Stein selecting 
her two favorites—Teresa of Avila and Ignatius of Loyola” (363-5).  Stein’s libretto 
dramatizes this same constructive process of identifying a broad category—the subject 
of saints—selecting a specific number of saints from all possible saints, and then putting 
the subjects into a narrative.  As the opera opens: 
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In narrative prepare for saints. 
Prepare for saints. 
Two saints. 
Four saints. (S 41)  
 
Similarly, the final lines of the last act alternate between specific quantitative 
descriptions of saints and generic, indefinite descriptors:  
All Saints. 
To saints. 
     Four Saints. 
And saints. 
Five Saints. 
To saints. 
Lact Act. 
Which is a fact.  (S 86) 
 
‘All,’ ‘four’ and ‘five’ are quantitative values that are opposed—both figuratively and 
spatially—to the ambiguous preposition ‘to’ and the conjunction ‘and,’ exemplifying her 
continual exploration of the relation of parts and wholes, and specifically the relation of 
individual to group identity.    
Stein also calls attention to the division of dramas into sections by using a non-
systematic, non-sequential ordering of scene numbers.  Act 1 concludes with a directive 
to “Repeat First Act” and multiple instantiations of acts and scenes arise throughout the 
text.  For example, in the second version of Act 2, there are nine instantiations of Scene 
5, suggesting that all of the content under each section is a part of Scene 5:  
Scene 5 
 
There are many saints. 
 
Scene 5 
 
They can be left to many saints 
 
Scene 5 
 
Many saints. 
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Scene 5 
 
Many many saints can be left to many many saints scene five left to many many saints  
 
(S 59) 
 
As is common in Stein’s self-referential experimentalism, the scene number or the 
ordering of scenes often become part of the content of that particular scene, as shown 
above in the last line, “scene five left to many many saints,” or later in Scene 7, which 
begins, “One two three four five six seven scene seven. Saint Therese scene seven” (S 
61).  Here Stein refers to traditional modes of dramatic presentation in which scenes 
build on one another in sequential order—the typical modes of narrative and character 
development she resists—so that the content of this scene, as with many others, entails 
the process of constructing its form.  As with many of her works, the process of its 
construction makes up much of the text’s content.10  
In Four Saints in Three Acts, numbers are pivotal to the form as well as the 
content, functioning structurally to “order” the play and also thematically as descriptors 
of the saints.  These numeric descriptions function as much to individuate the saints as 
to organize them according to groups, as indicated at the beginning of the opera: 
Four saints are never three. 
Three saints are never four. 
Four saints are never altogether. 
Three saints are never idle. 
Four saints are leave it to me. 
Three saints when you see. 
Begin three saints. 
Begin four saints. 
Two and two saints. 
One and three saints. (S 43) 
 
Stein delights in the definitude of numbers as descriptors of her subjects, stressing that 
four is not identical to three and vice versa, or that two and two saints adds up to four, 
just as one and three saints does as well.  The saints do not perform actions in the opera 
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so much as they determine their relations to one another through various quantitative 
and spatial qualities, including position (“Saint Therese seated and not surrounded”), 
distance (“One two three. There is a distance in between”), time (“St. Therese. In a 
minute.”), and number (“St. Ignatius and one of two.”).  These qualities are strikingly 
similar to Aristotle’s ten categories of being, among which are such categories as 
quantity, relation, time, position, and place, and about which many subsequent 
philosophers (Kant, Heidegger, Husserl, to name only a few) have ruminated and 
revised.11  Stein intervenes in this ongoing philosophical dialogue by similarly 
considering how language—whether ordinary or mathematical—mediates and even 
constructs these categories of being.  The “nature” of being, she suggests, cannot be 
understood outside of a representational system.  She is also interested in how 
individuals define themselves in relation to one another and to the world—relations that 
for her assume physical, material, and spatial forms and can thus be observed, measured, 
and quantified.   
 As a whole, the opera highlights both the fundamentally quantitative 
“ingredients” of narrative form--time, space, structure, and sequence—and the 
quantitative aspects of the self in relation to other.  The prologue establishes for the 
reader that the opera as a whole comprises a narrative: “In narrative prepare for saints,” 
and further down the page, “What happened to-day, a narrative,” and several pages 
later, “A narrative to plan an opera” (S 41, 45).  The opera playfully enacts the 
definitional qualities of narrative, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) as “an 
account of a series of events, facts, etc., given in order and with the establishing of 
connections between them.”12  The enumeration of saints throughout the text quite 
literally offers an account of the saints that unfolds in a series of grouped statements that 
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establish the relations among them.  As the saints all gather together at the opera’s 
conclusion, Saint Therese recognizes the importance of quantitative analysis to the 
structure and organization of individuals in a group: “The sisters and saints assembling 
and reenacting why they went away to stay. One at a time regularly regularly by the 
time that they are in and in one at a time…Saint Therese. It is very necessary to have 
arithmetic inestimably” (S 84).  As Saint Therese observes, assembling the saints 
according to space (“they are in”), time (“by the time”), sequence and number (“one at a 
time”) requires quantitative description.  Here, Stein stresses arithmetic or 
quantification as a mode of expression rather than as a determination.  Her numbers 
ultimately never add up to anything, just as the narrative never “progresses” in the 
traditional sense.  
 It with this interest in exploring Stein’s developing sense of the open-endedness 
of mathematical thought and expression that I return to Jennifer Ashton’s critical 
perspective.  For Ashton, the correspondence between Stein’s literary project and the 
mathematical philosophies of her contemporaries situates her writing firmly in the 
context of modernism, complicating recent criticism that claim her as a postmodernist 
avant la lettre or as a pioneer of linguistic indeterminacy.  Ashton argues that 
poststructuralist readings of Stein disregard her commitment to a poetics of 
determinacy—one that she claims Stein reinforces through her appeal to mathematics.  
She understands Stein’s expressed effort to make her writing “as exact as mathematics” 
as what Stein “thinks of as its absolute determinacy” (“Writing” 4).  I argue, however, 
that Stein, especially in her later fiction, uses numbers as descriptive tools in a way that 
parallels a contemporaneous shift in mathematical philosophy: away from an object-
oriented focus—the study of mathematical things and their properties—towards a more 
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complex linguistic foundation—studying the effects of the ambiguous nature of 
language on mathematics.  In other words, Stein reinforces the convergence of 
mathematics and language made apparent through the logicist program of 
mathematicians such as Frege, Russell, and Whitehead.  Moreover, exploring what 
Stein writes about mathematics rather than how she employs some of its concepts 
suggests that she comes to understand mathematics less as a paradigm of determinacy 
and more as a descriptive tool integral to how we make sense of the natural and social 
world.  Stein admittedly never solves the “problem of approximation” nor locates some 
absolute measure of determinacy; instead, her quest for exactitude leads her again and 
again to the representational paradoxes and limits that both mathematics and writing 
encounter.  While she might aim for an exactitude of reference analogous to a 
mathematical equation—so that “one and one make two”—her systematic use of self-
referential language is in direct tension to the linguistic exactness she seeks.   
Consider, for example, her famous line, “a rose is a rose is a rose,” which is more 
than just a simple repetition of phrases.13  While Stein considers this sentence as an 
attempt to link firmly the quality of ‘rose-ness’ to the word ‘rose,’—or to establish what 
Pound called “the thing-ness of the thing”—the sentence elicits a certain ambiguity with 
regard to how we read it: either as ‘a rose is a rose’ is a rose, or, a rose is ‘a rose is a rose.’  
Because the phrase circles back on itself, it is unclear to the reader which part of the 
phrase is being described as having a rose-like quality.  Countless other self-referential 
statements and passages, including in particular those discussed above in Four Saints 
and Three Acts, create ambiguities that undermine her efforts toward precision and 
exactitude.  Though Ashton acknowledges that Stein’s writing generates “indeterminate 
effects,” she maintains that these are counter to Stein’s intentions and thus challenges 
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the “prevailing critical view of [Stein’s] work, which sees her interest in the ‘liveliness’ 
of words as a commitment to “the poetics of indeterminacy” (“From Modernism” 28).  
She instead aligns Stein’s goals with those of Russell and Whitehead, who likewise 
sought a determinate logical grammar: “her commitment to the autonomous text is 
directly bound up with an account of language that insists that, like symbols in 
Whitehead and Russell’s vision of a logically perfect language in Principia Mathematica, 
words and their meanings stand in a relation of one-to-one correspondence” (28).  But 
this “vision” only represents part of their scientific realizations; what connects Stein to 
her scientific contemporaries has as much to do with their goals as their failures. 
The logicians of Stein’s era also come up against the limits of linguistic 
determinacy in their attempts to create an unambiguous mathematical language.  While 
the problem of assigning truth values to self-referential statements is classical, it became 
a fundamental concern for mathematicians such as Russell and Frege, who sought to 
axiomatize set theory.  Statements referring to themselves, such as “this statement is 
false,” are logically problematic because their truth value is indeterminate; to claim the 
statement is false is to admit its truth, and to say the statement is true is to admit it is 
false.  Ultimately, these mathematicians realized the inevitability of such ambiguous 
statements, and while these discoveries did not interrupt the everyday practice of “doing 
mathematics,” they had a profound effect on the philosophy of mathematics, which now 
required a much more careful treatment of language, particularly in dealing with self-
referential statements.  Comparably, Stein’s literary experiments appear to yield 
different results from those she perhaps intended because her commitment to exactitude 
paradoxically produces a surplus of linguistic meaning.  She is, like these scientists, 
attentive to the slipperiness of language—to referential excess—because of, but not in 
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contradiction to, her efforts toward precision and exactitude.  The very nature of the 
efforts of these mathematicians to achieve a logically perfect language forces them to 
confront the semantic imperfections that stand in their way.  The dual impulses that 
critics have observed and debated about in Stein’s writing—the tension between 
linguistic exactitude and ambiguity—are not problems in need of resolution but rather 
characteristic tendencies of modern scientific inquiry.  
Recent criticism on Stein has invested in a critical tug-of-war over which literary 
movement she best fits—modernism or postmodernism—according to the extent her 
fiction commits to a poetics of determinacy or indeterminacy.  While I agree with 
scholars such as Ashton and Nicola Pitchford that we significantly limit our 
understanding of Stein by removing her from the context in which she wrote, fitting her 
writing into either paradigm tends to undermine the changes within Stein’s writing—
her moves from realist modes to non-mimetic ones—imposing a coherency on her 
writing that suits the agreed upon tenets of that particular literary movement more 
than it does her actual body of work.  Three crucial aspects complicate the classification 
of Stein’s writing according to such broad categories: her writing draws from and later 
rejects nineteenth-century notions of literary representation; it comes to define a 
“modern” aesthetic while also remaining on the periphery of the modernist movement; 
and it anticipates fundamental aspects of postmodern writing, even if it does not 
consistently embrace what Marjorie Perloff has called her “poetics of indeterminacy.”  
Stein’s engagement with mathematical philosophies reveals her investment in ideas that 
transcend literary boundaries.  Indeed, her numerous non-fiction essays are less 
concerned with defining a modernist aesthetic than they are with defining universal 
qualities of writing and meaning-making.  More specifically, as I show, the shift in her 
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writing from realism to abstraction corresponds to a shift in her representations of 
mathematics from a Platonist perspective to a less determinate, non-realist conception 
of the subject.  Mathematics figures centrally in the development of her abstract writing 
at the same time that it provides her with the rhetorical and conceptual tools for 
exploring social, material, and subjective experience.  
 
II. 
While Stein is known mostly for her radical experimentalism, her earliest attempts at 
fiction, such as Q.E.D and Fernhurst, draw significantly from the traditions of American 
realism and naturalism.  Written in 1903, Q.E.D. is considered Stein’s first novel, 
though it remained unpublished until 1950 (four years after Stein’s death) due, scholars 
speculate, to its “overt, realistic, autobiographical lesbian content” (Dekoven, “Preface” 
xi).  The original title Q.E.D., later changed to Things As They Are, refers to the Latin 
abbreviation of the phrase, “which was to be demonstrated,” formerly used at the end of 
mathematical proofs to indicate that something has been proved definitively.  The title, 
along with the third person, past tense narration, gives the reader the sense that the 
characters have little control over their fates and that the story’s conclusion is 
inevitable, as is typical in naturalist novels.  The story is divided into three sections, 
each following one of three women—Adele, Mabel and Helen—who develop intimate 
friendships after traveling together on a steamship to Europe.  Further drawing on the 
naturalist tendency to create characters whose lives are genetically and 
socioeconomically predetermined, the personalities of Stein’s characters are 
physiognomically determined, or linked to their physical characteristics.  The narrator 
introduces readers to Mabel through a detailed description of her face:  
 137 
It was pale yellow brown in complexion and thin in the temples and forehead; 
heavy about the mouth, not with the weight of flesh but with the drag of 
unidealised passion, continually sated and continually craving. The long 
formless chin accentuated the lack of moral significance. If the contour has been 
a little firmer the face would have been baleful…It would never now express 
completely a nature that could hate subtly and poison deftly. (Q 179)  
All three women struggle with the expression of their emotions and with keeping their 
instincts and passions in check.  Stein describes Helen as “a woman of passions but not 
of emotions, capable of long sustained action, incapable of regrets” (Q 179).  The main 
character, Adele, who some argue is a stand-in for Stein, struggles to suppress her 
irrational impulses and to maintain, when she explains to Helen, “the middle-class ideal 
which demands that people be affectionate, respectable, honest and content, that they 
avoid excitements and cultivate serenity” (181).  As Adele also asserts, “The whole duty 
of man consists in being reasonable and just” (180).  Her passions and instincts take 
over, however, as Adele develops intense feelings for Helen and burning resentment 
toward Mabel, who maintains a closer connection to Helen.  
Q.E.D., however, becomes more than simply an ironic title referring to the 
irresolvable love triangle at the center of the story because it comes to represent the 
deterministic worldview—figured as a mathematical proof—that Adele adopts by the 
novel’s end.  This perspective emerges early in the story when Helen kisses Adele and 
Adele considers the kiss a result of outside forces rather than inner desires:  
‘Oh’ began Adele slowly ‘I was just thinking.’ ‘Havent you ever stopped thinking 
long enough to feel?’ Helen questioned gravely. Adele shook her head in slow 
negation. ‘Why I suppose if one can’t think at the same time I will never 
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accomplish the feat of feeling. I always think. I don’t see how one can stop 
it…‘Well’ Adele put it tentatively ‘I suppose it’s simply inertia.’ (186)  
As Adele wonders if it is ‘inertia’ that brought them together, she “stopped thinking” 
and experiences a kind of epiphany, realizing her inability to control her irrational or 
emotional impulses.  For Adele, fate draws two people together just as a mathematical 
equation works itself out: “Why…it’s like a bit of mathematics. Suddenly it does itself 
and you begin to see” (186).  Like a mathematical solution, Adele’s relationship with 
Helen appears laid out before her, predetermined.  Mathematics is thus represented as a 
complete and self-generative system—something that “does itself” without or prior to 
human interference.  Mathematics serves in this novel as proof of a constant and 
transcendent reality—an external world whose force is greater than individual will.  
Adele reinforces this notion in the novel’s conclusion when she responds to Helen’s last 
letter: “Hasn’t she learned that things do happen and she isn’t big enough to stave them 
off…Can’t she see things as they are and not as she would make them if she were strong 
enough as she plainly isn’t” (227).  Adele now sees the “dead-lock” between these three 
women as inevitable, as that “which was to demonstrated.”  That Q.E.D. draws on a 
deterministic model of mathematics as the primary means for understanding its fatalism 
is crucial to understanding how Stein’s attitude towards mathematics plays a role in 
shaping her narratives.  
In Tender Buttons (1914), one of her early and most recognized experimental 
works, Stein moves away from the notion of a fixed, determinate reality “behind” 
language to the notion of a reality defined through language.  As Christopher Knight 
argues, Tender Buttons marks her transition from the classical to the modern episteme.14  
According to Knight, this text is “constructed upon some rather classical premises of 
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perception,” reinforced by its emphasis on “color, difference, space, time, measure, 
meaning, substance, use, necessity, etc.,” or those qualities “most identifiable with the 
classic episteme” (36).  He also points to Stein’s expressed goal of “‘really knowing what 
a thing was’” and defining that object through the “seemingly more material and spatial 
qualities of number, measure, weight and difference” as evidence of the text’s foundation 
in classical epistemology (37).  In “Colored Hats,” for example, one can see this attention 
to quantitative description: “Colored hats are necessary to show that curls are worn by 
the addition of blank spaces, this makes the difference between single lines and broad 
stomachs, the least thing is lightening” (TB 473).  And yet, Stein shows little interest in 
using these qualities to conjure an accurate picture or a realistic representation of 
reality; there is hardly a direct correspondence between the objects and their 
descriptions.  While the descriptions emphasize material, physical, and sensory qualities, 
they read more like passing observations than a list of the object’s determinate 
properties.  Consider, for example, the opening sentence of “Milk”: “A white egg and a 
colored pan and a cabbage showing settlement, a constant increase” (TB 487).  As her 
use of the present tense emphasizes, she is primarily interested in capturing phenomena 
rather than the inherent attributes of a particular thing.  
Knight likewise concedes that Stein does not “do what she set out to do: to make 
the word be the thing. That she is, though she is hesitant to admit it, much more 
engaged in the making of metaphors, of substitutions, than she is in the making of 
nonlinguistic things” (43).  For Knight, Tender Buttons both represents “the culmination 
of the classical episteme” and marks a crucial shift in her conception of language: “Stein 
is beginning to conceive of language in a different way, not the way of correspondence 
within which the plane of language stands parallel to that of things; rather, more in the 
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way of language as an enveloping net faithfully contouring the ever various lumpish 
matter of ‘reality’” (35, 42).  What Knight understates, however, is the degree to which 
Stein self-consciously challenges, rather than draws on, classical notions of number, 
measure, color, and difference as stable, objective qualities independent of language and 
observation.  She identifies these classical modes of observation for the readers, 
referring to the acts of counting, measuring, and differentiating rather than specific 
instances of these practices, as she does in the following sentences: “A measure is that 
which put up so that it shows the length has a steel construction”; “Why is there a 
difference between one window and another, why is there a difference, because the 
curtain is shorter,” and “Suspect a single buttered flower, suspect it certainly, suspect it 
and then glide, does that not alter a counting” (502-3, 484).  More than simply defining 
an object according to its unique quantitative qualities, Stein is interested in how 
something is described—that is, the methods of measurement and how these function 
semantically and grammatically to shape our perceptions of the objects observed.  As 
she writes in Lectures in America (1935), “I began to discover the names of things, that is 
not discover the names but discover the things the things to see the things to look at” 
(LA 331).  Rather than simply call a thing by its name, Stein focuses on the “things to 
see the things to look at” or the descriptive words that conjure the things “without 
naming them.” 
Indeed, while critics emphasize Stein’s focus on the thing-in-itself in Tender 
Buttons, the book as a whole is far less concerned with objecthood than it is with the act 
of describing.  The descriptions refer less to the given object than to their own 
grammatical and syntactical construction.  In “Roastbeef,” Stein engages in a 
metadiscourse that playfully explores the function of different parts of speech: “In the 
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inside there is sleeping, in the outside there is reddening, in the morning there is 
meaning, in the evening there is feeling” (TB 475).  The preposition ‘in’ begins each 
clause and modifies nouns (“inside,” “outside,” “morning” and “evening”) that reinforce 
the preposition’s basic function: to express spatial and temporal relationships.  A similar 
sentence arises later in this section that uses prepositions, nouns, and verbs that express 
size, position, space, and movement: “Around the size that is small, inside the stern that 
is the middle, besides the remains that are praying, inside the between that is turning, 
all the region is measuring and melting is exaggerating” (479).  These examples show 
Stein’s interest in exploring the fundamental aspects of grammatical construction.  She 
also experiments with the way words can act as multiple parts of speech (by shifting the 
same word from adjective to noun or from noun to verb) and considers how different 
modifiers shape our understanding of a noun: “A transfer, a large transfer, a little 
transfer, some transfer, clouds and tracks do transfer, a transfer is not neglected” (481). 
While Stein may have set out to define the characteristics of a particular thing, her 
metadiscourse demonstrates that the object’s identity or “thingness” is inseparable from 
the language that describes it—that is, objects do not have inherent attributes 
independent from the language that describes them.  This shift in perspective has 
important implications for her representation of mathematics as a paradigm of 
determinacy. 
In order to demonstrate how her later fiction contributes to rather than resists 
available models of indeterminacy, I trace key similarities between Stein’s perspective in 
Tender Buttons and the philosophical insights of physicist Niels Bohr (1885-1962).  
While somewhat overshadowed by his protégé, Werner Heisbenberg, Bohr was deeply 
invested in exploring the larger implications of his discoveries beyond the realm of 
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physics, which continues to attract the attention of scholars such as Karen Barad, a 
physicist and theorist who finds Bohr’s “philosophy-physics” critically relevant if not 
essential to current debates about material-discursive relations.15  As Barad argues in 
detail, one of Bohr’s most important contributions to physics, his complementarity 
principle, qualifies Heisenberg’s more oft-cited uncertainty principle:  
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is an epistemic principle: it favors the notion 
that measurements disturb existing values, thereby placing a limit on our 
knowledge of the situation. By contrast, Bohr’s indeterminacy principle…is an 
ontic principle: the point is not that measurements disturb preexisting values of 
inherent properties but that properties are only determinate given the existence 
of particular material arrangements that give definition to the corresponding 
concept in question. (261) 
In other words, Bohr challenges the long-standing notion that the physical world abides 
by the laws of Newtonian physics by claiming that objects do not have inherently 
determinate, observation-independent properties.  According to Bohr, there can be no 
clear distinction “between a phenomenon and the agency by which it is observed…an 
independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the 
phenomena nor to the agencies of observation” (54).  For Bohr, phenomena describe the 
dynamic between object and measuring apparatus, or, as Barad glosses, “the primary 
ontological unit is not independent objects with inherent boundaries and properties but 
rather phenomena…Phenomena are constitutive of reality. Reality is composed not of 
things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena but of things-in-phenomena” (139-
40).  Bohr’s own analyses of the epistemological and ontological implications of his 
findings in quantum theory have not only made his work more accessible to non-
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specialists but also underline the importance he places on the interpretive aspects of 
physics.  What makes his work particularly useful for cultural and literary theorists is 
not that it offers a scientific analogy for linguistic indeterminacy, but rather he shows 
that physical and linguistic indeterminacy are interrelated problems.  Bohr not only 
finds that “things do not have inherently determinate boundaries or properties,” but also 
that “words do not have inherently determinate meanings” (Barad 138).  
While neither Bohr nor Stein is evidently aware of each other’s writings, they 
share some notable similarities both in their perspectives on language, including the 
semiotics of mathematics and the challenges they pose to classical notions of reality as 
stable and independent.  In his claim against the idea that language is secondary, Bohr 
famously wrote, “We are suspended in language in such a way that we cannot say which 
is up and which is down. The word ‘reality’ is also a word, a word which we must learn 
to use correctly” (qtd. in Peterson 302).  Like Bohr, Stein begins to embrace the idea 
that language comprehends reality rather than lies behind it.  Reflecting on her work in 
Lectures in America, Stein offers a comparable statement:  
Language as a real thing is not imitation either of sounds or colors or emotions 
it is an intellectual recreation…And so for me the problem of poetry was and it 
began with Tender Buttons to constantly realize the thing anything so that I 
could recreate that thing. I struggled I struggled desperately with the recreation 
and the avoidance of nouns. (331)  
According to Stein, language does not serve a mimetic or mediating function, but rather 
a creative one; meaning does not inhere in words or things, but is created over and 
again through different linguistic arrangements.  This helps to explain why certain 
objects in Tender Buttons receive multiple sets of unique descriptions.  In “Food,” for 
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example, there are multiple sections for items such as “potatoes,” “orange,” “chicken,” 
and even “salad dressing and an artichoke.”  The first two of four different sections on 
“chicken” reads:  
 CHICKEN 
 Pheasant and chicken, chicken is a peculiar bird. 
 CHICKEN 
 Alas a dirty word, alas a dirty third alas a dirty third, alas a dirty bird. (492-3)  
Each description alters the reader’s impression of the object; the first sentence recalls 
the chicken as a kind of fowl, the second refers to connotations of the word “chicken.”  
Thus, for Stein, as for Bohr, description does not uncover an object’s inherent properties 
but “recreates” qualities observed under specific conditions.  In “Rooms,” Stein indicates 
that objects change under different conditions: “Suppose they are put together, suppose 
that there is an interruption, supposing that beginning again they are not changed as to 
position, suppose all this and suppose that any five two of whom are not separating 
suppose that the five are not consumed…There was no certainty” (501).  An object’s 
qualities are not certain, according to Stein, but are shaped by a number of outside 
factors, including position, movement, time, and quantity.  For Stein, language serves as 
the “agency of observation” or the measuring apparatus that cannot be disentangled 
from the object under observation. 
However distant or neutral the narrator of Tender Buttons might seem—given 
that the words appear detached from a perceiving, embodied subject—the text does not 
represent a world of static objects with observation-independent qualities, but rather a 
world of things in flux, phenomena to which an observer must be witness.  The 
narrator’s presence manifests in observations such as the following: “The shadow is not 
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shining in the way there is a black line. The truth has come. There is a disturbance,” and 
in the self-reflexive comment,  “The author of all that is in there behind the door and 
that is entering the morning. Explaining darkening and expecting relating is all of a 
piece. The stove is bigger” (498-9).  The author “behind the door” recognizes her 
inseparability from the phenomena described.  Indeed, Stein’s interest is in experiential 
phenomena, that is, in capturing material, tactile, and sensory experiences.  Like Four 
Saints in Three Acts or Alphabets and Birthdays, what might appear at first as a purely 
formal exercise turns out to be a reflection on the fundamental aspects of subjective 
experience.  The concluding paragraph of “Roastbeef” insistently distinguishes the 
experiential and material from the abstract:   
There is coagulation in cold and there is none in prudence. Something is 
preserved and the evening is long and the colder spring has sudden shadows in a 
sun. All the stain is tender and lilacs really lilacs are disturbed…The result the 
pure result is juice and size and baking and exhibition and nonchalance and 
sacrifice and volume and a section in division…This is a result. There is no 
superposition and circumstance, there is hardness and a reason and the rest and 
remainder. There is no delight and no mathematics. (482) 
Stein adopts an anti-Platonist perspective that rejects the notion of the physical world 
as a shadowy reflection of a transcendent, ideal realm.  This passage suggests that there 
is nothing “behind phenomena” but only “things in phenomena.”  More specifically, her 
claim that there is “no mathematics” suggests that there is no mathematics as it has 
been traditionally conceived—as something that exists outside of physical reality or 
apart from human conceptual frameworks.  After all, she does not reject the existence of 
mathematical values altogether since she refers to “size,” “volume,” “a section in 
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division” and a “remainder” as a concrete “result.”  Bohr’s quantum theory holds similar 
implications for mathematics; his indeterminacy principle overturns the Newtonian view 
that objects have inherently determinate values that need only be revealed 
mathematically.  He challenges realist conceptions of mathematics as a pre-formed 
semiotics that functions outside and beyond phenomena. 
Tender Buttons marks a significant shift in Stein’s perception of mathematical 
objects compared to the view represented in Q.E.D.—that is, a shift away from the idea 
that mathematical entities are fixed and preexistent objects to the idea that they 
function semiotically.  Numbers operate in Tender Buttons in a descriptive capacity, as 
they do in a more sustained way in her later plays and operas.  For example, in the first 
section titled “Objects” and within the subsection called “A Box,” Stein uses numbers as 
a descriptive substitute for naming the box as such:  
A custom which is necessary when a box is used and taken is that a large part of 
the time there are three which have different connections. The one is on the 
table. The two are on the table. The three are on the table. The one, one is the 
same length as is shown by the cover being longer. The other is different there is 
more cover that shows it. The other is different and that makes the corners have 
the same shade the eight are in singular arrangement to make four necessary. 
(465)  
Rather than simply a rote tool for calculating and measuring, mathematics serves as an 
expressive means for describing and explaining phenomena.  For Stein, mathematics is 
no longer simply a metaphor for a transcendent reality, but rather a system bound up 
with the conventions of language, a descriptive tool for representing objects as well as 
subjects.  
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Another crucial similarity that links Bohr and Stein to their scientific 
contemporaries such as Russell and Gödel is that they all encounter the limits of 
representation, whether linguistic or mathematical, despite their efforts to achieve 
determinate results, or, to attain an exactitude of reference (Stein), to maintain scientific 
objectivity (Bohr), to establish a robust foundation for mathematics (Russell), and to 
uphold the belief in an objective mathematical reality (Gödel).  Though their work offers 
some of the most prominent models of indeterminacy, these scholars were also invested 
in resolving the representational problems they encountered.  These efforts are neither 
contradictory nor ironic, but rather the outcome of investigating what can be 
definitively known.  In different ways, they sought as much to preserve a certain 
determinacy of meaning as to account for impediments to it.  Thus, in placing Stein in 
the context of these scientists, these competing goals can be understood as a defining 
characteristic of modernist scientific inquiry rather than as an inconsistency in need of 
resolution or as a literary methodological problem. 
Stein’s self-analysis reflects this dialectic: while she aspires to make her writing 
“as exact as mathematics” and to know definitively “what a thing was,” she also 
questions whether these goals can be realized and admits to arriving at unexpected 
results.  She confesses in Lectures in America (1935) to being “bothered about something 
and it had to do as my bother always has had to do with a thing being contained within 
itself” (305).  She also “began to wonder at at about this time just what one saw when 
one looked at anything really looked at something…did it make itself by description by 
a word that meant it or did it make itself by a word in itself” (LA 303).  She begins, in 
other words, to question whether meaning inheres in the word or is instead created 
through its relation to other words.  She continues to explain that what “excited [her] 
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so very much” was that the descriptions that conjured a specific object, or the “words 
that make what I looked at be itself,” were never a precise or transparent referent for 
that object, often having “nothing whatever to do with what any words would do that 
described that thing” (LA 303).  She recognizes the unwieldiness of language, the 
“difficulty,” to use her own term, of pinning language down to an exact science.  No 
longer bound by a classical, deterministic view of mathematics, Stein increasingly 
approaches mathematical terms and concepts as creative, constructive resources for 
critiquing gendered power relations and asking questions about “human nature” and 
“the human mind.”  
 
III.  
In “Patriarchal Poetry” (1927), Stein continues to use mathematics as a means for 
theoretical as well as literary intervention.  What is different about this poem, however, 
is that she explores mathematics not simply as a symbol for an abstract reality (Q.E.D.) 
or as a descriptive device (Tender Buttons), but rather as a cultural phenomenon, bound 
to the system of patriarchal order and authority.  For Stein, the traditional literary 
canon is similar to other male-dominated institutions that value order, method, reason, 
and tradition: “Patriarchal poetry reasonably/Patriarchal poetry 
administratedly/Patriarchal poetry with them too/Patriarchal poetry as to 
mind/Patriarchal poetry reserved/Patriarchal poetry in regular places” (P 123). 
Patriarchal poetry, according to Stein, is a masculinist institution (“Patriarchal poetry 
their origin and their history”) whose standards are militantly upheld (“Patriarchal 
poetry left left left right left”), resulting in a homogenous body of literature 
(“Patriarchal poetry is the same”).  While critics such as Marianne DeKoven question 
whether the poem provides an “interpretable feminist thematic content,” it is hard to 
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overlook Stein’s overwhelmingly critical representation of patriarchal poetry as a male-
dominated, exclusionary system (“A Different Language” 129).  The mock sonnet she 
places in the middle of this prose poem offers a sample of what she considers patriarchal 
poetry:  
A SONNET 
 
To the wife of my bosom 
All happiness from everything 
And her husband. 
May he be good and considerate 
Gay and cheerful and restful. 
And make her the best wife 
In the world 
The happiest and the most content 
With reason. 
To the wife of my bosom 
Whose transcendent virtues 
Are those to be most admired 
Loved and adored and indeed 
Her virtues are all inclusive 
Her virtues are beauty and her beauties 
Her charms her qualities her joyous nature 
All of it makes of her husband 
A proud and happy man. (P 124) 
While the poem is ostensibly a man’s declaration of love for his wife, he actually 
celebrates the woman’s pliancy to her wifely duties—his ability to “make her the best 
wife in the world.”  That her own happiness and contentment are contingent on his 
satisfaction recalls the critiques of heterosexual dynamics that arise in Newman, Loy, 
and H.D.’s work, as discussed in the previous chapter.  He praises her as an object of 
male desire (“Whose transcendent virtues are those to be most admired and loved and 
adored”) and touts her virtues as reflections of his own status and desirability: “All of it 
makes her husband a proud and happy man.”  While this poem playfully parodies the 
marginalization of women and the rote mechanics of the Western literary tradition— 
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suggested by the sonnet’s adherence to conventional form in the repetition of “To the 
wife of my bosom”—other passages convey a more serious critique of the canon’s 
privileging of male experience, such as her insistent, two-page-long section involving 
various combinations of the following phrases:  “Let her try. Just let her try. Let her try. 
Never to be what he said. Never to be what he said” (P 121).   
Directly following “A Sonnet,” she continues to associate “patriarchy” with a 
parodied view of science, technology, and mathematics.  She associates the word 
“patriarchal” with the kind of authoritative language typical of scientific or technical 
writing: “Patriarchal in investigation and renewing of an intermediate rectification of 
the initial boundary between cows and fishes. Both are admittedly not inferior in which 
case they may be obtained as the result of organization industry concentration 
assistance and matter of fact” (P 110-11).  She sees the literary canon as a business-like 
institution, one that develops according to a generalized economic principle in which 
value is determined by comparison to an ideal standard: “Patriarchal poetry makes no 
mistake makes no mistake in estimating the value to be placed upon the best and most 
arranged of considerations” (124).  Such rigid standards mean that the canon must 
“include cautiously,” proceeding “one at a time.”  This systematic, quantitative method 
of inclusion/exclusion—“putting three together all the time two together all the 
time…five together three together all the time”—masks the continual reproduction of 
traditional literary conventions such that we “never…think of Patriarchal Poetry at one 
time.”  As her frequent use of numerical expressions to define patriarchal poetry 
suggest, Stein mocks the reliance on mathematics as an ideal standard for masculine 
epistemology and its attendant qualities: order, method, reason, tradition, and precision.  
She not only identifies mathematics as a paradigm of rationality and objectivity (“There 
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never was a mistake in addition”), but also offers a crucial observation about the 
appropriation of mathematics to preserve hegemonic structures (“Patriarchal poetry 
makes no mistake”) (106, 115).  Exploring her use of mathematical expressions in this 
poem is thus critical to understanding not only the complexity and pointedness of her 
feminist agenda, perhaps best exemplified in this poem, but also the growing complexity 
of her critical engagement with mathematics.     
In “Patriarchal Poetry,” numbers function metonymically for the ordered, 
regulated nature of mathematics that Stein associates with the literary canon:  
Patriarchal poetry makes it as usual. 
Patriarchal poetry one two three. 
Patriarchal poetry accountably. 
Patriarchal poetry as much. 
Patriarchal poetry reasonably 
Patriarchal poetry which is what they did. 
One Patriarchal Poetry. 
Two Patriarchal Poetry 
Three Patriarchal Poetry. 
One two three. 
One two three. (126) 
 
The sequence of numbers “one two three” are synonymous with regulation (“makes it as 
usual”), rationalization (“accountably”), standardization (“as much”), and reason 
(“reasonably”).  More broadly, she compares patriarchal poetry to the whole number 
system: 
Patriarchal Poetry shall be as much as if it was counted from one to one 
hundred. 
From one to one hundred. 
From one to one hundred. 
From one to one hundred. 
Counted from one to one hundred. (125) 
 
Like any number system—defined as a “set of symbols used to express quantities as the 
basis for counting, determining order, comparing amounts, performing calculations, and 
representing value”16—patriarchal poetry is a set of literary conventions that serve as 
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the basis for determining hierarchies, comparing elements among literary works, and 
conferring value on these works.  Each text is a discrete entity that belongs to a larger 
series that can be added to and summed up to determine its total value: “Patriarchal 
poetry added to added to to once to be once in two Patriarchal poetry to be added to 
once to add to to add to patriarchal poetry to add to to be to be to add to to add to to 
add to patriarchal poetry to add to” (128).  For Stein, patriarchal poetry develops 
methodically and laterally, evolving one integer at a time to form an ordered series such 
as that of the scale from one to one hundred: “Patriarchal poetry to be filled to be filled 
to be filled to be filled to method method who hears method method…Unified in their 
expanse. Unified in letting there there there one two one two three there in a chain a 
chain how do you laterally in relation to auditors and obliged obliged currently” (138-9). 
The number system is the most illustrative metaphor Stein uses in this poem to stress 
the calculated control asserted over the literary canon by its bearers.  More importantly, 
she uses this metaphor to parody the patriarchal understanding of mathematics as a 
rigid system of enumeration.  
Critics all seem to agree that this poem marks one of Stein’s most explicit efforts 
to destabilize traditional literary conventions, to emphasize the need for alternative 
(especially female) voices, and to revivify language through new combinations and 
forms.  However, these critics debate whether the poem adopts the formal qualities 
typically associated with patriarchal modes of writing in order to expose them and 
therefore critique them or if the poem assumes an entirely oppositional, anti-patriarchal 
style.  As Cary Nelson asks: is the poem “about patriarchal poetry, or is it to be an 
instance of patriarchal poetry” (84).  He continues to argue: “a critique of patriarchal 
poetry cannot be mounted from a position wholly outside the poetics it would critique. 
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The only sure strategy of demolition available is a defamiliarizing burlesque from 
within” (84).  DeKoven, on the other hand, considers this poem as an example of Stein’s 
larger efforts to create an separatist, anti-patriarchal form of writing: “she titles 
‘Patriarchal Poetry’ with the name of what its writing demolishes: sense, coherence, 
lucidity, hierarchical order” (“Different Language” 129).  Promoting a gendered notion 
of language, DeKoven advocates the kind of “female” writing Stein’s style exemplifies: 
“anarchic, undifferentiated, indeterminate, multiple, open-ended,” which she opposes to 
“male” qualities of writing: “objectivity, order, lucidity, linearity, mastery, and 
coherence” (xvii).  Neither critic, however, gives Stein the credit she deserves: she offers 
a model for a feminist poetics that is not simply imitative or reactionary, but rather 
illustrative of the gender biases that inform both literary and scientific praxis.17  By 
drawing on the “masculine” language of mathematics to articulate a feminist poetics, 
Stein also complicates any easy distinctions between male and female modes of 
writing.18  
While Stein associates patriarchal writing with rote calculation, her own 
writing, as we have seen, hardly eschews a mathematical sensibility.  Although her 
writing might read as incoherent or nonsensical—or it may, as DeKoven writes, “defy 
reading” altogether—it is also undeniably deliberate, calculated, and purposeful in its 
construction.  Her prose is often unemotional, detached, and robotic, qualities 
traditionally associated with a scientific and often associatively masculine aesthetic.  
Sections of “Patriarchal Poetry” appear as algorithmic rearrangements of a particular 
sentence: “Once threes letting two sees letting two three threes letting it be after these 
two these threes can be two near threes in threes twos” (107).  Or again in the section 
that begins: “Once or twice or once or twice or once or twice this it all or next to next 
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this show it all or once or twice or once or twice or once or twice this shows it all or 
next to next this shows it all” (128-9).  While these sections no doubt test the patience 
of their readers, they have a graphic quality that emphasize the machinic, mathematical 
sensibility to which Stein aspires.  But her deeper aim in this is not only to stress the 
endless permutations that language offers and to inspire new constructions with the 
available tools, but also to show that language, including the language of mathematics, 
is deeply imbricated in gendered power relations.  While mathematical language allows 
for a “critique from within,” it also enables new linguistic patterns, so that patriarchal 
poetry “may be finally very nearly rearranged” (117). 
Stein’s turn toward a more material, discursive conception of mathematics, and 
her related interest in how mathematical thought shapes our perceptions of the social 
and natural world, is nowhere better illustrated that in The Geographical History of 
America or the Relation of Human Nature to the Human Mind (1936).  The book as a whole 
is an attempt to distinguish between human nature, or all that has to do with our “hard-
wired” instincts and behaviors, and the human mind, which, according to Stein, does not 
store data, such as emotions or memories, but acts as a processor of immediate sensory 
data, or, as she writes, “it knows what it knows when it knows it.”  Counting, she 
speculates, is perhaps what connects human nature to the human mind, joining instinct 
with reasoning: “What is the relation of human nature to the human mind. Has it 
anything to do with any number.”  She later suggests a mind-based or intuitionist model 
of mathematics, or an innate mathematical sensibility:  
That is why numbers really have something to do with the human mind. 
That they are pigeons had nothing to do with it but that there was one 
and then that there were three and that then there are four and that then 
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it may not cease to matter what number follows another but the human 
mind had to have it matter that any number is a number. (90) 
Humans, she suggests, have an innate number sense, making them capable of 
distinguishing one from two from three, or performing simple arithmetic.  In this way, 
she aligns with scholars such as George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez, who argue for a 
mind-based model of math: “Mathematics is a product of the neural capacities of our 
brains, the nature of our bodies, our evolution, our environment, and our long social and 
cultural history” (9).  Similarly, Stein suggests that our number sense develops in 
response to environmental, material stimuli, so that one might determine, for example, 
the number of pigeons in the sky.  Like Lakoff and Núñez, she thus challenges the 
Platonist philosophy of mathematics, which holds, as Brian Rotman argues, “that 
mathematical objects are mentally apprehensible and yet owe nothing to human culture; 
they exist, are real, objective, and ‘out there,’ yet without material, empirical, embodied, 
or sensory dimension” (47).  Instead, she suggests that the mental apprehensibility of 
numbers owes something to human culture and cognition.   
 For Stein, the connection between mathematics and human culture is well 
illustrated by the language that brings numbers into being, or that gives them “such 
pretty names”: “The thing about numbers that is important is that any of them have a 
pretty name. Therefore they are used in gambling in lotteries in plays in playing in 
scenes and in everything. Numbers have such a pretty name” (78).  In context, the 
adjective “pretty” appears to mean that each number has a distinctive, characteristic 
name.  She also suggests that it is only through semiotic or symbolic representation that 
numbers can have abstract applications, such as in gambling, lotteries, or scenes in a 
play.  In other words, the basis of more complex, abstract mathematics is this 
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interdependency of language and mathematics.  Without a representational system, one 
could do little more than perceive that “there were three and that then there are four.”  
“Pretty” also implies that there is an aesthetic quality to numbers that involves emotion 
and sensation, a perspective she reinforces in the following lines:  
It can bring tears of pleasure to ones eyes when you think of any number eight 
or five or one or twenty seven, or sixty three or seventeen sixteen or eighteen or 
seventy three or anything at all or very long numbers, numbers have such pretty 
names in any language numbers have such pretty names. Tears of pleasure 
numbers have such pretty names. (79) 
This passage emphasizes the embodied, sensory dimension of mathematics—the notion 
that one can sense that “any number is a number” and that this can produce emotional 
and physical effects, bringing “tears of pleasure to ones eyes.”  Numbers both have 
“something to do with” our most fundamental reasoning skills as well as our instinctual 
impulses, since numbers “have something to do with the human mind,” but “tears have 
nothing to do with the human mind” (79).   
 If our number sense tells us something about how the mind processes 
information, Stein also theorizes that numbers have “something to do with” how we 
make sense of the physical world:  
They have something to do with money and with trees and flat land, not with 
mountains or lakes, yes with blades of grass, not much a little but not much with 
flowers, some with birds not much with dogs, quite a bit with oxen and with 
cows and sheep a little with sheep and so have numbers anything to do with the 
human mind. (79) 
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She resists the common belief that mathematics is inherently inscribed in nature. 
Instead, she implies an observing subject for whom quantitative reasoning is a means of 
navigating the social and natural world.  In other words, mathematics mediates between 
the external world and our perceptions of underlying form.  As importantly, she insists 
on the material basis on which mathematics is founded; numbers function as a 
representational system through which we order the elements of our external world, 
such as “trees” and a “bit of oxen.”  As I discuss more fully in the final chapter of the 
dissertation, Stein’s considerations anticipate cultural theorists of science such as Brian 
Rotman, Michel Serres, and Bruno Latour, who likewise problematize the rigid 
opposition between the material and the mathematical and argue for mathematics as a 
semiotic system.  
While The Geographical History of America certainly reflects Stein’s ongoing 
interest in formal experimentation and abstraction, it is also arguably her most focused 
study on the nature of the embodied, perceiving subject.  Throughout this text, Stein 
repeats the phrase “I am I because my little dog knows me,” a playful rewriting of 
Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am,” underlying which is a more serious attempt to show 
that identities are not essences, but rather that individuals are defined by their relation 
to and effect on other experiencing subjects.  This notion compliments Barad’s re-
articulation of Bohr’s insights—that humans are “not independent entities with inherent 
properties but rather beings in their differential becoming” (818).  Stein’s turn to 
mathematics as a means of exploring subjectivity is ultimately neither an attempt to 
abstract nor stabilize subjectivity, but rather to emphasize the process of “differential 
becoming.”  Like Bohr as well as later cultural theorists of science such as Barad, 
Rotman, Serres, and Latour, to name only a few, Stein comes to recognize the central 
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role mathematics plays in debating and destabilizing Cartesian oppositions between 
object and subject, reason and emotion, mind and body, nature and culture.  Her interest 
in math also has important implications for literary studies; in exploring the 
interdependency of language and mathematics—the idea that “numbers have such 
pretty names”— Stein challenges one of the most enduring fictions: that literature and 
mathematics have little to do with one another beyond serving as disciplinary opposites. 
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1 The emergence of mathematical formalism—the belief that mathematical signs 
function according to a set of formal rules, referring only to themselves—as well as the 
publication of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica (1910-13), which sought 
to establish a logical foundation of mathematics, reflected efforts to reconfirm the 
certainty and precision of mathematics and demonstrated the kind of disciplinary 
introspection also fundamental to the burgeoning movement of literary formalism.  
Russian formalism, an influential literary movement during the interwar period and 
predecessor to American New Criticism, urged a “scientific” approach to studying 
literary works and sought to define a text’s intrinsic properties, its “literariness,” or “the 
specific properties of literary material…that distinguish such material from material of 
any other kind” (Eichenbaum 8). Russian formalists considered the literary object, like 
all supposed mathematical objects (of Classical thought), as an enclosed, perfect system 
subject to its own internal standards and conventions.  These methodological 
similarities between literary theory and mathematics are not simply an example of one 
discipline’s influence over another, but more significantly reflect concurrently 
developing interests in questions of form, representation, objectivity and referentiality, 
fundamental to how both define their disciplinary objectives. 
2 See Gillian Beer, Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996, 115. 
3 In future developments of this project, I hope to consider the connections between 
Stein’s work and that of French philosopher Alain Badiou, who is well known for his 
provocative claim that “mathematics is ontology.” Like Stein, Badiou draws on the basic 
premises of set theory as the basis for an ontology that “does not claim to re-present or 
express being as an external substantiality or chaos, but rather to unfold being as it 
inscribes it: being as inconsistent multiplicity, a-substantial, equivalent to ‘nothing’” 
(Feltham, “Translator’s Preface” xxiii).  Or as Badiou writes, mathematics “pronounces 
what is expressible of being qua being” (8). Badiou’s thesis directly opposes the 
traditional notion of being as “one” or as self-identity; by using set theory as a model, he 
does not suggest that being is something, but rather, like set theory, is a mode or a 
process rather than a pre-formed set of ideas or truths. See Alain Badiou, Being and 
Event. Trans. Oliver Feltham. London: Continuum, 2005.  
4 Platonism holds that mathematical objects are eternal and unchanging and exist apart 
from human experience. This dominant perspective, as Brian Rotman argues, maintains 
“that mathematical objects are mentally apprehensible and yet owe nothing to human 
culture; they exist, are real, objective, and ‘out there,’ yet without material, empirical, 
embodied, or sensory dimension” See Rotman, Mathematics as Sign: Writing, Imagining, 
Counting. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 
5 See Michael Gold, “Gertrude Stein: A Literary Idiot.” The New Masses (1936), 
republished in Poetry 88. Ed. Alan Filreis. 
Web <http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/88/>.  
6 Ashton instead persuasively argues that Stein’s work complements the mathematical 
perspectives of her contemporaries Russell and Whitehead, who sought to define 
number on the basis of logic rather than by enumeration, one of the fundamental goals 
of their groundbreaking Principia Mathematica. The principle of defining a set according 
to a common property, she argues, “is like Stein’s idea in The Making of Americans of 
defining ‘every one’ by kind,” a principle that allows Stein to account for a history of 
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“every one” (315).  Stein, like many mathematicians of her time, suggests that there is 
something more basic or fundamental to the process of counting than number.  See also 
Phillip E. Johnson. A History of Set Theory. Boston: Prindle, Weber & Schmidt, 1972.  
7 For further explanation of Cantor’s proof, see Carl Boyer’s The History of Mathematics, 
2nd Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968, 566-70. 
8 Phillip E. Johnson, A History of Set Theory (Boston: Prindle, Weber & Schmidt, Inc.), 
1972, 28.  
9 This is one of Frege’s axioms in which he attempts to axiomatize underlying 
assumptions of set theory—one that was ultimately shown to be inconsistent by 
Russell.  
10 Marjorie Perloff similarly points out that Stein often stressed “composition rather than 
representation, the play of signifiers rather than the pointing relation of signifier to 
signified” (54). See Perloff, 21st-Century Modernism: The “New” Poetics. Malden: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2002, 44-76.  
11 See Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Trans. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1953. 
12 “narrative, n.” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford 
University Press. 13 Mar 2008.  
13 This line originally appears in her 1913 poem “Sacred Emily” as “Rose is a rose is a 
rose is a rose,” but there are numerous variations of this sentence in her other works. In 
Lectures in America, Stein explains the intention behind this sentence, “When I said. 
A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose. And then later made that into a ring I made poetry 
and what did I do I caressed completely caressed and addressed a noun” (231). In Four 
in America, Stein again explains this sentence: “I think that in that line the rose is red for 
the first time in English poetry for a hundred years,” suggesting that the qualities of a 
rose are inherent in the word ‘rose’ (vi). Stein also insists that she “never repeats,” which 
hints at her notion that each word functions like an individual, discrete unit that has its 
own function within a larger phrase or sentence.  
14 See Christopher Knight, “‘Tender Buttons,’ and the Premises of Classicalism.” Modern 
Language Studies. 21.3 (1991), 35-47. Knight defines the classical episteme as that “which 
privileges analysis and discrimination and in which space is conceived as three-
dimensional; time as linear; and language as artificial yet determinately connected with 
the parallel plane of ‘reality,’” while the “new modern sensibility” involves a turning 
away from “the problems of reference and human narrative, and back toward its own 
plasticity. Art here is autotelic; it serves its own ends” (45).  
15 See Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.  
16 See Annette Lamb and Larry Johnson.“Number Systems.”42Explore. July 2002. 10 
September 2008 <http://42explore.com/number.htm>. 
17 Maria Farland’s work offers support for this point in her investigation of Stein’s 
exposure to the “sexist assumptions in the realm of professional science,” whereby 
women were seen as “incapable of abstract thought” and approached “brain work as 
intrinsically masculine” (120, 124).  
18 More recently scholars have challenged the value of distinguishing masculine from 
feminine modes of writing. Jacqueline Rhodes, for example, argues that “dividing 
rhetorical strategies into masculine and feminine modes both denies women’s use of 
agonistic discourse through history and limits their inabilities to intervene today” (20).  
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Chapter 4: 
Between Metaphysics and Method: 
Mathematics and the Two Canons of Theory 
 
 
In the previous three chapters, I explore how and why a number of late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century American writers turn to mathematics to describe not only 
social phenomena but also individual, subjective experience.  What these writers 
understood about the constitutive interrelation of mathematics and culture does more 
than anticipate the work of cultural theorists of science such as Brian Rotman, Michel 
Serres, Bruno Latour, and Karen Barad, who argue for a materialist, semiotic foundation 
of mathematics; the fiction and poetry of these writers picks up where many of these 
theorists leave off by reflecting on and interpreting how exactly mathematics is 
culturally embedded, that is, how it functions with particular cultural, material, and 
semiotic practices.  Thus, rather than approach the fictional works of this dissertation as 
conceptually or methodologically distinct from the theoretical works under 
consideration here, I argue that both theorize the relationship of mathematics to 
“reality” and of mathematical to linguistic expression in complementary ways.  The 
critical and cultural study of mathematics is an important example of why theory needs 
literature as much as literature needs theory.    
 
I.  
Now that the dust has settled after the so-called Science Wars, and there is less pressure 
on humanists either to indict or defend poststructuralism’s penchant for mathematical 
imagery, it is an opportune time to reassess the ways in which poststructural theory 
both argues persuasively for mathematics as a culturally embedded practice—a method 
as opposed to a metaphysics—and, at the same time, reinscribes realist notions of 
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mathematics as a noise-free description of a mind-independent reality.  In the wake of 
poststructuralist theory, in which language is considered as the constitutive cultural 
force, trails the question of why mathematics often is treated as an exception to the rule, 
a realm exterior to language.  Brian Rotman argues that its “special” status rests on the 
very notion that mathematics is somehow “intransigently different from language”— a 
notion supported by an enduring version of Platonism, which “holds that mathematical 
objects are mentally apprehensible and yet owe nothing to human culture; they exist, 
are real, objective, and ‘out there,’ yet without material, empirical, embodied, or sensory 
dimension” (MS 47).  Despite poststructuralism’s conviction that there is no extra-
linguistic ‘out there,’ mathematics remains in a liminal space in much literary and 
cultural theory, its relationship to language left tenuous and undefined.  For theorists 
such as Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, Julia Kristeva, and Jacques Derrida, mathematics 
is both a privileged and exceptional discourse and that which must be stripped of its 
foundational, metaphysical status.  
Such paradoxical representations of mathematics arise particularly, I argue, in 
the work of Derrida.  While I do not wish to suggest that Derrida somehow stands in 
for the whole of poststructuralist thought, his work is not only representative of the 
kind of scholarship attacked by scientific realists in the 1990s, but also a pivotal force 
responsible for reframing a variety of problems in contemporary philosophy and critical 
theory, including the truth value of language.  Derrida’s engagement with scientific and 
mathematical theories and concepts, as Arkady Plotnitsky suggests, “play[s] a more 
significant role in his work than Derrida is willing to claim or perhaps than he 
perceives”1 (159). Particularly in his early work, Derrida argues against the notion of 
geometry as a closed system, and uses mathematics as an example of non-phonetic 
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inscription to deconstruct the logocentric assumption that writing is secondary to 
speech.  His later works, namely Dissemination, shift from his earlier reflections on 
geometry to the figurative use of arithmetic terminology.  Drawing analogies between 
numeric systems and literary texts, Derrida attempts to demonstrate the inherent 
numerical multiplicity of the text, that is, its dissemination “by numbers” through 
infinite contexts and readings.  This project paradoxically reinforces the presumed 
priority and otherworldliness of numbers and thus reinscribes the very aspects of 
mathematical realism he otherwise seeks to overturn.  
 In this article, I argue that Derrida’s paradoxical representations of mathematics 
are indicative of the ongoing problem—for both the humanities and the sciences—of 
how to distinguish mathematical from linguistic representation, whereby the former is 
repeatedly positioned as both homologous to and in excess of the latter.  With the 
exception of a few scholars such as Brian Rotman and Vicki Kirby,2 who have begun to 
describe the particular qualities that make the semiotics of mathematics both similar to 
and distinct from language, those in the sciences and the humanities, including Derrida, 
have tended to elide these concerns, casting their differences instead as a struggle 
between Nature and Culture or between realist and constructivist positions.  Karen 
Barad, drawing on the work of Joseph Rouse, argues that these adversarial positions are 
both caught up in different versions of the same representationalist paradigm: “[B]oth 
scientific realists and social constructivists believe that scientific knowledge…mediates 
our access to the material world; where they differ is on the question of referent, 
whether scientific knowledge represents things in the world as they really are (i.e., 
‘Nature’) or ‘objects’ that are the products of social activities (i.e., ‘Culture’)” (806).  Both 
“cultures,” in C.P. Snow’s sense, have also tended to rely on a tepid form of 
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interdisciplinarity that ultimately reinforces their own self-representations and 
reproduces as somehow fundamental this paradoxical representation of mathematics as 
both a metaphysics and a method.   
I want to consider more specifically, however, not the gap between the “two 
cultures,” but rather, in the humanities, a divide within the divide: the emergence of two 
distinct canons of theory—on the one hand, anthologized literary/linguistic theory, and 
on the other, science studies.  The work of theorists typically included in the 
literary/linguistic canon, often categorized under the broad heading of “postmodern 
theory,” such as Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, Gilles Deleuze 
and Judith Butler, is too infrequently brought into dialogue with work in the cultural 
study of science, such as that of Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, Michel Serres and N. 
Katherine Hayles, and even less with the recent scholarship of theorists such as Arkady 
Plotnitsky, Karen Barad, Cary Wolfe, Bruce Clarke, Ronald Schleifer, Robert Markley, 
and Elizabeth Wilson, to name only a few.3  One of the fundamental differences between 
these two canons is reflected in their different approaches to the subject of mathematics: 
literary/linguistic theorists tend to represent mathematics as an abstract and self-
governing medium, one that is alternately an exemplary semiotics or an instrument of 
scientific reductionism, while, for many science studies theorists, mathematics is 
fundamentally a material semiotics among others, though its particular qualities remain 
undertheorized.  We have yet to appreciate fully, however, both the ways in which 
science studies sheds light on poststructuralism’s engagement with science and, 
conversely, poststructuralist theory’s contributions to the cultural study of scientific 
discourses and practices.  By reading these bodies of theory in relation to one another, 
we stand to gain a fuller sense of the critique of metaphysics that is the undercurrent of 
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both theoretical realms and a better understanding of what the humanities and indeed 
what literary theory can contribute to the burgeoning field of science studies.4   
I begin by tracing the representations of mathematics in several of Derrida’s key 
works, then use this analysis to contextualize Rotman, Serres and Jean-Joseph Goux’s 
perspectives on mathematics, and finally turn to the work of Latour and Barad, which 
offers an alternative to the nature/culture dichotomy—a way to envision mathematics 
not simply as a social or semiotic construction but as integral to social and semiotic 
construction.  Particularly for Latour, mathematics is neither a transcendent form of 
reason nor a purely cultural phenomenon, but an interpretive tool constituted through 
the ongoing breakdown of traditional divisions between nature and culture, human and 
nonhuman.  We can thus begin to understand the notion of mathematics as a culturally 
embedded practice not as a conclusion, but as a starting point for considering how 
exactly it functions within particular cultural, material and semiotic practices, and 
ultimately, what connects mathematics to the discourses of literary and cultural theory.  
 
II.   
Derrida’s work reflects a larger cultural dialectic: mathematics is both lauded as “the 
paradigm of abstract rational thought” and treated skeptically as a perceived tool of and 
model for reductionism and a deterministic view of the social and natural world 
(Rotman, “TD” 18).  In both cases, math is caught in a representational paradox.  To 
understand the evolution of Derrida’s engagement with certain aspects of mathematics, 
we must begin his first significant publication, Edmund Husserl’s ‘Origin of Geometry’: An 
Introduction, in which he challenges the notion of a “ready made science.”  Derrida 
opposes Husserl’s notion that ideal objects, such as those of geometry, are self-
generative and form within a closed or definite system.  “About the mathematical 
 166 
system in general,” Derrida notes, “Husserl speaks of ‘an infinite and yet self-enclosed 
world of ideal objectivities as a field for study’” (OG 130).  For Derrida, however, a self-
enclosed system—a system closed to its own meta-concerns—does not constitute a field 
of study but rather signals its death.  Drawing on Gödel’s well-known (and often 
misrepresented) concept of undecideability,5 Derrida argues for the impossibility of any 
closed structure or system:  
The unity of the geometrical science…is not confined to the systematic 
coherence of a geometry whose axioms are already constituted; its unity is that 
of a traditional geometrical sense infinitely open to all its own revolutions…This 
whole debate is only understandable within something like the geometrical or 
mathematical science, whose unity is still to come on the basis of what is 
announced in its origin. (OG 52-3) 
Geometry, in other words, can be both coherent and incomplete, open to ‘its own 
revolutions’ or multiple instantiations of the axiomatic system.6  Derrida then argues for 
the impossibility of a singular or exact origin—a claim he reiterates throughout his 
body of work.  He thus asks, “if it is still legitimate to speak of an origin of geometry.  
Does not geometry have an infinite number of births…Must we not say that geometry 
is on the way toward its origin, instead of proceeding from it?…[W]hy have geometry 
begin with pure idealization and exactitude?” (OG 131).  Derrida’s case for the 
impossibility of a definite, closed or a priori mathematical system explicitly challenges a 
Platonist philosophy of mathematics and thereby asserts the historical contingency of 
its discourses.  
This perspective is underlined by his view that a mathematical system is  
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dependent on language (namely writing) for its genesis and transmission—that is, for 
its very systematic coherence.  In the Introduction, Derrida extends and strengthens 
Husserl’s claim that ideal objectivity is transmitted by language to argue that language 
constitutes ideal objectivity: “The possibility of writing will assure the absolute 
traditionalization of the object, its absolute ideal Objectivity” (OG 87).  Writing, then, is 
no longer simply an empty carrier of meaning, or as Husserl describes it, “a flesh, a 
proper body,” but the “condition of Objectivity’s internal completion” (OG 89).  As 
Derrida later states in Of Grammatology, writing is the condition for imagining the 
possibility of scientific objectivity because it is only through writing that abstract ideal 
forms become reified:  
As long as ideal Objectivity is not, or rather can not be engraved in the world—
as long as ideal Objectivity is not in a position to be incarnation…then ideal 
Objectivity is not fully constituted. Therefore, the act of writing is the highest 
possibility of all ‘constitution’…(OG 89)  
If writing constitutes our understanding of ideality, then even ideal objects, like those of 
mathematics, depend on writing for their preservation and translation.  Geoffrey 
Bennington glosses this relationship in Derrida’s work between writing and ideality: 
“Mathematical objects are the most ideal objects; but without a written tradition there 
would be no progress in mathematics…[W]riting, which threatens ideality with 
exteriority and death, becomes more necessary as ideality becomes more ideal” (68-9).  
In this respect, although writing ensures the transmission of idealities over time, it is 
also what makes inevitable misreadings or mistranslations that continually threaten the 
purity of these ideal objects.  Consequently, as Bennington notes, “only idealities can 
give a foundation to sciences, but there is only ideality through and by repetition: this 
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repetition brings with it an alterity that forbids the unity of the foundation it was 
supposed to insure” (64).  Derrida’s claim that writing is the ‘highest possibility of all 
constitution’ would suggest that mathematics is not ‘intransigently different from 
language,’ but is made possible by language—an argument which evolves through 
Derrida’s overarching critique of logocentrism.         
 In an interview with Julia Kristeva, one of the few places where he speaks 
explicitly about the subject of mathematics, Derrida explains why mathematics serves as 
a useful counterexample to logocentrism.  When asked by Kristeva if grammatology is a 
“nonexpressive ‘semiology’ based on logical-mathematical notation rather than on 
linguistic notation,” Derrida responds: 
[T]he resistance to logical-mathematical notation has always been the signature 
of logocentrism and phonologism in the event to which they have dominated 
metaphysics and the classical semiological and linguistic projects…A 
grammatology that would break with this system of presuppositions, then, must 
in effect liberate the mathematization of language, and must also declare that the 
practice of science in fact has never ceased to protest the imperialism of the 
Logos, for example by calling upon, from all time, and more and more, 
nonphonetic writing. Everything that has always linked logos to phoné has been 
limited by mathematics, whose progress is in absolute solidarity with the 
practice of non-phonetic inscription…We must also be wary of the ‘naïve’ side of 
formalism and mathematism, one of whose secondary functions in metaphysics, 
let us not forget, has been to complete and confirm the logocentric theology 
which they otherwise could contest…The effective progress of mathematical 
notation thus goes along with the deconstruction of metaphysics, with the 
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profound renewal of mathematics itself, and the concept of science for which 
mathematics has always been the model. (P 128-9) 
While mathematics has been used to hold in place ‘the logocentric theology’ of 
metaphysics, Derrida argues that it paradoxically collapses this theology; as a form of 
nonphonetic inscription, mathematics disrupts the naturalized connections among sign, 
sound, and voice.  As he later writes in Dissemination: “[T]he mark of numbers, whose 
nonphonetic operation, which suspends the voice, dislocates self-proximity, a living 
presence that would hear itself represented by speech” (D 331).  In contrast to 
alphabetic writing—the paradigm of logocentric accounts of language—mathematics, as 
a fundamentally written discourse, undermines the metaphysical assumption that 
writing is secondary to speech.  Derrida’s response points to this dialectical conception 
of mathematics as a privileged example of a non-logocentric semiotics and also a means 
through which metaphysics lays claim to a stable and objective ‘reality.’  The “renewal 
of mathematics,” he suggests, requires that mathematics be deconstructive of rather than 
complicit in the metaphysical tradition.   
While Derrida considers mathematics as a practice subsumed by writing in 
general, he also suggests that mathematical writing, in its opposition to natural 
language, exceeds or even precedes linguistic classification.  He reiterates this idea in Of 
Grammatology:  
The history of the voice and its writing [i.e. phonetic writing] is comprehended 
between two mute writings, between two poles of universality relating to each 
other as the natural and artificial: the pictogram and algebra…As phonetic 
writing [alphabetic writing], it keeps its essential relationship to the presence of 
a speaking subject in general, to a transcendental locutor, to the voice as self-
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presence of a life which hears itself speak…The consonant, which is easier to 
write than the vowel, initiates this end of speech in the universal writing, in 
algebra. (OG 302-3)  
Mathematical notation, in other words, functions for Derrida as a kind of disembodied 
writing, or what Vicki Kerby calls an “originary writing” (426).  Drawing on Rotman’s 
insights, Kirby argues that the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” (a phrase 
coined by the physicist Eugene P. Wigner) has “something” to do with this uneasy 
relationship between mathematical and alphabetic writing:  
Alphabeticism enables something that mathematics needs, while also providing 
an effective defense against something that mathematics rejects…Because the 
‘familiar authority of the alphabetic text’ is so easily taken as the definitive stuff 
of writing, the ‘how and what it is,’ it follows that mathematical grams can 
appear as if from nowhere, a ‘writing’ that is pre- or nonlinguistic. (430) 
Indeed, in its “failure” to satisfy the logocentric criterion for language, Derrida 
considers mathematical notation as a kind of nonlinguistic semiotics—a perspective 
closer to how mathematicians have traditionally understood their discipline.  
The nature of mathematical language, the issue of whether it is “about anything” 
or “whether its signs have referents, whether they are signs of something outside 
themselves” is a contested subject among mathematicians (MS 5).  Rotman contends 
that there are three dominant models of mathematics, each with its own sense of what 
mathematics is ‘about’: Platonism holds that mathematical language refers to an 
objective, external world; formalism maintains that mathematical signs function 
according to a set of formal rules, referring only to themselves; and intuitionism 
understands mathematics as a purely cerebral process through which immaterial, a 
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priori signifieds are constructed (MS 7).  All three models, according to Rotman, tend to 
“sever their signifieds,” or “what they are supposed to mean,” from the “real time and 
space within which their material signifiers occur,” so that math always positions itself 
as an accurate description of a “prior reality” (MS 5).  Ultimately, Rotman argues, these 
models fail to provide a solid foundation of knowledge, or more specially, how the 
practice of mathematics leads to the formation of mathematical knowledge.  Taking 
particular issue with Platonism, or what he calls the orthodox philosophy of 
mathematics, Rotman draws on the insights of poststructuralism to contest realist 
claims that language functions as a mere descriptor for a preexisting world.  As Derrida 
would have us understand, “reality” or “truth” is constructed by and through language, and 
language—including the semiotics of mathematics—does not give us direct access to either.  
Rotman likewise argues that there can be no “semiotic coherence of a prelinguistic 
referent;” while such a referent “might present itself as abstract, cognitively universal, 
presemiotic (in the case for mathematical objects), it will be no more timeless, spaceless, or 
subjectless than any other social artifact” (MS 31).  Rotman’s work thus reveals the 
potential for the insights of Derrida and his contemporaries to contribute to the 
philosophy of mathematics, particularly to the idea that the mathematical concept is 
inextricable from its semiotic expression.7 
The notion that the sign precedes mathematical understanding or intuition is 
implicit in Derrida’s reading of Husserl;8 however, Anna Tsatsaroni and Jeff Evans argue 
that Derrida could have developed further his analysis of the ongoing relationship between 
the mathematical concept and the sign: 
Derrida's deconstruction—again with reference to Husserl—of the relationship 
between sign and mathematical truth could perhaps show in a more forceful way 
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how mathematics differs from itself: how mathematics cannot constitute its identity 
because it has to rely on the sign, the irreducible other. This could bring forth the 
question of the relation between mathematics and language, the structural inability 
to draw a rigorous distinction between the mathematical concept and its linguistic 
expression. (103)  
Although Derrida does not carry his analysis of mathematical signs to the logical end 
envisioned by Tsatsaroni and Evans, he implies the codependency of the mathematical 
object on its sign by placing writing at the scene of geometry’s ‘origin,’ marking geometry 
as both historically bound and “open to all its own revolutions.”  Thus, he works against the 
common assumption that mathematics is an independently generative, complete and merely 
programmatic science.  
When he turns to the subject of literature, however, Derrida turns his focus to the 
metaphoric use of arithmetic concepts.  Significantly, he shifts his attention from earlier 
notions of geometric objects as historically and linguistically bound to the sense that the 
“natural” numbers or integers are natural, pre-given entities.  Why this discrepancy?  For 
Derrida, the idiom of geometry—more so than arithmetic, algebra or calculus—dovetails 
with his overarching philosophical interest in questions of representation, form and matter, 
subject and object.  In moving from the geometric to the arithmetic branches of 
mathematics, the direction of influence is reversed: whereas linguistic theory comes to bear 
on geometry in Derrida’s Introduction, arithmetic concepts reveal crucial characteristics of 
the literary text in Dissemination.  In his later writings on literature, Derrida considers the 
literary text as a kind of ideal object, based on what he described as its “already-there-
ness.”  This notion, however, is less a divergence from his early work on Husserl than an 
idea that had been dormant.  He has spoken about a thesis, which he never came to write, 
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that was to be titled “The Ideality of the Literary Object.” About this thesis, he writes: “It 
was then for me a matter of bending, more or less violently, the techniques of 
transcendental phenomenology to the needs of elaborating a new theory of literature, 
of that very peculiar type of ideal object that is the literary object, a bound ideality 
Husserl would have said, bound to so-called ‘natural’ language, a non-mathematical 
or non-mathematizable object, and yet one that differs from the objects of plastic or musical 
art, that is to say from all of the examples privileged by Husserl in his analyses of 
ideal objectivity” (TT 37). As in his response to Husserl, Derrida suggests that in order 
for a text to be “ideal,” it must be repeatable and transmissible, leading him to assert that 
the text is inherently numerous, that it exists “in numbers.”  In order to build his case for 
the ideality of the literary object, however, Derrida paradoxically relies on the priority of 
number, the “already-there-ness” of number, leading him to reinscribe a conventional view 
of mathematics that he had deconstructed in his early work.  
His section by the same name, “Dissemination,” an account of Philippe Sollers’ 
novel Numbers, is perhaps the best example of how Derrida draws analogies between 
numeric systems and literary texts.  The essay begins: “These Numbers enumerate 
themselves, write themselves, read themselves. By themselves.  Hence they get themselves 
remarked right away, and every new brand of reading has to subscribe to their program” 
(D 290). Though this passage describes Sollers’ text, it is through this specific analysis that 
Derrida begins to carve a broader understanding of the inherent numerical multiplicity of 
all literary texts.  He argues, more specifically, that a text disseminates in countless 
numbers, enumerating itself within different contexts and by way of every reading: the text 
“begins by repeating itself,” it is “triggered off—for the first, but innumerable, time... even 
in its first occurrence, the text mechanically, mortally reproduces, even ‘steadier’ and 
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‘deader,’ the process of its own triggering” (D 292).   This notion of a division at the origin 
is crucial to Derrida’s understanding of the literary text and to his overall theoretical 
framework: “[t]he beginning is plied and multiplied about itself, elusive and divisive; it 
begins with its own division, its own numerousness” (D 300).  In other words, there is no 
singular origin: 9 
[N]umerical multiplicity…serves as a pathbreaker for ‘the’ seed, which therefore 
produces (itself) and advances only in the plural. It is a singular plural, which no 
single origin will ever have preceded…If this in itself were intended to mean 
something, it would be that there is nothing prior to the group, no simple originary 
unit prior to this division through which life comes to see itself and the seed is 
multiplied from the start. (D 304) 
The notion of plurality at-the-origin extends to the idea that a reader or writer cannot 
claim to represent a text in its original state, nor distinguish between the first and 
subsequent readings, and therefore finally cannot prevent or control the text’s regeneration 
by a potentially infinite iteration.  The text is, in a sense, “numerous” but also beyond 
mathematical reductionism; the text’s “numbers” proliferate without offering a means to 
interpret the text.   
 As Derrida is also careful to point out, however, the text’s dissemination by 
numbers does not imply that the text simply reproduces over and over identical copies of 
‘itself,’ but rather that it appears differently, as ‘foreign,’ within each new context or by 
each new reading.  Therefore, as Derrida urges, one must consider the pluralized singularity 
of the literary text.  As he explains, “there is no literature...without an absolutely singular 
performance”—that is, through countless contexts and readings, literature offers a 
“singular performance,” or a unique “number”—in effect, an “event”—but at the same 
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time, this uniqueness does not represent the text’s absolute meaning because the text 
never stops dividing or multiplying itself through these contexts and readings (AL 213).  
Derrida’s notion of the singular seeks to redefine the concept of “one”—the key number of 
Western metaphysics—as a unique, contextual, non-repeatable, non-unitary event.  For 
Derrida, then, what defines the relationship between literature and mathematics is the 
notion that a text is characterized by its nonlinear, non-systematic or systematizable, 
numerical behavior. 
 Derrida’s metaphoric use of arithmetic terminology aims overall to show that the 
multiplicity or divisibility of a literary text paradoxically effaces its susceptibility to any 
kind of scientific analysis—a critique, in other words, of formalism’s efforts to establish a 
“science” of literary study.  And yet, this rhetorical move risks the reinscription of 
mathematics as a metaphysics—that is, as an abstract and universal expression of a 
particular literary text’s dissemination.  These numbers, in other words, hold the privilege 
of revealing or proving what we know to be “true” about the literary text.  This analogy 
between literary texts and numeric systems relies on a notion of number as an object not 
related to any particular subject or context.  Numbers are characterized more specifically 
as self-productive, natural entities, an impression given, for instance, by his use of 
recurring biological metaphors—“the tree of Numbers”—and by claims such as “[t]he 
literal air…cannot be disassociated from number,” or “Numbers always maintain their links 
with unlimited dissemination—of germs, of the crowd, of the people, etc.” (D 336, 347).  
This use of number to describe Derrida’s crucial metaphor of dissemination lends a certain 
agentless agency to numbers, the sense that numbers are inscribed in nature, or as Rotman 
notes, the idea they are somehow “before us.”  
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 Again, Derrida’s work reinscribes this nature/culture dialectic as he shifts from 
calling attention to the material, cultural foundation of mathematics—as he had done in his 
Introduction to Husserl—to the idea of mathematics as a kind of preformed semiotics.  In 
Dissemination, he does invoke the material basis from which mathematics has been formed 
when he writes, “[h]ere you stand, close to the first—undecipherable—stone, which is not 
one, or which...was, numerous. Calculus. Pebbles used in counting. Gravel” (D  358).  He is 
punning on his reader’s assumed awareness that the word “Calculus,” in both Latin and 
Greek, refers to “pebbles,” which were used in ancient Greek and Roman cultures for 
counting and other basic arithmetic—implying a move from the material to the abstract 
rather than a “top-down” model of math’s development.  However, he then undercuts this 
perspective by representing mathematics as a kind of prelinguistic semiotics: “The ‘first’ 
sequence, therefore, is not a discourse, a present speech (in the beginning was the number, 
not the word, nor, in what presently amounts to the same, the act)” (D 339).  In this 
instance, he works against the notion that the mathematical object and its sign are co-
constitutive, as he had suggested in his earlier work on Husserl.  And yet, Derrida does 
suggest a theoretical dependency between mathematics and literature, a relationship not 
defined by disciplinary opposition, as is often assumed, but a comparative, mutually 
illuminating relation—one that constitutes a rich site for further inquiry. 
Rotman has taken the lead in investigating the linguistic properties of mathematics, 
specifically the codependency of mathematics and a materialist semiotics: “In no sense can 
numbers be understood to precede the signifiers that bear them; nor can the signifiers occur 
in advance of the signs (the numbers) whose signifiers they are.  Neither has meaning 
without the other: they are coterminous, cocreative, and cosignificant” (MS 39).  Rotman 
asserts the material and semiotic constitution of mathematical objects—a position Derrida 
 177 
alternately embraces and resists.  For Rotman, realist conceptions of mathematics as a pre-
given semiotics deny mathematics the constitutive significance it deserves:  
Besides making an enigma of mathematics’ usefulness, this has the consequence of 
denying or marginalizing to the point of travesty the ways in which mathematical 
signs are the means by which communication, significance, and semiosis are brought 
about. In other words, the constitutive nature of mathematical writing is 
invisibilized, mathematical language in general being seen as a neutral and inert 
medium for describing a given prior reality — such as that of number — to which it is 
essentially and irremediably posterior. (TD 19) 
Rotman’s work as a whole brings mathematics out from the shadows of the Western 
philosophical tradition in which it has long been a silent but constitutive force and 
emphasizes the connections between language and mathematics; the former serves as 
the undisputed nexus of poststructuralist theory, while the latter is among the most 
fundamental and yet theoretically ignored semiotic modes.  Rotman and Derrida do 
ultimately agree, however, on the notion that language is the exemplary and primary 
object of meaning, one of the driving forces behind the poststructuralist questioning of 
the principles of both Platonic and realist philosophy.  Theorists with backgrounds or 
interests in science studies have taken on these same problems of representation, 
language and truth that have held the attention of those, like Derrida, whose work is 
associated with the literary/linguistic canon of theory, though scholars in science 
studies frame these problems in intriguingly different ways.  
 
III.  
Though the work of such theorists as Barthes, Lacan, Derrida, Kristeva and Foucault 
became the foundation for the “textual revolution” that dominated the French 
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intellectual scene in the 1960s and 70s, they were not the only theorists of the time 
exploring the social and semiotic bases of metaphysics.  In different ways, Michel Serres 
and Jean-Joseph Goux were tackling a similar set of problems, but with a particular 
focus on understanding the broader structural similarities that underlie the seemingly 
disparate fields of the sciences and the humanities.  To put it differently, Serres and 
Goux consider science not as an analogy for illuminating aspects of the humanities, but 
rather as a semiotic and logical sibling that shares the same epistemological parent.  
Indeed, their work surpasses what Arkady Plotnitsky calls “comparative-
interdisciplinary” investigation—a juxtaposition of the discourses and practices of two 
or more distinct fields—and instead aims to uncover “epistemological convergence” 
among different realms of knowledge (24).  For both Serres and Goux, disciplinary 
divisions are neither impasses nor superficial distinctions, but rather porous boundaries 
that can and must be productively crossed.  It is both the complexity of and necessity 
for such cross-disciplinary exchange that leads Serres to call the division between the 
humanities and the sciences the Northwest Passage: “Between the hard sciences and the 
so-called human sciences the passage resembles a jagged shore, sprinkled with ice, and 
variable…It’s more fractal than simple. Less a juncture under control than an adventure 
to be had” (C 70). It is perhaps because of this rigorous and demanding disciplinary 
interweaving that Serres and Goux’s work seems to lack the kind of audience and 
institutional canonization that continues to make their Tel Quel contemporaries 
required reading for most introductory theory courses.10  And yet, Serres and Goux, as 
well as Rotman and Latour, are grappling with similar philosophical problems and 
similar kinds of structural dynamics within different symbolic economies.  Their work 
offers pathways between the canons of “literary theory” and “science studies” by 
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exploring how and why a theoretical analysis of science and especially mathematics is 
crucial to any critique of Western metaphysics precisely because, as Derrida recognizes, 
mathematics serves as the fundamental structuring logic of this philosophical tradition. 
That mathematical concepts and its early practitioners are important to Serres’ 
work comes as little surprise given that he began his studies in physics and 
mathematics, only later turning to the philosophy of science and eventually completing 
a dissertation on Leibniz under Gaston Bachelard.  What distinguishes Serres from 
Derrida is that the latter deems language the transmitter of mathematical truths, the 
primary and exemplary object, while, for Serres, there is no primary or exemplary object 
apart from the material conditions that make abstraction possible.  He thus argues that 
mathematics shares its history with the “birth” of representation—of abstract thought which 
required the separation of form from matter—a phenomenon which makes possible the 
epiphenomenon of semiosis.  As he writes, “mathematics is the key to history, not the 
contrary. The schema is the invariant of the tale instead of the tale being the origin of the 
schema” (H 88).  Mathematics is generated by and through a representational logic—an 
origin and relationship which is forgotten or effaced when mathematical signs are 
considered mere descriptors of presemiotic forms.   
Serres finds a useful model for his theoretical perspectives in the Greek figure, 
Thales, who is considered to be the first true mathematician, or more specifically, the 
“originator of the deductive organization of geometry” (Boyer 46).  While much about 
Thales’ life remains obscure, one speculative narrative that has been passed down through 
multiple generations of historians is that Thales developed a system for measuring the 
height of the Egyptian pyramids using a simple stick, or what was, according to Serres, the 
gnomon on a sundial.  Thales’ method was to wait until the shadow cast by the gnomon 
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was as long as the gnomon itself, at which point he measured the shadow cast by the 
pyramid and hence—reasoning that at any given moment the ratio of the height of an 
object to the length of its shadow is constant for all objects—determined the height of the 
pyramid.  This tale reveals the extent to which mathematical expression is dependent on 
written language: the Thalian “origin” of geometry and the theorem associated with it are 
inseparable from the narrative that describes them.  Kenneth Knoespel makes a similar 
case for Euclid’s formalization of geometry’s fundamental axioms: “The rational written 
response of Euclidean geometry also marks the moment when shapes are given a narrative, 
or even more precisely, the moment these shapes are plotted and brought under linguistic 
control” (41).  His example drawn from geometry supports Knoespel’s overarching claim: 
“Language, and even more specifically the linguistic arrangement of experience found in 
narrative, helps determine the ways mathematics can be applied to the world” (27).  For 
Serres, Thales is important not only because he sought to explain the world through 
naturalistic rather than mythic means, but also because he relies on a physical object (the 
gnomon) to arrive at an abstract concept (the principle now known as “similar triangles”).  
This move from materiality to abstraction becomes the basis for Serres’ effort to invert the 
Platonic ideal, to claim that particulars (material objects) beget universals (ideal forms) 
rather than the other way around.   
That the gnomon is an equal protagonist or quasi-object in Serres’ retelling of 
Thales’ story anticipates key concerns in feminist science studies regarding the 
relationship between materiality and discursivity.11  Karen Barad in particular argues for a 
reconceptualization of the dualisms of material/discursive, subject/object, nature/culture, 
whereby each element is mutually constitutive of the other through and within particular 
instances: “[M]ateriality is discursive (i.e., material phenomena are inseparable from the 
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apparatuses of bodily production: matter emerges out of and includes as part of its being 
the ongoing reconfiguring of boundaries), just as discursive practices are always already 
material (i.e., they are ongoing material (re)configurings of the world)” (822).  Like Serres, 
Barad critiques poststructuralism’s dismissal of nonhuman agency.  The significance of the 
gnomon for Serres is that it “helps us to place the active centre of knowledge solidly 
outside ourselves”12 and thus marks the initial “scene” of representation itself:   
[W]hat Thales’s mathematics recounts, at its very inception, is the de-centering of 
the subject of clear thought with regard to the body that casts its shadow: the 
subject is the sun, placed beyond the object, on the other side of the shadow…What 
it announces, for the first time, is a philosophy of representation…Here is the scene 
of representation established for Western thought for the next millennium, the 
historically stable contemplation from the summit of the pyramids. Thales’s story is 
perhaps the instauration of the moment of representation, taken up ad infinitum by 
philosophers. (H 91-2) 
In this “scene where things see things,” where the object’s knowledge transcends that of the 
subject, Plato declares the “essential reality of idealities,” and in doing so, relegates 
“Thales’s story to the depths of his cave” (H 93).  Serres expands on this point in his 
characteristically imagistic prose: “Plato has the pure pyramid come into existence beneath 
the fires of the sun, and from this tetrahedron he has fire born again: a double miracle that 
fulfills the scriptures, the Egyptian legend, and the initiation of intuition by positioning the 
source of light within the polyhedron” (H 95).  But it is this Platonic notion of the priority of 
ideal forms that Serres ultimately challenges:  
Plato kills the hen that laid the golden eggs: by cutting through the solids he 
nullifies history; the eternity of transcendency freezes the diachrony and the 
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genealogy of forms. The future of the square and the diagonal is decided as much on 
the sand where we describe them through the language that names them as it is 
decided in the sky of ideas. The realism of transparent idealities is still immersed in a 
philosophy of representation. (H 96) 
For Serres, pure abstract idealities cannot exist apart from the matter—the “shadow of 
solids,” which casts the outline of its form—nor the language which names it.  Plato’s 
account, he argues, denies representation a history, treating it instead as inevitable or 
natural.  Mathematics functions according to Platonism only in a representational capacity, 
as an abstract mediator between the material subject and an immaterial, a priori reality.  But 
as Serres contends, the Thalian “origin” of geometry bespeaks the socio-material 
foundations and practices of mathematics.    
While Serres focuses on the historical specificity of scientific knowledge, Goux’s 
work identifies a transhistorical episteme underlying Western reason; for Goux, the 
phenomenon of exchange is the tie that binds, the logic which structures the seemingly 
disparate realms of semiotics, linguistics, psychoanalysis, and economics.  More largely, 
Goux argues that a generalized concept of exchange lies at the heart of the metaphysical 
tradition (and its Platonic roots)—a tradition through which material objects are 
considered shadowy reflections of a privileged and constant ideal:  
The use of coins, of alphabetic writing, or still more simply, the use in all domains of 
standard units, of common measures based on reciprocal agreement: from this ideal 
measure of values could be derived all of Platonism, or rather one of the most enduring 
and essential strata of Platonism…Broadly speaking, the relation between Platonic 
forms (models, ideal standards) and the concrete world is the displaced yet faithful 
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philosophical parallel of the relation between (fetishized) general equivalents and 
relative forms. (93-4)  
Goux refers to this “ideal measure of values” as the “general equivalent”—a term he 
borrows from Marx, whose insights, Goux argues, can be extended beyond the economic 
realm for which they were originally devised.  The notion of the general equivalent, he 
writes, “pertains first of all to money: what is in the beginning simply one commodity 
among many is placed in an exclusive position, set apart to serve as a unique measure of 
values of all other commodities” (3).  Goux, like Serres, explores the materialist semiotics of 
measurement; for both, measuring itself involves the dynamical interaction between object 
and subject, ideal and concrete forms.  Goux extends the notion of the general equivalent to 
the domains of semiotics, linguistics and psychoanalysis, shifting the term from a 
description of quantitative to one of qualitative value:  
In each case, a hierarchy is instituted between an excluded, idealized element and 
the other elements, which measure their value in it.  In short, I came to affirm that 
the Father becomes the general equivalent of subjects, Language the general 
equivalent of signs, and Phallus the general equivalent of objects, in a way that is 
structurally and genetically homologous to the accession of a unique element...to the 
rank of general equivalent of products. (4) 
For Goux, the persistence of these dominant forms of value—and indeed, the very concept 
of value—help explain the staying power of metaphysics: theories and practices may 
change, but the basic logical structure stays the same.  This logical structure is predicated 
on the materiality of the ideal standard as well as the practice of measurement.  
 Though Goux does not directly engage the subject of mathematics, its function has 
been traditionally described in terms of this symbolic model of exchange; mathematics has 
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been predominately understood as the universal language—as a general equivalent—for 
describing material phenomena.  This is the same premise from which Derrida and Serres 
launch their critiques of a Platonist philosophy, which, as Rotman convincingly argues, 
continues to anchor mathematics as a paradigm of abstract thought.  The extension of 
Goux’s insights to the realm of mathematics is crucial to our recognition of Number among 
the general equivalents—that is, Number as the unmoved mover of all systems of calculation 
and measurement versus numbers, as a semiotic system whose behavior is explained and 
predicted by abstract models.  Goux’s symbolic economies, in which an idealized element is 
set in opposition to and deemed as the standard of all other circulating and relative elements, 
can help explain the dialectical representations of math as both a metaphysics and a method 
that have emerged in contemporary linguistic and cultural theory.  Goux’s insights reveal 
the extent to which Language and Number function in isotropic ways: as ideal standards set in 
opposition to material practices.  His work also sharpens our understanding of how 
mathematics—as the “language” presumed to give us direct access to the world of ideal 
standards and measurements—has upheld its privileged position in Western philosophy.  
 
IV. 
While Serres and Goux shed light on the perspective that mathematics is 
structurally and symbolically embedded in processes of signification, Latour is interested in 
how mathematics gets mapped onto the material world.  For Latour, there is no 
“meta”physics— no universal and transhistorical semiotics that pre-exists the collection, 
calculation and distribution of resources and knowledge formations.  Latour, more so than 
Serres, argues against the fundamental premises of Platonism and positions his work more 
overtly in contrast to poststructural theory.  About the limitations of poststructural and 
postmodern theories, Latour writes:  
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Whether they are called ‘semiotics,’ ‘semiology’ or ‘linguistic turns,’ the object of all 
these philosophies is to make discourse not a transparent intermediary that would 
put the human subject in contact with the natural world, but a mediator 
independent of nature and society alike.  This autonomization of the sphere of 
meaning has occupied the best minds of our time for the past half-
century…Language has become a law unto itself, a law governing itself and its 
own world. (W 62-3)  
In considering mathematics as text—as a semiotics unto itself—postmodern and 
poststructural theorists have tended to treat mathematics as a mediator independent of 
nature and society.  Mathematical meaning, like linguistic meaning, is bracketed off from 
“the question of reference to the natural world” and to the “identity of speaking and 
thinking subjects,” and thus can do little to overturn its Platonist underpinnings (W 63).  
Like Serres, Goux and Derrida, Latour seeks to overturn the basic premises of 
metaphysics, but in contrast to these theorists, he has little interest in deconstructing this 
philosophical tradition from within, instead altering the contexts through which the 
functions of mathematics have traditionally been understood.  
Latour, however, is not so much invested in arguing for a constructivist view of 
mathematics—one that would continue to reinforce its reactive as opposed to active and 
creative functions—as he is in showing how mathematics is at the basis of social formation 
and development.  What defines the advent of the city millennia ago, he argues, are “centres 
of calculation,” which make possible the continual development of society and form the basis 
of the distribution of all resources.  The mobilization of elements is the phenomenon that 
leads to the construction of these centres, or as he writes, “All the distinctions one could 
wish to make between domains (economics, politics, science, technology, law) are less 
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important than the unique movement that makes all of these domains conspire towards the 
same goal: a cycle of accumulation that allows a point to become a centre by acting at a 
distance on many other points” (S 222).  Thus, he maintains, “the history of science is in 
large part the history of the mobilization of anything that can be made to move and shipped 
back home for this universal census” (S 225).  These mobilized elements are collected, 
recorded, reconfigured, and finally transformed and sent back to us as mathematical 
equations, as abstractions of raw materials and socio-material phenomena such as human 
labor, urban development, population growth, and resource extraction; this is the work of 
the centres of calculation: “Equations are not only good at increasing the mobility of the 
capitalized traces, they are also good at enhancing their combinability, transforming centres 
into what I will call centres of calculation” (S 239). These centres, his argument follows, 
attempt to impose an order on the world—an order confirmed by these equations—so that 
“everything can become familiar, finite, nearby and handy” (S 230).  What Latour describes 
is the process by which these centres abstract the material world into the universalizing 
semiotics of mathematics.   
But, as Latour’s work emphasizes, mathematics cannot be completely closed off 
from its reference to the natural/social world and the speaking/interpreting subject, just 
as it cannot be deemed a mere product of social enterprises.  Thus, Latour’s description of 
quasi-objects (a term he borrows from Serres) offers a new perspective on the philosophical 
basis of mathematical objects—one that rejects the poststructuralist tradition which Serres 
and Goux critique.13  For Latour, quasi-objects are an attempt to overcome the dualisms of 
object/subject and nature/society, recognizing that none of these terms can exclusively 
account for material phenomena: “Quasi-objects are much more social, much more 
fabricated, much more collective than ‘hard’ parts of nature, but they are in no way the 
 187 
arbitrary receptacles of a full-fledged society. One the other hand they are much more real, 
nonhuman and objective than those shapeless screens on which society—for unknown 
reasons—needs to be projected” (W 55).  Understanding mathematical objects as 
constituted through the dynamics of nature/society and subject/object helps to explain 
why certain mathematical truths are transmissible over time and through different 
cultures, and yet are also, in numerous instances, culturally specific, historically marked 
and subject to revision and creative extension.  For example, the objects which can be 
considered “legitimate numbers” has changed repeatedly through time: √2, 0, -1 and i were 
all met with skepticism and adopted only after their intimate connection with “true 
numbers” was established.14 Nevertheless, the mathematical circumstances that gave birth 
to these new concepts and ultimately vindicated them are tied to fundamental geometric 
and arithmetic questions common to every culture’s mathematics—a commonality that 
allows for dialogue across historical periods and cultures.  This comparison of 
mathematical objects to quasi-objects resists the either/or dichotomy that continues to 
reposition mathematics as an inert medium either for describing a prior reality or ordering 
elements of the empirical world; instead, mathematics is considered an interpretive tool, 
infinitely open to all its own revolutions. 
Latour, in effect, severs mathematics from its metaphysical roots, extracting it 
from a representationalist philosophy in which it is considered either the mere product 
of an increasingly mechanized society or the reflector of Nature’s hidden truths.  But 
while he rejects the philosophical basis of the metaphysical tradition in which humans 
are deemed the purveyors of meaning to non-human entities, he argues that we still 
remain “within metaphysics” because of our failure to recognize the co-construction of 
nature and society, human and non-human.15  Like Latour, Barad similarly calls for a 
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“different metaphysics,” recognizing that metaphysics in the more traditional sense has 
been a “term of opprobrium” in twentieth century theory.  Despite this, she writes, 
“[t]his positivist legacy lives on even in the heart of its detractors” and will not “abide 
by any death sentence” (812f).  Barad instead calls for a “relational ontology that rejects 
the metaphysics of relata, of ‘words’ and ‘things,’” and acknowledges phenomena as the 
“ontologically primitive relations.”  She elaborates: “The primary ontological units are 
not ‘things’ but phenomena—dynamic topological reconfigurings/entanglements  
/relationalities/(re)articulations.  And the primary semantic units are not ‘words’ but 
material-discursive practices through which boundaries are constituted” (818).  In other 
words, for Barad, the abstraction or mathematization of raw materials and socio-material 
phenomena—the work of the “centres of calculations”—is less important than calculating 
the relationships, or what she calls “intra-actions,” among material-discursive phenomena.  
Both Latour and Barad thus offer alternatives to the logical impasse faced by Derrida and 
other poststructuralists vis-à-vis mathematics and the metaphysical tradition that has 
long shaped our understanding of this discipline.  
Although science studies scholars such as Latour and Barad take issue with some of 
poststructuralism’s fundamental assumptions, they acknowledge their interest in a similar 
set of problems and questions and engage in a critical dialogue with these scholars that is 
too often interrupted by institutional imperatives to classify and canonize.  By bracketing 
off science studies scholarship from more “mainstream” cultural and literary criticism, we 
risk misunderstanding the crucial role science has played in the history of critical and 
literary theory, and more specifically, the centrality of mathematics to questions of 
representation, objectivity and subjectivity, materiality and embodiment that structure 
so much of the current theoretical conversations taking place across these divergent but 
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often overlapping realms of theory.  We also risk stalling further explorations of the 
epistemological and conceptual overlaps of literary and mathematical study that could 
help to overturn the still prevalent perception that these two fields are fundamentally 
antagonistic or that they are disciplinary opposites.  While poststructural theorists have 
revealed the metaphoric potential of mathematical concepts to describe aspects of literary 
interpretation, there is much more to be said about the use of metaphor and other 
figurative devices in mathematical reasoning and expression.16  By bringing literary and 
linguistic theory to bear on mathematics, we can begin to see the realm of mathematics and 
literature as, in some ways, complimentary rather than oppositional subjects.  Considering 
the ways in which figurative devices such as metaphor, instances of paradox and 
ambiguity, reliance on narrative constructions, and strategies of logical and rhetorical 
argumentation cut across disciplinary boundaries present exciting theoretical and 
especially pedagogical possibilities.  These conceptual parallels insist that we continue to 
investigate why mathematics needs literature—a line of inquiry that depends on the 
collaborative insights of literary theory and science studies.  
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1 Plotnitsky notes that while Derrida is cautious around the subject of science, he also 
“acknowledges the possibility and indeed unavoidability of intersections between the 
problematics of his work or, more generally, deconstruction, and mathematics and 
science, and he even argues that ‘science is absolutely indispensable for deconstruction.’ 
This statement is itself worth attention, at the very least in relation to the role of 
mathematics and science for all modern philosophy, deconstruction included” (159).  
Plotnitsky argues that the criticisms thrown at postclassical philosophers during the 
“Science Wars,” most notably Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Deleuze and Baudrillard, and 
especially by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont in their 1998 book Fashionable Nonsense: 
Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science, were largely based on “indiscriminately 
extracted, isolated references to science,” and failed to place such statements in the 
larger context of their work or to consider how these theorists use scientific ideas, 
instead focusing on the (in)accuracy of their references (159).  While careful to avoid 
defending the mathematical and scientific references in the work of Derrida and Lacan 
(the theorists on which he primarily focuses), Plotnitsky does argue for the 
epistemological convergence of postclassical theory with aspects of modern 
mathematics and physics, and believes further explorations of these connections can 
lead to more productive exchanges between the “two cultures.”  
2 As both a mathematician and cultural theorist, Rotman is uniquely positioned to make 
a semiotic analysis of mathematical writing legible to a non-specialized audience. 
Rotman ponders why mathematics has been given only passing consideration in 
postmodern theory: “…[T]here has been no sustained attention to mathematical 
writing even remotely matching the enormous outpouring of analysis, philosophizing, 
and deconstructive opening up of what those in the humanities have come simply to call 
‘texts.’ Why, one might ask, should this be so? Why should the sign system long 
acknowledged as the paradigm of abstract thought and the without-which-nothing of 
Western technoscience have been so unexamined, let alone analyzed, theorized, or 
deconstructed, as a mode of writing?” See Rotman, “Thinking Dia-grams: Mathematics, 
Writing and Virtual Reality” in Mathematics, Science, and Postclassical Theory, Eds. 
Barbara Herrnstein Smith and Arkady Plotnitsky. Durham: Duke University Press, 
1997, 18. See also Vicki Kirby’s “Enumerating Language: ‘The Unreasonable 
Effectiveness of Language’” in Configurations 11.3 (2003), 417-436 for further discussion 
of the relationship between math and language and a response to Rotman’s work on the 
subject.  
3 A number of science studies scholars, particularly those indicated here, are actively 
engaged in bringing these two bodies of theory into dialogue with one another.  See, for 
example, Arkady Plotnitsky’s The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, 
Nonclassical Thought, and the “Two Cultures.”Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2002, Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement 
of Matter and Meaning. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007, Cary Wolfe’s Critical 
Environments: Postmodern Theory, and the Pragmatics of the “Outside.” Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998, Bruce Clarke’s Energy Forms: Allegory and Science 
in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001, 
Ronald Schleifer’s Modernism and Time: The Logic of Abundance in Literature, Science and 
Culture, 1880-1930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, Robert Markley’s 
Dying Planet: Mars in Science and the Imagination. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005, 
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and Elizabeth Wilson’s Psychosomatic: Feminism and The Neurological Body. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004.  
4 There is a tendency amongst humanists to overlook the fact that many of the most 
influential Western theorists and philosophers—on which contemporary theorists 
continue to draw—were students and practitioners of science. The Norton Anthology of 
Theory and Criticism, for example, begins with works by Plato and Aristotle, who 
contributed to the philosophy and practices of science, including mathematics and logic. 
The legacy of Cartesianism often overshadows Descartes’ significant contributions to 
modern mathematics, particularly his innovative application of algebra to geometry. 
Kant served as a professor of mathematics and science for fifteen years at the University 
of Königsberg, and Derrida’s exposure to mathematics as a graduate student under the 
advisement of Hyppolite helps explain his early interest in Husserl’s “Origin of 
Geometry.” More broadly, it is possible to trace the parallel developments of critical 
movements within “theory,” namely formalism and structuralism, and similar trends in 
mathematics toward questions of form and structure. Indeed, literature’s relationship to 
science has been one of the underlying concerns of 20th century theorists, from the 
formalists’ efforts to create a “science of literary study” to the poststructuralist rejection 
of science as a model for literary interpretation.  
5 Gödel’s theorems can be summarized as follows: “In any formal system adequate for 
number theory there exists an undecideable formula—that is, a formula not provable 
and whose negation is not provable…A corollary to the theorem is that the consistency 
of a formal system adequate for number theory cannot be proved within the system”; see 
Rebecca Goldstein, Incompleteness: The Proof and Paradox of Kurt Gödel. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2005, 23. Postmodern theorists have gravitated toward 
the concept of undecideability, and in many cases, have disassociated it from its 
specifically mathematical context. It is also important to remember that Gödel was a 
mathematical realist and did not necessarily see his ideas as a challenge to the 
foundation of mathematics.   
6 For example, both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry faithfully represent the 
traditional axioms of geometry. 
7 Arkady Plotnitsky considers the common epistemological concerns between 
deconstruction and nonclassical ideas in quantum mechanics.  More specifically, he 
analyzes Heisenberg’s 1929 lectures as “deconstructive” in Derrida’s sense and argues 
that Heisenberg’s critique of classical concepts are analogous to Derrida’s sense of 
“play,” his concept of différence, and the inextricable link he finds between writing and 
technology. The Knowable and the Unknowable, 226. 
8 As Derrida writes later in Writing and Difference: “Meaning must await being said or written 
in order to inhabit itself, and in order to become, by differing from itself, what it is: meaning. 
This is what Husserl teaches us to think in The Origin of Geometry” (11).  
9 The history of mathematics appears to confirm this notion; according to Carl Boyer’s 
A History of Mathematics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968, in earliest known 
concepts of number, fingers were presumed to be used to “indicate a set of two of three 
or four or five objects, the number one generally not being recognized at first as a true 
‘number’” (3). 
10 Neither Serres nor Goux, for example, are included in the Norton Anthology of Theory 
and Criticism, gen. ed. Vincent B. Leitch. New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001.  
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11 In The Parasite, Serres explains his now widely circulated concept of the ‘quasi-object’: 
“This quasi-object is not an object, but it is one nevertheless, since it is not a subject, 
since it is in the world; it is also a quasi-subject, since it marks or designates a subject 
who, without it, would not be a subject.” Serres continues, using a ball as an example: “A 
ball is not an ordinary object, for it is what it is only if a subject holds it. Over there, on 
the ground, it is nothing; it is stupid; it has no meaning, no function, no value. Ball isn’t 
played alone…Let us consider the one who holds it…The ball isn’t there for the body; 
the exact contrary is true: the body is the object of the ball; the subject moves around 
this sun.” Michel Serres, The Parasite. Trans. Lawrence R. Schehr Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982, 225-226.  
12 See Serres’ “Gnomon” in A History of Scientific Thought: Elements of A History of Science, 
eds. Michel Serres & Michel Authier. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995, 80.  
13 I refer here to mathematical objects not as physical or material entities, but 
nonetheless as the substance of which mathematics is composed—the numbers, 
equations, triangles and lines that comprise mathematical thought. Latour himself 
implicitly draws a link between math objects and quasi-objects: “Reason today has more 
in common with a cable television network than with Platonic ideas. It thus becomes 
much less difficult than it was in the past to see our laws and our constants, our 
demonstrations and our theorems, as stabilized objects that circulate widely, to be sure, 
but remain within well-laid-out metrological networks from which they are incapable of 
exiting—except through branchings, subscriptions and decodings,” We Have Never Been 
Modern, 119.  
14 See Morris Kline, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1980.   
15 Latour writes, “Where are we, then? Where do we land? As long as we keep asking 
that question, we are unmistakably in the modern world, obsessed with the construction 
of one immanence or the deconstruction of another. We still remain—to use the old 
word—within metaphysics,” We Have Never Been Modern, 128. 
16 Several scholars have begun to explore the common use of figurative devices and 
other shared practices between mathematical expression and so-called natural language. 
Paul Ernest argues that mathematics relies on rhetorical and argumentative strategies 
common to disciplines in the humanities. In particular, he asserts that the practice of 
mathematical proof is essentially dialogical in nature; a mathematician constructs an 
argument with the intention of convincing a presumed listener whose potential objections 
must be taken into account. See Paul Ernest, “The Dialogical Nature of Mathematics” in 
Mathematics, Education and Philosophy, Ed. Paul Ernest. London: The Falmer Press, 1994.  
George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez’s Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied 
Mind Brings Mathematics into Being. New York: Basic Books, 2000 consider how 
metaphor functions within math, arguing that mathematical knowledge is grasped and 
transmitted through conceptual metaphors, or through the use of concrete terms to 
conceptualize abstract concepts.  Citing mathematical metaphors such as “Numbers are 
Points on a Line,” “Numbers are Sets,” or their “Basic Metaphor of Infinity,” Lakoff and 
Núñez consider metaphor not only as a linguistic phenomenon but as a cognitive 
mechanism.  In his How Mathematicians Think: Using Ambiguity, Contradiction, and Paradox 
to Create Mathematics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, William Byers argues 
that despite the perception that mathematics is the practice by which ambiguity, 
contradiction and paradox are purged, logical inconsistencies are instead fundamental to 
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mathematical development. For example, Byers cites Euclid’s parallel postulate as an 
ambiguous statement in traditional geometry, which has given birth to modern theories of 
Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries.  Although the resolution of ambiguities and 
paradoxes are integrated into mathematics as logical advancements, Byers argues that they 
remain integral markers of the discord between our mathematical perceptions and their 
“realities.” 
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